dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Because Edmund Olszewski (Claimant) presented uncontroverted, unequivocal testimony that he had an employment contract providing for his use of a company vehicle as transportation to and from work, thereby placing Claimant under the first exception to the “coming and going” rule, I believe that Claimant’s injury occurred within the course and scope of his employment.
In reaching a contrary result, the majority maintains that Claimant did not meet his burden of proof because Claimant did not produce a written contract nor provide unequivocal testimony that there was a provision in his contract for transportation to and from work. (Majority Op. at 525.) I admit that this would be an easier case if Claimant either had *529offered a written employment contract into evidence or had testified with more conviction regarding the contract’s form. However, I do not believe these failings are necessarily fatal, and they should not automatically preclude Claimant from prevailing here. Indeed, after considering Claimant’s uncontroverted testimony concerning his employment contract in its entirety,11 am convinced that he has satisfied the first exception to the “going and coming” rule.
In assessing the sufficiency of Claimant’s testimony, the majority failed to consider Claimant’s uncontroverted testimony in its entirety, focusing instead on only one word and, as a result, misrepresenting Claimant’s testimony. The majority states: “Claimant indicated he ‘believed ’ that he had a written contract and that this contract provided for transportation.” (Majority Op. at 525) (emphasis added). However, as a summation of Claimant’s testimony, this statement is defective.
Claimant testified that he “believed” that there was a written contract. Claimant then asserted positively that there was an employment contract which included a provision for transportation to and from work. Claimant’s testimony, in context, is as follows:
A. As a condition of employment part of the compensation package was to drive a brand new vehicle [provided by Employer].
*530(R.R. at 8a-9a.)2
Q. Were you driving the car that was provided to you by Royal Chevrolet [at the time of the accident]?
A. Yes, I was.
Q. Did other salesmen also drive cars from Royal?
A. Every salesman there drove a car.
Q. And you have a written employment contract?
A. I believe I do, yeah.
Q. And is that part of the provisions of the contract? A. Yes ma’m, it is.
(R.R. at 9a-10a) (emphasis added).3
The first exception to the “coming and going” rule does not require that the employment contract be written.4 Indeed, in *531Hastings v. Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Ins. Co., 407 Pa. Superior Ct. 282, 595 A.2d 1150 (1991), appeal denied sub nom, Pennsylvania National Mutual Casualty Ins. Co. v. Ford, 530 Pa. 645, 607 A.2d 255 (1992), cited by the majority5 and relied upon by the Board, the Superior Court assumed that the employment contract of a car salesperson was oral because no allegations had been made to the contrary and because no document purporting to be an employment contract had been produced. However, despite the fact that the contract was not in written form, the court, in Hastings, determined that the car dealership might still have been contractually obligated to provide the car to its salesperson, thereby placing the sales employee within the course and scope of his employment when injured.
Here, Claimant’s uncertainty as to whether his employment contract had been put into writing does not make his testimony equivocal with regard to the contract’s existence. Claimant maintained unequivocally that there was an employment contract with a provision for transportation to and from work. Once a claimant has established that transportation to and from work is one of the terms of his employment contract, the claimant has met his burden to prove that he is entitled to benefits under The Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act.6 Empire Kosher Poultry v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Zafran), 154 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 276, 623 A.2d 887 (1993), appeal denied, 536 Pa. 648, 639 A.2d 34 (1994). However, in spite of his testimony, Claimant did not prevail before the referee.
*532Where, as here, the party with the burden of proof is the only party to present evidence before the referee, and yet that party does not prevail, we must first examine the record to determine whether that party, as a matter of law, has met his burden. Kirkwood v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 106 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 92, 525 A.2d 841 (1987). As stated, I believe that Claimant, through his uncontroverted, unequivocal testimony, has presented sufficient competent evidence that, if believed, would support a finding that Claimant had an employment contract that provided transportation to and from work and, thus, was injured within the course and scope of his employment.
