concurring.
I agree with the majority that the State’s motion for rehearing should be granted and *150appellant’s conviction should be affirmed. I further concur with the majority’s analysis and disposition of all of the issues presented, with the exception of one issue. I write separately because I believe that the Court misconstrues the law of third party consent. I concur in the disposition of this cause, however, because I believe that there was no harm resulting from the admission of the illegally obtained evidence.
I was not a member of this Court when it issued the opinion on original submission. See page 125. That opinion held that the search of appellant’s Peterbilt truck was illegal and reversed the conviction because the Court could not determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the error made no contribution to the conviction. See Tex. R.App.Pro. Rule 81(b)(2). After reviewing the record, I am convinced that the error attendant to the illegal search was harmless.
I.
The opinion on original submission set forth twenty-six pieces of evidence admitted at trial which were derived from the illegal search, 135-136, and concluded the admission of such evidence contributed to the conviction. Id., at 137. I disagree. I believe that the Court fell into error when it assessed the volume of the tainted evidence, instead of looking to the effect of the tainted evidence adduced at trial, as required by Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568, 588 (Tex.Cr.App.1989) (analysis for determining whether error was harmless).
Appellant’s guilt was conclusively established through “non-tainted” evidence. Appellant’s initial connection to this crime was established through the information provided by John and Milagros Wertz. They saw the deceased board appellant’s truck, and they provided information which ultimately allowed the authorities to locate appellant and his truck. Their testimony was in no way “tainted” by the State’s misuse of the Grand Jury attachment to seize appellant. Additionally, it is undisputed that appellant’s fingerprints were found on pieces of duct tape which bound the deceased’s naked body. Her nude body was found secreted in an area several miles outside Amarillo, bound in a “hog-tied” fashion and gagged. She had been beaten about the head and face with some sort of blunt instrument; she had been strangled. Appellant’s fingerprints were located on the adhesive side of the duct tape which was wrapped around deceased’s face and head, and also on pieces which bound her hands and connected her hands to her bound feet. This compelling evidence is also unrelated to the State’s improprieties. Id., 790 S.W.2d at 588 (overwhelming evidence can be a factor to be considered in a harmless error analysis).
While the “tainted” evidence admitted at trial is voluminous, I believe that its admission would not affect an average rational juror. In short, I believe that appellant’s trial was an “essentially fair one,” and that the tainted evidence was not of such a magnitude that it “disrupted the juror’s orderly evaluation of the evidence.” Ibid. Therefore, I would conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous admission made no contribution to the conviction. Id.; Tex.R.App.Pro. Rule 81(b)(2). Accordingly, I would affirm appellant’s conviction.
II.
However, I believe the majority errs in its analysis of third party consent. Under the facts of this case, the owner of the truck, Jewett Scott, could not give effective third party consent. In U.S. v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 94 S.Ct. 988, 39 L.Ed.2d 242 (1974), the Supreme Court articulated the test for validity of third party consent where the police obtained consent to search a bedroom from a woman who occupied that room as the defendant’s cohabitant. The Court upheld the validity of the war-rantless search on the theory of third party consent where the third party “possessed common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected.” Id. 415 U.S. at 172, 94 S.Ct. at 993.
The Supreme Court concentrated on the “common authority” the third party held. “Common authority is, of course, not to be *151implied from the mere property interest a third party has in the property.” Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7. Property interest is insufficient to establish justification for third party consent as Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 81 S.Ct. 776, 5 L.Ed.2d 828 (1961) (lessor’s consent not generally good against lessee), and Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 84 S.Ct. 889, 11 L.Ed.2d 856 (1964) (hotel clerk’s consent not normally effective against registered occupant), had so held. Property interest is unnecessary to the determination because such authority could be inferred from “mutual use of the property by persons generally having joint access or control for most purposes ...” Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7. The requisite conclusions about common authority, to be drawn from the facts of mutual usage, were said to be that the third party had “the right to permit the inspection in his own right and that the others [had] assumed the risk that one of their number might permit the common area to be searched.” Id.
In Illinois v. Rodriguez, — U.S. —, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990), the Supreme Court held that the third party from whom police obtained consent to search the defendant’s apartment did not have common authority or control of the apartment. The defendant’s girlfriend, visibly battered and bruised, informed the police that the defendant was responsible for her injuries. She told police that she knew where the defendant could be found. She possessed a key to the defendant’s apartment and referred to the apartment as “our apartment.” When the police entered the apartment with the woman’s key, they found narcotics in plain view.
