dissenting.
I.
The Scope of Coverage of the Ethics Act Is Constitutional as Applied to School Directors.
By rewriting the Ethics Act to bring within its scope those public officials the Legislature has specifically excluded, the majority has usurped the Legislature’s function. The Commonwealth Court was clearly correct in its determination that the classification of public officials which the Ethics Act employs is constitutional as applied to school directors throughout the Commonwealth, and does not violate equal protection. See Snider v. Shapp, 45 Pa.Cmwlth. 337, 405 A.2d 602 (1979) (Wilkinson, J.). Thus, I dissent.
A.
The school directors to whom the statute does not apply consist only of (1) school directors within Philadelphia, Pennsylvania’s only school district of the first class and, thus, the only district authorized by law to have appointed school directors; and (2) school directors in other school districts in the Commonwealth who are interim appointees prior to the *182next municipal election occurring more than sixty days after appointment. 24 P.S. §§ 3-301 et seq. When the classification is measured against the statute’s stated purpose to prevent conflicts of interest with the public trust, it is manifest that there exist fair and substantial differences between the school directors within and outside the statute’s scope which are relevant to the legislative objective. The exclusion of appointed uncompensated officials clearly reflects the Legislature's judgment that the financial disclosure requirements imposed upon elected officials should not also be imposed upon Philadelphia school directors, who have considerably less fiscal power than elected school directors, or upon interim appointees, who are immediately needed to fill vacancies.
In Danson v. Casey, 484 Pa. 415, 399 A.2d 360 (1979), this Court recognized that school directors in Philadelphia are uniquely situated in the performance of their duties when compared with school directors in other districts in this Commonwealth. We stated:
“Philadelphia is Pennsylvania’s only school district of the first class. See School Code, 24 P.S. § 2-201. Pursuant to statutory authority, the voters of Philadelphia have adopted a home rule school district. See Act of August 9,1963, P.L. 643, §§ 1 et seq., 53 P.S. §§ 13201 et seq.; Educational Supplement to the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter (hereinafter Charter). While boards of education of other classes of school districts must be elected, School Code 24 P.S. §§ 3-301 et seq., section 12.12-201 of the Charter authorizes appointment of Philadelphia’s school board by the Mayor of Philadelphia. See also School Code, 24 P.S. § 3-301. Because the General Assembly may delegate its legislative power to levy taxes only to elected officials, the Philadelphia School Board does not have direct power to levy local taxes. Wilson v. Philadelphia School District, 328 Pa. 225, 195 A. 90 (1937). The School District of Philadelphia is, therefore, in a unique position with regard to local taxation.”
*183Id., 484 Pa. at 422, 399 A.2d at 364. Philadelphia school directors must account to City Council each year with “a lump sum statement of anticipated receipts and expenditures for the next fiscal year and a request for authority to levy taxes to balance its budget for the year.” Philadelphia Home Rule Charter, 351 Pa.Code § 12.12-303(b). Because school directors in Philadelphia have less control over the public purse than school directors in other districts, and must obtain approval of proposed taxes and expenditures from elected officials who are themselves subject to the Ethics Act, it is entirely rational for the Legislature to exclude Philadelphia school directors from financial disclosure requirements designed to prevent conflicts of financial interests with the public trust. Whether this is a wise choice is a legislative determination, and not one for this Court. To be a valid exercise of legislative power it is sufficient that the exclusion have a fair and rational relationship in substance to the statute’s purpose.
Similarly, the temporary nature of interim appointments in school districts which elect their directors provides an inherent check on potential abuses of these offices for private gain. This, too, constitutes a fair and substantial basis for excluding these school directors from the statute. As the Supreme Court of the United States has stated, “[t]he problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require, rough accommodations . . . . ” Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70, 33 S.Ct. 441, 443, 57 L.Ed. 730 (1913). See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 25 L.Ed.2d 491 (1970).
