dissenting.
I dissent from the majority’s finding that the furloughs of appellees were valid.
Appellees, Eugene H. Stecher, Leroy L. Craig, Clayton O. Scott, and Theodore J. Charney, held the civil service position of Administrative Officer II. As noted by the majority, they performed duties related to occupational licensing boards under jurisdiction of the Bureau of Professional and Occupational Affairs. Such duties including budgeting, legislative review, complaint processing, drafting of regulations and procedures, rationalization of operations, and general supervisory tasks. The Bureau is responsible for twenty-two licensing boards. Scott was responsible for the *213State Board of Medical Education and Licensure. Each of the other Appellees was responsible for seven other licensing boards. The evidence, including testimony and job descriptions, indicates that these duties involved substantial work such as to keep Appellees occupied on a full-time basis through a thirty-seven and one-half hour work week.
Because of the reduced budget, appellees were furloughed, effective August 27, 1980. Their duties were reassigned to the Bureau’s Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner and the licensing boards’ secretaries and counsel. However, there was no indication of any reduction in work. The Commission found that the essential cause of the furloughs was lack of funds and not lack of work. It found that as of July 1, 1980, there was a lack of funds such as to justify furlough, but such lack of funds ceased to exist as of the October 16 supplemental appropriation. It did not accept Appellant’s claim that there was a lack of work. Consequently, it found that the furlough could not continue to be justified and ordered Appellees reinstated with back pay from October 16, 1980.1
Appellant claims that the Commission’s finding of no lack of work and order directing reinstatement were not supported by the evidence and contrary to law. The governing law is the Civil Service Act, Act of August 5, 1941, P.L. 752, 71 P.S. § 741.1 et seq. The Act empowers the Civil Service Commission, inter alia, to hear appeals in cases of furlough and to adopt rules to effectuate the provisions of the Act, *214Art. II, § 203, as amended. Any employee aggrieved by a personnel action, including a furlough, has the right to appeal to the Commission, Art. IX, § 951, added by Act of August 27, 1963, P.L. 1257, § 27, 71 P.S. § 741.951. A furlough is defined as “the termination of employment because of lack of funds or of work”, Art. I, § 3, as amended, 71 P.S. § 741.3. In case of an appeal of an adverse personnel action,
The appointing authority shall go forward to establish the charge or charges on which the personnel action was based. If, at the conclusion of its presentation, the appointing authority has, in the opinion of the Commission, established a prima facie case, the employe shall then be afforded the opportunity of presenting his case.
4 Pa.Code § 105.15(e). That means that the appointing authority has the burden of going forward with the evidence to establish a prima facie case to justify a furlough, D'Amato v. Department of General Services, 58 Pa. Cmwlth. 489, 427 A.2d 1287 (1981), i.e. must establish a lack of funds or work, Forbes v. Department of Transportation, 61 Pa.Cmwlth. 641, 434 A.2d 892 (1981).
Section 951(c) of the Civil Service Act states that “all final decisions of the (Civil Service) Commission shall not be reviewable by any court.” Accordingly, we have held that review of Commission decisions is on narrow certiorari and is limited to questions of jurisdiction to hear the matter, regularity of the proceedings, whether the Commission exceeded its authority, and whether any constitutional violations have occurred, O’Piel v. State Civil Service Commission, 424 Pa. 151, 225 A.2d 546 (1967). Appellant cites O’Piel as a basis for review and claims that the Commission exceeded its authority and conducted its proceedings in an irregular manner. I would not conduct this Court’s review on that basis. In Humphreys v. Civil Service Commission, 7 Pa.Cmwlth. 566, 301 A.2d 400 (1973), the court held that § 951 was superseded by the Administrative Agency Law, Act of June 4, 1945, P.L. 1388, § 47, added by Act of December 2, 1968, P.L. 1135, No. 354 § 2, 71 P.S. § 1710.47. *215That section provided in relevant part that “where an act of assembly expressly provides that there shall be no appeal from an adjudication of an agency, or that the adjudication of an agency shall be final or conclusive, or shall not be subject to review, ... any person aggrieved by such an adjudication may nevertheless appeal the same ...” That statute has been repealed and superseded by the Act of April 28, 1978, P.L. 202, No. 53, 2 P.C.S.A. § 101 et seq. Under the new act,
Any person aggrieved by an adjudication of a Commonwealth agency who has a direct interest in such adjudication shall have the right to appeal therefrom to the court vested with jurisdiction of such appeals by or pursuant to Title 42 (relating to judiciary and judicial procedure).
