ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
Appellant asserts on Motion for Rehearing that this Court erred in considering the recitals of the judgment rendered in the case of Coughlin v. Ramada and General Electric because the same was not a certified copy or otherwise properly authenticated copy as required by Rule 166-A. We find no merit in this contention. The record reveals that Fireman’s incorporated a copy of the judgment in its petition. Since Appellant made the judgment a part of its pleadings, the judgment was properly *71before the trial court whether authenticated or not. The record further reveals that a copy of the judgment was introduced into evidence in connection with the deposition testimony of Robert M. Blair, Fireman’s Claims Supervisor. Since the judgment was introduced as a part of the deposition, we think the lack of authentication was a mere formal deficiency which should have been raised in the trial court and may not be raised for the first time on appeal. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Penn, 363 S.W.2d 230 (Tex.1962).
Appellant further asserts that this Court erred in affirming the summary judgment on a “ground” directly contradicted by Ap-pellees’ Brief in which Appellees assert: “It is undisputed that the judgment is valid and could be executed upon, but upon the advice of Mr. Bernays, Fireman’s Fund has deliberately withheld execution.” (Emphasis added by Appellant.) We overrule the contention.
Our decision affirming the summary judgment was not made on the basis of Appellees’ contention that Ramada (Fireman’s) could have levied execution on the judgment. Our decision was made to rest upon the uncontradicted recital in the Coughlin judgment showing that it had “been paid and satisfied in full”. While Appellees’ grounds for summary judgment are somewhat confusing, we think it apparent that Appellees intended to rely upon the judgment as conclusive proof of the fact that Fireman’s had not in fact suffered any loss. In any event, where it “affirmatively appears from the pleadings, admissions, depositions and affidavits that there is no issue as to any material fact upon which the outcome of the litigation depends, then summary judgment is the proper remedy even though it be granted upon a ground different from that specified in the motion.” In re Price’s Estate, 375 S.W.2d 900 (Tex.1964). See also Phil Phillips Ford, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Co., 465 S.W.2d 933 (Tex.1971); Navarro v. Secret Harbor Farms, Inc., 506 S.W.2d 337 (Tex.Civ.App., Houston (1st Dist.) 1974, writ ref’d n. r. e.).
The record before us conclusively shows that the Coughlin judgment had been “paid and satisfied in full”. If the recital in the judgment is correct, and we must assume it is, then the record conclusively shows that Ramada recouped its entire loss from General Electric. Consequently, Appellees alleged malpractice did not cause Fireman’s to suffer a loss and as a result Fireman’s would have no cause of action against Ap-pellees. Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing is overruled.