As to Issue III,
McNEILLY, Justice,dissenting:
Because I believe that the majority, in modifying the Family Court’s alimony award, has exceeded the proper bounds of appellate review on the facts of this case, I must respectfully dissent. In my opinion, the only question before the Court below concerning alimony was whether the wife’s “cohabitation” situation (characterized factually by the Family Court as more like a roommate type relationship than a marital relationship) constituted a “real and substantial change of circumstances” under 13 Del.C. § 1519(a)(4) sufficient to warrant reduction of the prior $1,000.00 per month alimony award. It cannot be disputed that the Family Court in its written opinion delineated and considered all pertinent financial factors of both parties in an orderly and logical deductive process before concluding that the wife’s living arrangement did not warrant reduction of the alimony award. Given this thorough financial analysis, I cannot agree with the majority that the conclusion reached by the Court below was clearly erroneous and thus an abuse of discretion:
“In exercising our power of review, we have the duty to review the sufficiency of the evidence and to test the propriety of the findings below. We do not, however, ignore the findings made by the trial judge. If they are sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process, in the exercise of judicial restraint we accept them, even though independently we might have reached opposite conclusions.” Levitt v. Bouvier, Del.Supr., 287 A.2d 671, 673 (1972).
Sitting in the court of first resort, I might well have concluded that a proper alimony award in this case would be something less than $1,000. per month; however, sitting in this Court of last resort, I cannot conclude that the Family Court’s determination was “clearly wrong” and that “the doing of justice” requires modification of the award. Id. Thus, I would affirm the decision below in toto.