concurring.
I join the Concurring Opinion authored by Mr. Justice Montemuro. I write separately for three reasons.
*406First, I would endorse the reasoning of the learned Superior Court that it possesses no appellate jurisdiction to review an interlocutory order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County by virtue of 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 742, 932 and 1123.
Second, in my opinion, the decision herein implicates an important question of waiver that should be addressed in order to protect Appellant’s constitutional rights. Significantly, an order suppressing physical evidence against Appellant was entered by the Philadelphia Municipal Court, and reversed on appeal by the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Appellant’s subsequent appeal to the Superior Court was quashed based upon a lack of jurisdiction. Since we have affirmed the decision of the Superior Court, this matter will now be returned to the Philadelphia Municipal Court for trial on the merits. At that trial, the Commonwealth will be permitted to introduce physical evidence obtained from a search of Appellant that was arguably conducted without reasonable suspicion or probable cause. If convicted, Appellant will be entitled to appeal for a trial de novo in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. However, this trial is not de novo in the traditional sense. During this de novo trial, Appellant will be precluded from re-litigating the suppression claims previously decided by the Philadelphia Municipal Court and affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas, since this form of “de novo trial” has been held to not include pre-trial matters. Commonwealth v. Harmon, 469 Pa. 490, 366 A.2d 895 (1976).
Given this form of limited “de novo trial” by the Court of Common Pleas, I am concerned that Appellant’s suppression claims will not be preserved for review by the Superior Court should the de novo proceedings also culminate with a conviction. In my opinion, the ruling of this Court now makes it incumbent upon Appellant to take affirmative action to preserve his suppression claims during the de novo trial before the Court of Common Pleas. Otherwise, they may be deemed waived by the Superior Court, since by general definition a de novo proceeding is conductéd as if the matter has not been heard before and as if no decision has been previously ren*407dered. Thus, I believe that during this form of limited de novo proceeding Appellant must at least raise, or attempt to re-litigate, his suppression claims and incorporate the relevant portions of the record created by the Philadelphia Municipal Court. In so doing, Appellant will ensure that his suppression claims will be sufficiently preserved should the Superior Court be called upon to review a conviction arising from the de novo trial.
Third, in rendering its decision, the Majority has for some reason deemed it desirable to reference a “general rule” that all motions to suppress evidence must be presented in writing, irrespective of the fact that such was not at issue in the case. While it is advisable to file suppression motions in writing, it is my experience that under certain circumstances there is insufficient time in which to do so. A hard and fast rule preventing such emergency oral motions to suppress could conceivably serve only to harm, without adequate basis, the rights guaranteed to an accused by the Constitutions of the United States and this Commonwealth. I agree that the relaxed requirement in the Philadelphia Municipal Court has fostered confusion on this question in other jurisdictions, since Pa.R.Crim.P. 323 governing suppression of evidence contains no specific requirement that such motions must be in writing. However, if this Court is going to address the issue, it should be decided completely, and in a manner that would achieve consistency in practice before all jurisdictions. Therefore, I expressly disassociate myself from this portion of the Majority Opinion.