dissenting.
I do not agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Appellant’s request for modification of alimony by not treating his petition as a prayer for special relief, therefore, I dissent. The majority correctly states that the payments at issue do not fit the description of alimony and should not be treated as such, but it oversimplifies the opinions of the lower courts by implying that they failed to recognize this fact. Maj. op. at 301-02. As the trial *274court clearly stated, it denied Appellant’s motion “[s]ince the alimony award was so intertwined with the equitable distribution award, a modification of the alimony award would unduly weaken the equitable distribution scheme that we intended.” No. 612 of 1988 DV (C.P. Beaver County filed April 29, 1992). Clearly, the trial court did not treat the payments as alimony.
The Superior Court, in Romeo v. Romeo, 417 Pa.Super. 180, 611 A.2d 1325 (1992), found that an equitable distribution decree is not modifiable. It is also true that Rule 1920.43(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure allows the courts to grant special relief and that courts retain equitable jurisdiction over “[t]he determination and disposition of property rights and interests between spouses____” 23 Pa.C.S. § 3104(a)(1). However, because I find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, I see no need to invoke this Court’s equitable jurisdiction. The majority relies too heavily on Appellant’s reduction in income in finding that “the trial court’s decision to deny relief was a manifestly unreasonable disregard of the reality of Appellant’s situation, and thus an abuse of discretion.” Maj. op. at 169. Appellant’s loss of employment, although it greatly reduced his monthly income, is not the only reality of his situation. Appellant does have the means to make these payments, but the majority seems to ignore this reality. Appellant received substantial assets when he and Appellee divorced, including a cottage in Erie, almost five acres of land in Chippewa Township, a 1971 Corvette, over $32,000 in stocks, his pension with Pan Am and other assets providing Appellant with an equitable distribution well over $100,000. Appellant was also awarded non-marital assets which included a condominium in Florida and retirement accounts he held with Pan Am. Rather than having Appellee participate in Appellant’s pension, Appellant was ordered to pay Appellee $1,000 per month for a limited period. This would allow Appellee to plan for her retirement, and Appellant’s retirement would be secured, as he maintained the pension and his retirement accounts. Appellant can use any of the substantial assets he owns to satisfy his obligation to Appellee.
*275The majority’s reliance on Romeo v. Romeo, 417 Pa.Super. 180, 611 A.2d 1325 (1992), demonstrates that it failed to take into account Appellant’s assets, a factor which distinguishes the instant case. The court’s equitable powers allowed the distribution of assets in Romeo to be modified when the husband refused to agree to lower the selling price for properties originally awarded to the wife. She was obligated to pay the taxes on these properties until they were sold; however, the wife, unlike Appellant, did not have the resources to maintain the taxes. Moreover, the fact that the husband’s actions in Romeo prevented the wife from selling the properties was a factor in allowing the distribution to be modified. Without the husband’s cooperation, the wife would have had to maintain the taxes indefinitely.
To prevent Appellee from receiving what the court found she was equitably entitled to upon dissolution of the marriage, would not be an equitable resolution to this matter. The lower courts recognized this, and therefore refused to allow Appellant to destroy a scheme which was grounded in equity. This decision was within the discretion of the trial court. In light of the fact that Appellant does have the means to maintain the equitable distribution scheme, he should be required to decide how he will meet his obligation. If he fails to do so, Appellee can petition the court pursuant to section 3502(e), as the lower courts correctly stated.
Since the trial court did not abuse its discretion, I would affirm.