The exclusion of appointed uncompensated officials also indicates a legislative purpose to encourage individuals to accept uncompensated appointments not only to the School Board in Philadelphia but also to myriad posts throughout this Commonwealth. The Legislature, in seeking to promote public trust in government and to prevent conflicts of interest, established a permissible scheme to further this legislative judgment. It is not this Court’s function to substitute its judgment for that of the Legislature. The Legislature *184may well have thought that qualified persons unwilling to enter the fray of electoral politics would best be encouraged to volunteer and accept appointments which offer no compensation if they were not required to comply with the detailed disclosure requirements of the Ethics Act. Thus, by excluding appointed uncompensated officials from its requirements, the act accommodates and promotes the vital goal of public participation in government.
“It is clear that ‘the Equal Protection Clause does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a problem or not attacking the problem at all.’ ” Springfield School District v. Dep’t of Education, 483 Pa. 539, 569, 397 A.2d 1154, 1170, quoting Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. at 486-87, 90 S.Ct. at 1162. “Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. Or so the legislature may think.. . . Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind.” Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 489, 75 S.Ct. 461, 465, 99 L.Ed. 563 (1955) (citations omitted). Thus, because the exclusion of appointed uncompensated officials, including Philadelphia school directors, has a reasonable, fair and substantial relation to the purposes of the legislation, the Ethics Act as enacted by the Legislature is constitutional as applied.
B.
In rewriting the Ethics Act to strike down the exclusion from the act of all appointed uncompensated public officials in this Commonwealth the majority not only usurps the Legislature’s role but also contravenes the express language of the act. Indeed, it may well be that the Legislature would not have enacted the Ethics Act at all without the exclusion which the majority strikes down.
An invalid portion of a statute may be severed only if, after severance, the statute can be executed in accordance with the legislative intent. See 1 Pa.C.S. ¡§ 1925. The majority erroneously relies upon Commonwealth v. Butler, *185458 Pa. 289, 328 A.2d 851 (1974), a case in which, unlike here, legislative intent could be easily ascertained. There, this Court held that the last sentence of 61 P.S. § 566, which prohibited minimum sentences for female offenders, was unconstitutional, yet severable from the rest of Section 566. In reaching this result the Court concluded:
“It is certain that the legislative intent to have women convicted of crime be imprisoned at Muncy (where facilities for women exist) is not ‘essentially and inseparably connected with,’ but rather is distinct and separate from the question whether those women should serve minimum sentences. Moreover, the valid part of § 566, standing alone, is easily executed in accordance with the legislative intent; this valid portion is independent and complete within itself. See Commonwealth v. Armao, 446 Pa. 325, 338, 286 A.2d 626, 632 (1972); Saulsbury v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 413 Pa. 316, 320-21, 196 A.2d 664, 666-67 (1964); Rieck-McJunkin Dairy Co. v. Milk Control Comm’n, 341 Pa. 153, 162-63, 18 A.2d 868, 871-72 (1941); Rutenberg v. Philadelphia, 329 Pa. 26, 39, 196 A. 73, 79 (1938). See generally 2 J. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction §§ 44.01-44.20 (4th ed. C. Sands 1973); 2 C. Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law § 15.35 (1969).”
Id., 458 Pa. at 303 n.22, 328 A.2d at 859 n.22.
A similarly clear statement of legislative intent cannot be found in the statute now before this Court. Unlike Butler, which involved two separate and independent statutory provisions relating to minimum sentences and prison facilities, each of which could stand without the other, here the statutory provisions are “essentially and inseparably connected.” In articulating who is to come within the requirements of the Ethics Act, the Legislature expressly stated that appointed uncompensated officials are to be treated differently than either elected officials or appointed compensated officials. Appointed uncompensated officials, unlike other public officials, are to be excluded from the act. 65 P.S. § 402. Manifestly, the majority errs in holding that, contrary to the express legislative intent, all public officials must be treated the same.
*186II. OPINION IN SUPPORT OF REVERSAL
The Mandatory Financial Disclosure Requirements Relating to Spouses Violate Due Process.
