concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I agree with my learned colleague that Mr. Dickerson may not take advantage of the discovery rule recognized by the Bond Court. His cause of action for distribution of a defective product is covered by 40 P.S. § 1009.301(a)(2). The period *350of limitations on the plaintiffs claim began to run when he was injured. The statute was not tolled until Dickerson reached the no-fault threshold. Therefore, his claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Because this issue is dispositive of the trespass claim, I believe that any further discussion concerning difficult questions of statutory interpretation is unwise and unnecessary.
Mr. Dickerson’s claim for breach of warranty may likewise be disposed of in a more restrictive manner. It is unnecessary for us to determine whether a “lease” constitutes a “sale” under the Pennsylvania version of the Uniform Commercial Code. On appeal, Dickerson has argued that he is a third party beneficiary of the warranties given by Keenan to Brind. However, as my colleague aptly notes, any warranty which might exist binds only Keenan, the seller, not Brind, the buyer. Because this appeal is from Brind’s motion for summary judgment, any discussion of Keenan’s liability is irrelevant dicta. Therefore, we have no call to reach the novel issue as to whether a lease is equivalent to a sale in Pennsylvania under the warranty provisions of the U.C.C.
Accordingly, I concur in the result.