(dissenting.) I cannot agree with the majority opinion’s statement of Connecticut law or its characterization of the issue presented as one which turns on principles of causation.
For many years Connecticut has adhered to the common-law rule that there is no tort cause of action—not only no action in negligence—against one who furnished, whether by sale or gift, intoxicating liquor to a person who voluntarily became intoxicated and in consequence of his intoxication injured the person or property either of himself or of another. Slicer v. Quigley, 180 Conn. 252, 255, 429 A.2d 855 (1980); Nelson v. Steffens, 170 Conn. 356, 358, 365 A.2d 1174 (1976); Moore v. Bunk, 154 Conn. 644, 649, 228 A.2d 510 (1967); Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 436-37, 226 A.2d 383 (1967). The reason for the rule is that the proximate cause of the intoxication was not the furnishing of the liquor but the drinking of it by the purchaser or donee. Slicer v. Quigley, supra, 255; Nolan v. Morelli, supra, 436-37.
I am confused by the majority opinion’s agreement with the common-law doctrine that the sale or furnishing of liquor to another cannot be a proximate cause of intoxication where the plaintiff alleges negligence, but holding that the sale or furnishing may be a proximate cause of intoxication where the plaintiff alleges gross negligence, wanton and reckless conduct. How the proximate cause can shift from the drinking of the liquor by the purchaser or donee where the plaintiff alleges negligence by the seller or the furnisher, to the sale or furnishing of the liquor by the seller or donor where the plaintiff alleges gross negligence, wanton and reckless conduct escapes me. The only legal difference involved is the degree of care.
*364The proximate or “legal cause” of the plaintiff’s injuries in this case has been established by this court as a matter of law; see Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) §§42, 45; regardless of the theory upon which the plaintiff endeavors to impose tort liability. To create a common-law cause of action for gross negligence, wanton and reckless conduct in the sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages while acknowledging that there is no such action for negligent conduct in the sale or furnishing of alcoholic beverages contradicts precedent established by this court; Slicer v. Quigley, supra; Nelson v. Steffens, supra; Moore v. Bunk, supra; Nolan v. Morelli, supra;1 and fosters a theoretical distinction among degrees of negligence which “has been condemned by most writers, and, except in bailment cases, rejected at common law by nearly all courts, as a distinction Vague and impracticable in its nature, unfounded in principle,’ which adds only difficulty and confusion to the already nebulous and uncertain standards which must be given to the jury.” Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) § 34, p. 182.2 The terms wanton and reckless “apply to conduct which is still merely negligent.” Prosser, Torts (4th Ed.) § 34, p. 184.
The majority of jurisdictions with dram shop acts which have addressed this issue hold that where the act applies, the remedies provided by the legislature are exclusive because the legislature has *365preempted additional common-law remedies. Richardson v. Ansco, Inc., 75 Ill. App. 3d 731, 732, 394 N.E.2d 801 (1979), citing Cunningham v. Brown, 22 Ill. 2d 23, 174 N.E.2d 153 (1961); Holland v. Eaton, 373 Mich. 34, 39, 127 N.W.2d 892 (1964), overruled on other grounds, Lambert v. Calhoun, 394 Mich. 179, 184, 229 N.W.2d 332 (1975); exclusivity doctrine followed in Rowan v. Southland Corporation, 90 Mich. App. 61, 68-69, 282 N.W.2d 243 (1979); Blarney v. Brown, 270 N.W.2d 884, 890 (Minn. 1978); Griffin v. Sebek, 90 S.D. 692, 694, 245 N.W.2d 481 (1976), citing Kennedy v. Garrigan, 23 S.D. 265, 121 N.W. 783 (1909); annot., 78 A.L.R.3d 1199, 1202; 45 Am. Jur. 2d, Intoxicating Liquors $ 561; 48 C.J.S., Intoxicating Liquors § 430; contra Mason v. Roberts, 33 Ohio St. 2d 29, 32, 294 N.E.2d 884 (1973). Even those jurisdictions which have provided a common-law cause of action where the act does not apply have held that where the act applies its remedies are exclusive. Shasteen v. Sojka, 260 N.W.2d 48, 50 (Iowa 1977), citing Lewis v. State, 256 N.W.2d 181, 189-92 (Iowa 1977), citing Robinson v. Bognanno, 213 N.W.2d 530, 531 (Iowa 1973); McNally v. Addis, 65 Misc. 2d 204, 225, 317 N.Y.S.2d 157 (1970).
The cases cited by the majority opinion as having entertained the liability of a seller for intentional or reckless conduct are inapposite. The plaintiff in this case has not alleged an intentional tort by the defendants. As the majority concedes, when Nally v. Blandford, 291 S.W.2d 832 (Ky. 1956), was decided, Kentucky, unlike Connecticut, had no dram shop act. In addition, the action was brought by an administratrix for the wrongful death of her husband who had purchased and consumed the intoxi-*366eating beverages. Here the plaintiff’s decedent was a third party injured by the actions of another who purchased and consumed the intoxicants. The plaintiff was therefore eligible for a remedy under the dram shop act. Nolan v. Morelli, supra, 438-39. In Grasser v. Fleming, 74 Mich. App. 338, 253 N.W.2d 757 (1977), the other ease cited by the majority opinion, the plaintiff executrix, like the administratrix in Nolan v. Morelli, supra, could not state a cause of action under the dram shop act because the Michigan act, like its Connecticut counterpart, provides no right of action to the intoxicated person who injures himself. These cases, which endeavored to provide a remedy where the plaintiff otherwise had none, can hardly be considered precedent for the issue raised here, where the dram shop act applies.
By enacting the dram shop statute the legislature created an exception to the common-law rule of no tort liability for those who sell or furnish alcoholic beverages. The statute does not require the plaintiff to prove that the sale produced or contributed to the intoxication of the person to whom it was sold. Recognizing the remedial nature of the statute, this court has said that where the dram shop act applies, it will be construed liberally. Pierce v. Albanese, 144 Conn. 241, 250-51, 129 A.2d 606, appeal dismissed, 355 U.S. 15, 78 S. Ct. 36, 2 L. Ed. 2d 21 (1957). The plaintiff is not without a remedy against the defendant seller. He seeks only to expand the seller’s liability beyond the scope of the remedy provided by the legislature, supplementing it with a newly created common-law cause of action in gross negligence, wanton and reckless conduct which only involves a different degree of care. If *367the statutory limitations are inadequate, changing them is a matter for the legislature. Nelson v. Stef-fens, supra, 361; Nolan v. Morelli, supra, 438-39.
I would find no error.
In this opinion Healey, J., concurred.
In Nolan v. Morelli, 154 Conn. 432, 436, 226 A.2d 383 (1967), the plaintiff alleged both negligence and intentional wrong in the defendants’ sale of intoxicating liquor. This court applied the common-law rule on both counts without mention of any distinction based on proximate cause.
See also 2 Harper & James, Torts § 20.4, p. 1133, which states that a policy consideration in establishing proximate cause is the “need to work out rules which are feasible to administer and yield a workable degree of certainty.”