dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Wilson brought nine points of error on appeal. In points one and two, he contended generally that the trial court erroneously interpreted the contract to require that the acreage within the roadways was to be included in computing the purchase price under the contract. I agree. In reaching this conclusion, I begin with the earnest money contract and its subject matter.
1. The Land. The land involved consisted of parts of three dedicated subdivisions along with two tracts of “raw land” or acreage tracts. Tract one is described as “all of Silent Ridge Subdivision, save and except those two certain lots ...” while tract two is described as “all of Commander’s Point Subdivision, save and except lot 19 ... save and except Sunday House Subdivision ...” and tract three described as “lots 43A and 44A, Ralph White Addition.” On the other hand, the descriptions for tracts four and five were in terms of acres of land with each description containing a reference to a recorded deed, presumably for a metes and bounds description.
2. The Contract. Klein’s survey was to locate all streets, roads, and easements. The parties specifically noted, by interline-ation after the proposed contract was typed, that “land subject to easement will not be deducted from total acreage in calculating the purchase price.” By the terms of the contract, especially in view of the nature of the property involved, I believe that streets and roads were considered by the parties to be something separate and apart from easements, with only easements to be included in calculating the acreage involved in the tracts. Therefore, I believe that the acreage within the roadways should not be included in computing the purchase price under the contract.
Of course, the construction of a written instrument is a question of law for the court, and a reviewing court is obligated to give effect to the parties’ intent as expressed in the writing, in light of the wording of the instrument and all the surrounding circumstances. City of Pinehurst v. Spooner Addition Water Company, 432 S.W.2d 515 (Tex.1968). Further, courts should construe contracts most strictly against the party preparing same. Republic National Bank v. Northwest National Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109 (Tex.1978).
In this appeal, the earnest money contract was prepared by Klein’s attorney. With its attached exhibits, the contract is some thirteen pages long, and sets out the rights and obligations of the parties in painstaking detail. It would have been a simple matter when stating that the “land subject to easement will not be deducted from total acreage in calculating the purchase price” to say rather “land within the streets and roadways and land subject to easements will not be deducted from total acreage in calculating the purchase price.”
3.Acceptance of the Survey. Under the contract, Klein was to supply a survey to Wilson, and Wilson was then to have five days to accept or reject the survey. The surveyor was chosen by Klein. Klein had extensive communications with the surveyor before the survey was completed and delivered to Wilson. Klein had ample opportunity to instruct his surveyor as to his particular interpretation of the contract, and could have required the surveyor to *825include the acreage within the dedicated streets and roadways in computing the total acreage. However, the survey as delivered to Wilson properly excluded the acreage within the dedicated streets and roadways from the total acreage computation.
4. Mutuality of Obligation. When Wilson failed to object to the survey, he thereby became bound by the contract to pay the price based on the survey. Klein in turn became bound to convey the property in exchange for the same price. Without this mutuality of obligation, the proposed earnest money contract would be void and unenforceable. Stanfield v. Kaufman, 195 S.W.2d 848 (Tex.Giv.App.1946, writ dism’d). By construing the contract to obligate both parties to perform upon the acceptance of the survey by Wilson, the mutuality of the contract is thereby preserved. Such a construction, in favor of mutuality, is to be preferred when possible. Texas Utilities Gas Company v. Barrett, 460 S.W.2d 409 (Tex.1970).
Having interpreted the contract to provide that the acreage within the dedicated roadways was not to be included in computing the purchase price, I would conclude that the $1,170,000 purchase price was correctly reduced to $1,008,300, and that Wilson correctly tendered that sum to Klein. Accordingly, I would sustain Wilson’s first and second points of error.
In its findings of fact and conclusions of law, the district court concluded that $16,-000 would be a reasonable attorney’s fee for Wilson’s attorney for the trial and appeal to the Court of Appeals of this cause if the appeal was successful. As I would have sustained Wilson’s first and second points of error and reversed the judgment of the district court, I would remand the case to the district court for entry of judgment that Wilson is entitled to specific performance of the contract and that Klein be ordered to specifically perform. I would also instruct the district court to award Wilson’s attorneys reasonable attorney’s fees in the amount of $16,000.