OPINION ON APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
ODOM, Judge.This is an appeal from a revocation of probation. After conviction for possession of marihuana in 1971, punishment was assessed at ten years and appellant was placed on probation.
Appellant contends the trial court abused its discretion and denied him due process of law when it revoked his probation on August 8, 1977, without any evidence of a violation of probation. The trial court revoked appellant’s probation on August 8, 1977, on the basis of appellant’s plea of true entered at a hearing on May 12, 1977, to a. *827motion to revoke probation that had been filed on February 12, 1977. On original submission it was held no abuse of discretion was shown. In his motion for rehearing appellant relies on Wallace v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 575 S.W.2d 512. We agree that Wallace is more closely on point than the cases relied on in our prior opinion and grant appellant’s motion for rehearing and set aside the revocation of probation.
In Wallace v. State, supra, the court, after a June 10 hearing on a motion to revoke the defendant’s probation, ordered the probation revoked but deferred sentencing, announcing, “ . . .1 will not impose sentence at this time. I will delay that action until some further date. I hope that I don’t have to take that action.” About two months later the defendant’s conditions of probation were modified. The following December the State filed a motion requesting sentencing and in January the trial court revoked the defendant’s probation on the basis of the June 10 hearing. On appeal this Court held:
“It is clear from the statute that upon a revocation hearing the discretion to either continue, modify or revoke rests in the discretion of the trial judge. Wise v. State, 477 S.W.2d 578 (Tex.Cr.App.1972); Soliz v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 376, 350 S.W.2d 566 (1961); Gossett v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 52, 282 S.W.2d 59 (1955). If, however, probation is revoked, the trial judge is to proceed as if there had been no probation.
“What did the trial judge do here? Did he continue the appellant on probation or did he revoke probation on June 10, 1977? He orally stated he was revoking probation, but he entered no written revocation at the time and did not impose sentence. In fact, he stated to the appellant that he hoped he didn’t have to take that action. The docket sheet then reflects the appellant was ordered to serve four months in county jail. .
“ . . .on August 17, 1977, the appellant’s conditions of probation were modified and he was released subject to such conditions. He was not sentenced, and appellant’s case was not disposed of as if there had been no probation. In effect what the court did was to continue the appellant on probation.”
In this case, likewise, the effect of what the trial court did after the May 12, 1977, hearing at which appellant pled true to the State’s motion to revoke, was to continue appellant on probation with modified conditions. The record shows that after the May 12 hearing the trial court issued a second amended probation order imposing additional conditions of probation on appellant. He was not sentenced and his case was not disposed of as if there had been no probation. Article 42.12, Sec. 8(a), V.A.C.C.P., provides in controlling part:
“If the defendant has not been released on bail, on motion by the defendant the court shall cause the defendant to be brought before it for a hearing within 20 days of filing of said motion, and after a hearing without a jury, may either continue, modify or revoke the probation. The court may continue the hearing for good cause shown by either the defendant or the state. If probation is revoked, the court may proceed to dispose of the case as if there had been no probation . . .”
(Emphasis added.)
The record in this case, as in Wallace v. State, supra, clearly shows that the trial court continued appellant on modified probation and did not revoke the probation after a violation of the conditions of probation was shown at the earlier hearing. Cf. Wester v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 542 S.W.2d 403. The court having exercised its authority at that earlier hearing by modifying the terms of probation instead of revoking probation, it was clearly without authority to change that disposition at a subsequent hearing at which no further violation of probation was shown. While the court could have continued the hearing and delayed exercise of its discretion to continue, modify or revoke the probation, as was done in Traylor v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 561 S.W.2d 492, and apparently in Sappington v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 508 S.W.2d 840, that option is not what occurred in this case. The trial court’s revocation of appellant’s probation on August 8 was an abuse of discretion.
*828The motion for rehearing is granted, the order revoking probation is set aside, and the cause is remanded.