dissenting.
I dissent because I believe plaintiffs failed to adequately controvert Murillo’s good faith affidavit, utilizing the test set out in City of Lancaster v. Chambers, 883 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.1994). Therefore, Murillo is entitled to a summary judgment upholding his official immunity defense.
Murillo has met his summary judgment burden of proving his affirmative defense of official immunity. The first two elements of the defense are either uncontested (Murillo was acting within scope of authority) or have been satisfied by judicial determination (Murillo’s acts were discretionary). The remaining element (good faith) has been proved by the showing that a reasonably prudent traffic engineer might have believed that Murillo’s actions were reasonable under the circumstances.
*693Plaintiffs can defeat Murillo’s summary judgment motion only if they are able to successfully controvert Murillo’s good faith proof; they must show that no reasonable traffic engineer in Murillo’s position would have failed to place traffic control devices at the subject intersection. City of Lancaster, 883 S.W.2d at 657.
Good Faith
Murillo is a highly qualified traffic engineer. He earned an electrical engineering degree from Southern Methodist University in 1983, and then held the position of Traffic Engineering Assistant for the City of Dallas from October 1983 until July 1990, at which time he was hired by the City of Laredo.
As Laredo City Traffic Engineer, Murillo is responsible for conducting and supervising traffic studies, including traffic counts and speed surveys; participating in research relating to traffic accident prevention, signalization needs, traffic counts, and speed studies; analyzing accident patterns at various locations and preparing reports detailing specific recommendations for improvement; reviewing preliminary and final plans concerning traffic operations, signing, signals, and pavement markings; and developing signal timing optimization plans for traffic signals along heavily travelled arteries to minimize vehicle stops and reduce intersection delays.
In carrying out these responsibilities, Murillo monitors various intersections around the city, including the subject intersection, for traffic and pedestrian traffic flow, and has acted to improve the intersections when circumstances dictated.
The subject intersection, Scott and Agus-tín, is one block away from the fully controlled intersection at San Bernardo. Two years before the accident in question, studies by the traffic engineer’s office led to the synchronization of the traffic signals along Scott Street and the signal cycles were increased from 50 seconds to 70 seconds to help relieve traffic congestion. Low pedestrian counts at the intersection indicated no need for a signal device at that intersection, particularly since there was a controlled intersection one block away.1
Murillo’s discretionary duties included “striking a balance” between his engineering judgments and the finite resources available to the City for traffic engineering improvements. He was unaware of any legal interpretation of the Laredo Code that he was under a mandatory duty to provide “traffic control devices” on “heavily travelled” roadways.
In his summary judgment proof, Murillo offered the affidavit of Joe Nix, an independent expert, who reviewed the conditions existing at the intersection shortly after the accident. Nix determined that a reasonable traffic engineer could conclude that no traffic control improvements were necessary at the intersection.
Based on the above summary judgment evidence, it can be concluded as a matter of law that Murillo met his burden of establishing his good faith when exercising his discretionary duties within the course of his authority.
The Controverting Affidavit
At issue, then, is whether the nonmovant-plaintiffs have overcome the immunity defense by negating one of its elements, in this case the good faith element. Plaintiffs attempt to do this through the affidavits of their traffic expert, David Steitle.
When reviewing the controverting proof, it should be kept in mind that it is not enough for plaintiffs to prove by summary judgment evidence merely that some other traffic engineer would have placed traffic control devices at the intersection (a subjective standard); plaintiffs are required to establish that no reasonable traffic engineer would have failed to erect traffic control devices at the intersection (an objective standard). City of Lancaster, 883 S.W.2d at 657.
*694In Ms first affidavit, dated March 4, 1994, expert Steitle gave his opimon that the Texas Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices and the Laredo Code “governed and defined” the duties of the City and its employees. He further expressed his opinion that the Code and Manual created mandatory duties on the City wMeh were not complied with, specifically as to traffic control studies and in erecting traffic control devices on designated “heavily travelled” streets. The failure to perform the mandatory duties, he said, was negligence wMeh proximately resulted in the death of decedent. It should be noted that tMs first affidavit makes no reference to the good or bad faith conduct of Murillo; at best it makes a prima facie negligence case against Murillo, wMeh does not pierce the official immumty sMeld.