By the terms of the Ethics Act, those persons within its coverage who fail to disclose the financial interests of their spouses will be denied public office and may be subject to criminal penalties including a fine of not more than $1,000 or imprisonment for not more than one year, or both. 65 P.S. §§ 404,405, 409(b). On the record before this Court, the refusal of an office seeker’s spouse to disclose his personal financial interests denied her the opportunity to run for office, despite the fact that those interests were beyond her knowledge or control. In the case of an office holder, a similar refusal by the spouse could result in not only the loss of office but also the imposition of criminal penalties. Where disqualification from office and criminal liability result not from unwillingness, but from inability to comply with the act’s requirements, the imposition of these sanctions is fundamentally unfair and clearly violates the due process requirements of the Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania.* See Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 91 S.Ct. 668, 28 L.Ed.2d 130 (1971) (imprisonment because of inability to pay fine unconstitutional); Commonwealth v. Koczwara, 397 Pa. 575,155 A.2d 825 (1959) (imprisonment for vicarious criminal offense violates due process); Dobbs, Remedies § 2.9, at 104 (1973) (inability to comply is good defense against both criminal and civil contempt charges). See also Perillo v. Commonwealth, DPW, 476 Pa. 494, 383 A.2d 208 (1978) (Opinion in Support of Reversal, Manderino, J.) (denial of AFDC benefits because of refusal of mother’s non-applicant, non-recipient husband to encumber realty violates due process).
*187The Ethics Act not only penalizes those within its scope who fail to comply with the spousal disclosure requirements; it permits no defense. Thus, in effect, the act creates an irrebuttable presumption that a person has knowledge or control of his or her spouse’s financial interests. However, as the Supreme Court of the United States has stated, a presumption violates due process “where the inference is so strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life . . . . ” Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 468, 63 S.Ct. 1241, 1245, 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943).
This Court has made clear that the fiction that husband and wife are one entity has no place in this Commonwealth. In 1979 we held that an individual’s testimony under the Pennsylvania Dead Man’s Statute may not be excluded solely on the basis of his marital status. Estate of Gross-man, 486 Pa. 460, 406 A.2d 726 (1979). There we stated:
“Any presumption of identity of interest is based upon the same outmoded social conditions and policy as was the common law legal fiction of unity of person of husband and wife.
Modern conditions demand that courts no longer engage in the automatic and unsupported assumption that one’s pecuniary or proprietary interest is identical to that of one’s spouse.”
Id., 486 Pa. at 472-73, 406 A.2d at 732. More recently, guided by the same considerations, this Court abolished completely the defense of interspousal immunity. Hack v. Hack, 495 Pa. 300, 433 A.2d 859 (1981). See also Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 101 S.Ct. 1195, 67 L.Ed.2d 428 (1981) (unilateral right of husband to dispose of jointly owned property without wife’s consent violates equal protection); Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 100 S.Ct. 906, 63 L.Ed.2d 186 (1980) (automatic exclusion of spousal adverse testimony invalid); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972) (marital couple not independent entity but association of two individuals).
*188The presumption that an individual has knowledge or control of his spouse’s financial interests is overbroad, and bears no reasonable, fair and substantial relation to the statute’s purpose. Thus, it cannot justify mandatory disqualification from public office and criminal penalties against persons who are unable to comply with the spousal disclosure requirements. For this reason, those statutory provisions that require an individual to disclose the financial interests of his or her spouse over which he has no control must be declared unconstitutional. See 65 P.S. § 413 (sever-ability provision).
LARSEN and FLAHERTY, JJ., join in Part II of this Opinion.Appellants challenge the constitutionality of the spousal disclosure requirement on the theory that it violates the Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment, Pa.Const, art. 1, § 28. Although this theory does not have merit, the constitutional challenge is meritorious and may properly be addressed. See Yeaple v. Yeaple, 485 Pa. 399, 402 A.2d 1022 (1980).