Smith v. Commonwealth

STEPHENS, Chief Justice,

dissenting.

I must dissent from the majority opinion. I would reverse on all three issues discussed by the majority.

First, the majority concludes that appellant opened the door to the questions on cross regarding her sexual relationship with Laura Meade. The majority suggests this is so because appellant introduced on direct examination that Laura Meade was a dominating presence in her life. After reviewing the record, I find that testimony on direct examination regarding Laura Meade was minimal, opening no doors to allow inquiry by the Commonwealth into Brenda Smith’s sexual habits.

Mention of Laura Meade first occurred when appellant’s attorney was developing a line of questioning about why Brenda had married a man so much older than she was. This particular reference to Laura was included in a response to a question concerning how Smitty treated her. Brenda answered:

Very good.... I could find somebody that I could go talk to when I needed to. I didn’t have to worry about being hurt, being abused or nothing.... And, then my cousin Laura wants to stay with me and beat on me all the time. And, half the time make me do things that I don’t really want to do.

The next discussion of Laura arose when defense counsel was questioning Brenda about fights she had with Smitty. This line of questioning went as follows:

Question: What were the fights over? What were the arguments over?
Answer: Mostly over Laura. And, about people coming over.
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Question: Okay, but Laura was over there and there were some things going on that Smitty didn’t like?
Answer: Yes.
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Question: Have you ever seen anybody beat on Smitty?
Answer: Yes, I have.
Question: Who have you seen beat on Smitty and leave Mike out at this point? Is there anybody over there besides Mike ever had a fight and beat on Smitty?
Answer: Yes.
Question: Who?
Answer: Laura.
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Question: ... They’ve gotten in fights over what?
Answer: Over different things. Laura didn’t want Smitty there. Smitty didn’t want Laura there. And, I was caught in the middle either way I went.
Question: You were his wife. Why didn’t you control the situation and keep everybody out of that place that he didn’t like? Answer: I couldn’t. I tried. If I done something that I wouldn’t suppose[d] to, once you had people around there, I’ve went around, I had stay in the trailer for one week ‘cause my eyes were swelled together so black that I couldn’t even see because of Laura. I couldn’t do anything. Me and my husband were prisoners in our own home.

These are the only references to Laura Meade that I find in the record with the exception of one more time asking about Laura’s moving out. In fact, these are the only discussions of Laura Meade in over 70 pages of direct examination in the transcript. Substantively, I find that these references, in their totality, present no need to investigate appellant’s sexual relationship with Laura. Since the testimony from both parties clearly *226indicates that Laura was not implicated in the murder of Smitty, allowing the testimony in regarding Brenda’s sexual orientation could only serve an impeachment purpose. “No authority ... suggests that homosexuality indicates a propensity to disregard the obligation of an oath.” United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531 (2d Cir.1954).

More importantly, however, is the fact that Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 768 S.W.2d 119 (1988), is directly applicable in this case. The admission of this testimony clearly results in the admission of bad character evidence when character has not been put at issue. Barnett v. Commonwealth, Ky., 763 S.W.2d 119 (1988).

I also find that, even if one could hold that the door had been opened to the admission of this evidence, the repeated questions asked by the Commonwealth regarding Brenda’s sexual preferences and sexual relationships with women other than Laura Meade reached a point where they were far more prejudicial than probative. On these grounds alone, a reversal is warranted.

Second, the majority concludes that appellant did not suffer prejudicial error when the affidavit was admitted. The statement in the affidavit, “she likes to abuse me” is classic hearsay to which no exception applies. This court has repeatedly held that the “hearsay rule forbids the use of an assertion, made out of court, as testimony to the truth of the fact asserted....” Davis v. Bennett’s Adm’r, 279 Ky. 799, 132 S.W.2d 334, 338 (1939).

There is nothing about this statement that indicates a need for the testimony and supports its trustworthiness so as to permit admission under an exception. The facts indicate, first, that other testimony was presented at trial to support a theory of Brenda’s abuse of her husband. Second, it is clear also that the affidavit was withdrawn when Smitty did not appear for court. This could possibly suggest that the trustworthiness of the statements were questionable. On these grounds, I believe reversal is necessary.

Third, I would reverse because the admission of evidence regarding seeing Smitty with black eyes and bruises was extremely prejudicial to appellant. The most obvious inference to be drawn from this testimony is that appellant was responsible for these bruises. No exception to the uncharged crimes evidence rule applies. KRE 404(b); O’Bryan v. Commonwealth, Ky., 634 S.W.2d 153 (1982). The eyewitnesses testifying to these bruises had no knowledge of how they were inflicted. Further, no other evidence was presented that connected the bruises to appellant.

As a result of the foregoing, I would reverse appellant’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

STUMBO, J., and SCOTT FURKIN, Special Justice, join in this dissenting opinion.