As to the mandatory nature of the Code and Manual, our opimon in Murillo v. Garza, 881 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1994, no writ) (“Murillo I ”) held that Murillo’s duties in tMs case were discretionary. The mandatory character of the language in the Code thus did not affect the discretionary nature of Murillo’s duties as traffic engineer. To the extent Steitle’s affidavit is based on an erroneous understanding of the law, it should be disregarded.
Steitle’s supplemental affidavit, dated August 26, 1994, was clearly intended to meet the more difficult burden of overcoming the good faith element of official immumty that was announced in City of Lancaster in June 1994. Relying solely on the underlying factual basis set out in Ms first affidavit, Steitle offers only conclusory statements tracking the City of Lancaster language, while tailoring Ms statements to the facts of tMs case. He stated:
... A reasonably prudent traffic engineer ... could not have believed that there was no need to take appropriate action to ... remedy the ... traffic problems existing at Scott and San Agustín.... The failure to take such corrective action ... did not outweigh the clear risks of harm to the decedent ... by leaving the subject intersection without ... corrective action and in failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of the Laredo Code as it relates to the installation of ... traffic control devices....
It is not sufficient to simply file a concluso-ry statement echoing the language of the Supreme Court test. There must be a valid basis for the statements made in the affidavit. Mercer v. Daoran Corp., 676 S.W.2d 580, 583 (Tex.1984). Here, Steitle’s essential contention that in every case a reasonable traffic engineer would have taken corrective action at the intersection must be based on some extraordinary duty imposed on the traffic engineer to do so. The criticism of Murillo’s conduct must be based on some set of circumstances that are so compelling that they dictate a certain course of conduct by any reasonable traffic engineer. That his failure to take action constituted negligence simply does not rise to such a compelling level.
Thus, an inquiry must be made to determine the origins of the asserted “extraordinary” duty in tMs case. In Steitle’s affidavits, other than the mere allegations of negligence, the oMy indicated basis for his conclusion that Murillo failed to act in good faith is that the Laredo Code imposed a mandatory duty on the traffic engineer. The supplemental affidavit also makes reference to tMs “mandatory” duty. But as previously noted, Murillo I rejected the contention that the Laredo Code created a mandatory duty on the traffic engineer in this context. Murillo I, 881 S.W.2d at 201.
The circumstances described by Steitle are not so compelling that Murillo’s conduct falls short of the objective good faith standard announced in City of Lancaster. There, the Supreme Court set up a standard of objective legal reasonableness in determining good faith — in tMs case, whether a reasonably prudent traffic engineer “could have believed” that his actions were appropriate. The test is said to be analogous to the abuse of discretion standard of review in appellate courts: an abuse of discretion is shown only if the trial court could not have reasonably reached the decision in question. City of Lancaster, 883 S.W.2d at 657, n. 7. The test does not mean that the traffic engineer must prove that it would have been unreasonable to take corrective action; nor does it mean that the *695engineer must prove that all reasonably prudent traffic engineers would have done what he did. If another traffic engineer of reasonable competence could disagree on the issue, the immunity should be recognized. See Id., at 657. In reviewing Murillo’s actions in light of this authority, it cannot be said that he could not have reasonably reached the decision to not install traffic control devices at the subject intersection.
The Supreme Court, in announcing the rule in City of Lancaster, clearly intended to make it more difficult to overcome an official immunity defense asserted by a government employee acting within the scope of his responsibilities. The new test originates from federal immunity law and, in drawing on federal authorities to describe the extent of the intended immunity protection, the court stated: “[Official] immunity protects ‘all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’ ” Id. at 656. (quoting Swint v. City of Wadley, 5 F.3d 1435, 1441-2 (11th Cir.1993), modified, 11 F.3d 1030 (11th Cir.1994), and cert. granted sub nom., Swint v. Chambers County Comm’n, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2671, 129 L.Ed.2d 808 (1994). Murillo is a highly qualified traffic engineer and is not plainly incompetent. And there is no evidence that he knowingly violated the law in this case. Accordingly, Murillo’s immunity defense should be recognized and given effect.
I would reverse the trial court’s order overruling appellant’s motion for summary judgment and would render judgment that plaintiffs take nothing from appellant.
. The David Steitle affidavit offered by appellants to controvert the good faith issue asserts that in 1988 a Laredo City Councilman requested a traffic study of the subject intersection, but that there was no record of the study ever being done. It would appear, however, that a review of the intersection was done in connection with the Scott Street traffic. The work on light synchronization and increased light cycle times was completed in 1990.