concurring.
I agree with the conclusion reached by the Majority in this case. However, I write separately to express my views on the extent to which our opinion in Commonwealth v. Baker, 518 Pa. 145, 541 A.2d 1381 (1988), should be overruled.
Petitioner relies on the following language in Baker to support his assertion that he is entitled to appeal to the Superior Court as a matter of right:
We find no merit in the Commonwealth’s contention that an appeal taken from an appellate reversal of a suppression *408order is interlocutory and that the instant appeal should therefore be quashed. Appeals taken by defendants following appellate reversals of orders suppressing evidence are clearly cognizable by this Court.
Baker, 518 Pa. at 146 n. 1, 541 A.2d at 1382 n. 1 (citations omitted).
In Baker, the Court of Common Pleas suppressed certain evidence seized in a search of the appellant’s vehicle. The Commonwealth appealed to the Superior Court which reversed the suppression order. The appellant appealed to this Court and we granted allocatur on the question of whether a revolver seized from under the seat of appellant’s automobile was properly admissible in a search made without a warrant. The Commonwealth argued that the appeal to this Court should be quashed as interlocutory. In the above-quoted footnote we rejected the Commonwealth’s contention that appellate orders suppressing evidence were not cognizable by this Court. I believe that this footnote did no more than reassert our longstanding authority to review appellate reversals of orders suppressing evidence where they present “special” or “important” reasons for such review. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lopez, 525 Pa. 185, 579 A.2d 854 (1990) (review of Superior Court reversal of trial court order granting suppression motion); Commonwealth v. Melilli, 521 Pa. 405, 555 A.2d 1254 (1987) (same); Commonwealth v. Robinson, 518 Pa. 156, 541 A.2d 1387 (1988) (same); Commonwealth v. Carlisle, 517 Pa. 36, 534 A.2d 469 (1987) (same); Commonwealth v. Hamlin, 503 Pa. 210, 469 A.2d 137 (1983) (same). I do not believe that Baker should be overruled so as to suggest that all appellate reversals of suppression orders are interlocutory, thus precluding this Court from its longstanding practice of reviewing such orders where special or important reasons are presented.
I write to express my view that Baker should be overruled in a more limited manner. The instant case comes to us in a different form than Baker and the cases cited above. This case was not brought in the court of common pleas, *409appealed to the Superior Court by the Commonwealth, and then granted allocatur by this Court. Instead, this case was brought in Municipal Court, appealed to the court of common pleas sitting as an appellate court by the Commonwealth, and then appealed to the Superior Court by the appellant. I agree with the Majority that Baker should be overruled to the extent that the above-quoted language in Baker suggests that appellate reversals of suppression orders are not interlocutory and appealable as a matter of right to the Superior Court in cases such as this. However, I would carefully limit our holding to this point. Although I agree with the Petitioner that the language in this footnote is facially applicable to the case at bar, I reiterate my belief that this language in Baker did no more than preserve our authority to review appellate reversals of suppression orders where they presented special or important reasons for our consideration. I do not believe that our intent was to make all such appellate reversals appealable as a matter of right to the Superior Court in the instant context. Thus, I agree with the Majority’s conclusion that appellate reversals of suppression orders are interlocutory in this instance and not appealable to the Superior Court as a matter of right.
As with cases that originate in the Commonwealth Court and are granted discretionary appeal to this Court, defendants whose cases originate in the Municipal Court have an avenue for discretionary appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1311 allows a party to appeal an interlocutory order to the Superior Court by permission by filing a Petition for Permission to Appeal. Pa.R.A.P. 1311(a), (b). Here, such a Petition for Permission to Appeal was not filed. Thus, I agree with the Majority that the Superior Court was well within its authority to quash appellant’s appeal and that we should not disturb its ruling.
NIX, C.J., and ZAPPALA and CAPPY, JJ., join in this concurring opinion.