concurring.
I concur in affirming the trial court’s judgment, as reformed, for the reasons stated by Justice Butts. With respect to appellant’s third ground of error, however, I believe further discussion is warranted.
Appellant’s third ground of error must be examined in the specific light of the statute in question and the cases upon which appellant relies, keeping in mind that the essence of the offense of burglary is the unauthorized entry into a habitation with intent to commit theft. Teniente v. State, 533 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). Young v. State, 621 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), upon which appellant relies, involved an aggravated robbery conviction which was reversed because the trial court’s charge failed to require the jury to find that the appropriation of property was without the effective consent of the owner. ■ The missing element in Young, therefore, was an essential element of the offense without which no violation of the statute could be found. The court’s statement concerning the lack of an instruction on the culpable mental state alleged in the indictment was dictum in Young, and because of the differences between the essential elements of aggravated robbery and burglary with intent to commit theft, the general principle stated as dictum in Young does not control our disposition of the case before us.
West v. State, 567 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.Cr.App.1978), also relied upon by appellant, was a criminal trespass case in which the trial court’s charge failed to require the jury to find that the accused entered the habitation intentionally or knowingly. The court held that since the criminal trespass statute does not prescribe a specific culpable mental state, the section 6.021 requirement of “intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly” should have been charged by the trial court. 567 S.W.2d at 516.
Holloway v. State, 583 S.W.2d 376 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), also relied upon by appellant, was a criminal trespass case expressly controlled by West. The opinion on the State’s motion for rehearing is helpful in understanding the significant difference between omitting an instruction on “intentionally or knowingly” entering in a criminal trespass *637case, on the one hand, and in a burglary with intent to commit theft case, on the other:
“It is entirely possible that a person may not intend to enter a habitation or know that his actions would cause him to enter a habitation (i.e., entry by mistake or accident) even if he knew that he was not welcome there.”
583 S.W.2d at 377.
In Teniente v. State, 533 S.W.2d 805 (Tex.Cr.App.1976), it was held that an indictment charging burglary of a habitation with intent to commit theft was not fundamentally defective for failure to allege that the unauthorized entry was a knowing and intentional act. The court pointed out that the conduct which constitutes the essence of burglary with intent to commit theft is the entry into the habitation with that specific intent, and that the indictment in that case, by alleging that the accused entered with intent to commit theft, alleged the culpable mental state required by the substantive statute and was not fundamentally defective. Teniente thus holds that an indictment charging an unauthorized entry “with the intent to commit theft” satisfies the requirement that a culpable mental state be charged. Applying the rationale of Ten-iente to the case before us, it follows that the trial court’s charge was not fundamentally defective for failure to instruct on “intentionally and knowingly” entering. The teaching of Teniente is that those terms are surplusage in this case, and need not be included in the court’s charge, because the substantive statute2 required the State to plead and prove, and the court to instruct upon, a more stringent standard of culpability, i.e., the specific intent to commit theft. In addition, logic dictates that an entry made “with the intent to commit theft” is not an entry made “by mistake or accident.” Cf. Holloway, supra.
. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 6.02 (Vernon 1974).
. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 30.02 (Vernon 1974).