Although the referee made no specific credibility determination, a fair reading of the referee’s opinion indicates that the referee considered and accepted Claimant’s testimony but determined from that testimony that Claimant was not injured in the course and scope of employment because (1) the provision of a company car for transportation to and from work was merely a supplemental employee benefit rather than a contract provision and (2) Claimant was not using the vehicle for business purposes when he was injured. In this, the referee erred.
Whether or not Claimant’s driving of a supplied vehicle was a supplemental benefit of employment does not affect its status as a contract provision requiring that Claimant drive that vehicle at all times, including to and from work. Indeed, one would expect to find employee benefits defined in an employment contract. Moreover, contrary to the view espoused by the referee, Claimant does not have to prove that his injury occurred while in furtherance of the employer’s business. William F. Rittner Co. v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Rittner), 76 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 596, 464 A.2d 675 (1983).7
*533Where the party with the burden of proof is the only party to present evidence, and that party, though credible, does not prevail before the referee because of an error of law, we will reverse. Kirkwood. I believe that that is what occurred here and, accordingly, I would reverse and remand for further proceedings on the remaining issues.8
. I disagree with the majority's assertion that "Claimant had ample opportunity to present evidence regarding his employment contract at the referee’s hearing." (Majority Op. at 526, n. 4.) In fact, I believe that it is particularly important to view all of Claimant’s existing testimony because his opportunity to present this evidence was curtailed prematurely. The record indicates that while Claimant's counsel was eliciting testimony from Claimant about the terms and conditions of the contract, the referee interrupted the examination and stated:
We’ll assume that the automobile is owned, primarily maintained by the employer and that this claimant received the automobile as a supplemental benefit for his job to (a) help him sell automobiles and help the employer and (b), for his own personal use. Okay?
(R.R. at 18a-19a.) Claimant's counsel acquiesced and ended her examination. Thus, the referee prevented Claimant from providing additional testimony on the employment contract issue.
. The arrangement required Claimant "to keep the car clean and presentable at all times” in order to help Employer sell automobiles. (R.R. at 18a-19a.) As Claimant further testified:
Q. Mr. Olszewski, when you were driving the car, were there any specific rules or regulations that you had to adhere to?
A. Yeah, I put the gas in the car and I had to keep the car clean and presentable at all times.
Q. Who paid the insurance and all the maintenance on the car?
A. The dealership.
(R.R. at 18a.)
. Opposing counsel never even addressed the employment contract issue during cross-examination of Claimant. In fact, Employer did not present any testimony or evidence in this case.
In light of Claimant's testimony set forth here, I am at a loss to understand that portion of the Board's decision that states:
Although Claimant testified that a written employment contract was entered into between him and Defendant, he did not provide any testimony or evidence that there was a specific, provision for Defendant to provide transportation to and from work.
(R.R. at A-9.) Quite the contrary, Claimant’s testimony clearly shows that his employment contract contained a provision requiring that salespersons drive cars (a means of transportation) provided by Employer.
. The "coming and going” rule states that injuries received by an employee while travelling to and from work are not compensable. Peer v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (B & W Construction), 94 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 540, 503 A.2d 1096 (1986). However, injuries sustained by an employee while coming and going to work are compensable if one of the following exceptions applies:
*531(1) the employment contract included transportation to and from work;
(2) the claimant has no fixed place of work;
(3) the claimant is on special assignment for the employer; or
(4) special circumstances are such that the claimant was furthering the business of the employer.
SEPTA v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Scott), 136 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 98, 101, 582 A.2d 421, 422 (1990) appeal denied, 527 Pa. 658, 593 A.2d 428 (1991) (emphasis added).
. The majority cites Hastings in regard to the fourth exception to the “coming and going” rule.” I would not reach this issue.
. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1031.
. Even if Claimant had to prove that he was using the company car in furtherance of Employer’s business, I believe that Claimant met that burden. The testimony reveals that Claimant was required to keep the car clean and presentable in order to promote customer interest and help Employer sell automobiles. (R.R. at 18a~19a.) Thus, whenever Claimant drove the car, it was in furtherance of Employer’s business.
. Having reached this result, I would not address Claimant’s second argument; i.e., that his injury occurred within the course and scope of employment because he was injured on the premises of Employer.