The Supreme Court concluded that there was insufficient common authority or control to effectively give third party consent. The record established that while the woman had once lived in the apartment, she no longer lived there. She only occasionally spent the night at the apartment and had previously moved most of her belongings out of the apartment. It is unclear whether the defendant even knew that the woman still had a key to the apartment. The Court held, however, that while the woman did not have the common authority or control to give the consent, the police might have reasonably believed that she did. Rodriguez, — U.S. at —, 110 S.Ct. at 2801. Accordingly, the Supreme Court remanded the cause to the Court of Appeals.1
The majority opinion suggests that the reasoning of Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), and U.S. v. Carter, 569 F.2d 801 (4th Cir.1977), should control the disposition of the case at bar. However, these cases are factually distinct from the instant cause.
This Court addressed whether a defendant’s supervisor could validly give consent to search a vehicle used by an employee in Sharp, 707 S.W.2d 611. The defendant, a drilling rig worker, was a suspect in the capital murders of a woman and her daughter. He was arrested pursuant to an arrest warrant, and the truck which he was driving at the time of arrest, his employer’s truck, was searched pursuant to consent given by his supervisor. The opinion does not suggest what, if any, evidence was seized from the truck. It states that the supervisor had unconditional authority to assign or reassign trucks to all the tool pushers under his supervision, one of whom was the defendant. The Court summarily concluded, “We find the degree of control exhibited by [the defendant’s] supervisor sufficient enough to establish a valid consent, dispensing then with the requirement of a search warrant.” Id., 707 S.W.2d at 617.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit addressed a similar situation where a defendant’s truck, assigned for work related purposes only, was searched pursuant to consent given by the defendant’s boss, *152the owner of the truck. Carter, 569 F.2d 801. The Court concluded that the owner could give consent to search, noting that while the defendant was permitted to drive the truck to and from work, its use was not authorized for any purpose unconnected with the business. Id. 569 F.2d at 804. “Moreover, [the owner] at his caprice, could reassign the van to another employee.” Ibid.
The record in the case at bar reflects that the owner of the truck, Jewett Scott, did not possess “common authority over or other sufficient relationship” to the truck. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171, 94 S.Ct. at 993. The record indicates that the truck, used for hauling large quantities of products, was under appellant’s exclusive control during his interstate travels. At the time of the offense, Scott Truck Line operated approximately forty trucks, nationwide, from its headquarters in Mangum, Oklahoma. Under appellant’s contract with Scott Truck Line, appellant was paid according to a percentage basis of the gross revenue that the truck generated. Appellant’s assigned routes, consisting of several hundred miles, took days to complete. The truck which appellant drove was equipped with a “sleeper,” which a Scott Truck Line employee described as a place of “security” for the driver, and as the “driver’s home away from home.” Apparently, when appellant was out on the road but between assignments, he was still in exclusive control of the truck and could use the sleeper for a place to sleep.2
A “mere property interest” is neither sufficient nor necessary to the determination of “common authority,” Matlock, 415 U.S. at 171 n. 7, 94 S.Ct. at 993 n. 7. Jewett Scott’s ownership of the truck is not dispositive of the issue of whether he could give effect third party consent. As we reiterated recently in Moberg v. State, 810 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Cr.App.1991), a guest in a hotel or motel does not lose his expectation of privacy in the rented premises until the rental or occupancy period has terminated.
Appellant, having contracted to drive this large truck, equipped with a sleeper, for hundreds of miles and through several states, including the expanse of Texas, could not be said to have “assumed the risk” that the owner, in Oklahoma, might permit the truck to be searched in Texas. Under these circumstances, Jewett Scott, the owner of the truck line, did not possess common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the truck to give effective third party consent. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 172, 94 S.Ct. at 993. Contrary to the majority’s assertions, Sharp, 707 S.W.2d 611, and Carter, 569 F.2d 801, are neither dis-positive nor persuasive authority for determining third party consent in this cause.
For the reasons set forth herein, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
OVERSTREET and MALONEY, JJ., join this opinion.. Other cases have upheld the common authority or control where a defendant’s spouse has given consent to search a vehicle, Swinney v. State, 529 S.W.2d 70 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); U.S. v. Baldwin, 644 F.2d 381 (5th Cir.1981), and where a defendant’s parent, who has control of house where defendant lives, gives consent to search defendant’s bedroom. Williams v. State, 668 S.W.2d 692 (Tex.Cr.App.1983).
. Appellant delivered a load from Duke, Oklahoma to San Antonio, Texas. His route ended in San Antonio on Friday, October 11, 1985.
His new route began on Monday, October 13, when appellant picked up a load in Diboll, Texas for delivery in Canon City, Colorado.