dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion which states that the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s award of damages. The harm done by false imprisonment is in the detention and arrest of the accused. Persons who cause others to be arrested are not responsible for the condition of the jail and the types of prisoners detained there. The humiliation suffered by someone arrested certainly is real; however, the fact that the other prisoners smelled, that the floor was filthy, or that an officer spoke unkindly cannot be considered elements of damages. Awarding a person $15,000 per hour for false imprisonment is excessive and could only occur as a result of passion, prejudice or improper motive on the part of the jury. See Moore’s Inc. v. Garcia, 604 S.W.2d 261 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
The true test of whether passion or prejudice affected the damages awarded is the degree of harm resulting from the jury argument or from the questions asked. In each instance the question for resolution is whether the allegedly improper jury argument or questioning was reasonably calculated to cause prejudice to the opposing party so that a withdrawal by counsel or an instruction by the court, or both, could not eliminate the probability that it resulted in an improper verdict. Luna v. North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., 667 S.W.2d 115, 120 (Tex.1984); Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Haywood, 153 Tex. 242, 245, 266 S.W.2d 856, 858 (1954). Texas courts have found plain error in jury argument that refers to witnesses or parties in ethnic or racial terms. Penate v. Berry, 348 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
In the case at bar, to refer to the security personnel as those “black” security guards or “two black people” and by contrast refer to the appellee as a “God fearing Christian woman” is certainly designed to inflame and provoke the jury. See Texas Employers’ Insurance Association v. Jones, 361 S.W.2d 725, 727 (Tex.Civ.App.— Waco 1962, writ ref’d n.r.e). Unfortunately these ethnic references are not isolated incidents but pervade the entire trial proceeding. If the security personnel needed to be characterized at all, it would have been by sex and not by race; one guard was a female and the other a male. As the supreme court has stated, “cases ought to be tried in a court of justice upon the facts proved; and whether a party is a Jew or gentile, white or black, is a matter of indifference.” Moss v. Sanger Bros., 75 Tex. 321, 323, 12 S.W. 619, 620 (1889).
In light of these observations the trial court abused its discretion in failing to remit part of the $150,000 actual damages and part of the $225,000 exemplary dam*677ages. I would, therefore, reverse the judgment and remand the cause for a new trial.