2 P.C.S.A. § 702. The Act provides that judicial review shall apply to all Commonwealth agencies regardless of the fact that a statute expressly provides that there shall be no appeal from an adjudication of an agency, or that the adjudication of an agency shall be final or conclusive, or shall not be subject" to review.
2 P.C.S.A. § 701. I would hold that adjudications of the Civil Service Commission are appealable and that our prior decisions limiting review to narrow certiorari are no longer applicable. Such holding is required by the statute and also by the Pennsylvania Constitution, Art. V, § 9, added April 23, 1968, which provides that
There shall be a right of appeal in all cases to a court of record from a court not of record; and there shall also be a right of appeal from a court of record or from an administrative agency to a court of record or to an appellate court, the selection of such court to be as provided by law; and there shall be such other rights of appeal as may be provided by law.
I would apply the standard of review that we have established for appeals from administrative agency adjudications, which is that the adjudication must be upheld unless a necessary finding of fact is not supported by substantial evidence, an error of law has been committed, or there has *216been a violation of constitutional rights, Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 489 Pa. 109, 413 A.2d 1037 (1980). This standard of review has been applied to the Civil Service Commission, Vovakes v. Department of Transportation, 71 Pa.Cmwlth. 3, 453 A.2d 1072 (1982). It is for the Commission to resolve questions of credibility and evidentiary weight, Silverman v. Department of Education, 70 Pa.Cmwlth. 444, 454 A.2d 185 (1982).
A lack of work may result from the reorganization of an agency, in which case a furlough will be proper. This is illustrated by Department of Public Welfare v. Magrath, 14 Pa.Cmwlth. 257, 321 A.2d 403 (1974). In that case the director of a state hospital had surgery performed by non-staff surgeons on a fee basis. That was found to create a lack of work such as to justify the furlough of a staff surgeon who had previously performed required surgery. On the other hand, in Silverman v. Department of Education, supra, the court held that the mere elimination of a position is not determinative of whether there is a lack of work and that a furlough is not justified where the abolition of a position creates a lack of work, rather than vice versa. In the instant case, the evidence indicates that the duties performed by Appellees were transferred to other personnel in the Bureau, meaning that the work performed by Appellees is still considered necessary and is still being done. In view of that situation and in view of the fact that Appellees were shown to have performed substantial work, I would hold that the evidence supports a finding that there was no lack of work such as to cause or justify Appellees’ furloughs. I would find that in view of the fact that Appellees were occupied full-time, it was necessary for Appellant to show a work reduction in order to establish a lack of work. Appellant failed to meet its burden, having presented no evidence of a reduction in work. In Eastern Pennsylvania Psychiatric Institute v. Russell, 77 Pa. Cmwlth. 390, 465 A.2d 1313 (1983), which involved the *217furlough of eighteen members of a hospital research staff, the evidence supported a finding that there was no lack of funds to justify the furlough, where $4.17 million in available funds remained in the hospital’s budget. The evidence in the instant case supports a finding of no lack of funds, in view of the supplemental appropriation. I would hold that the Civil Service Commission’s finding of no lack of funds or work was proper, being supported by the evidence, and must be upheld.
The majority misapplies the lack of work test by finding such lack on the basis of the reassignment of Appellees’ duties. The majority opinion opens the way for a government agency to furlough employees at any time by reorganizing. It does not take account of whether there was a reduction in work, whether Appellees lacked sufficient work to keep themselves occupied, or whether the work performed by Appellees continued to be performed. The question of lack of work cannot properly be resolved without considering such factors.
The majority is further remiss in ignoring the fiscal situation that led to the furloughs. The supplemental appropriation was sought in order to restore the pre-existing personnel level. There was no point to the supplemental appropriation if the personnel reduction was due to lack of work. The Commission’s termination of the furloughs as of October 16, 1980 and not before is reflective of the financial situation. The budget shortfall and supplemental appropriation are part of the fact situation and should not be cavalierly dismissed, as the majority does. If one takes proper account of what has occurred, one is compelled to conclude that the Commission was justified in finding that lack of funds and not lack of work was the cause of the furloughs, that the lack of funds ended on October 16, 1980, and that the furloughs could not properly continue after that date.
I would affirm the Order of the Commonwealth Court.
. It should be noted that the testimony at the hearing establishes that the Department was arranging to have Pierce Clouser, a clerical supervisor, reclassified as Administrative Officer I. In their answer to Appellant’s petition for a stay in the Commonwealth Court, Appellees averred that Clouser and one Rita Beck had been promoted to Administrative Officer I and were performing duties similar to those that Appellees had performed. This is a lower classification than Appellees' classification as Administrative Officer II. The promotion of Clouser and Beck would indicate that there was no lack of work. It cannot be a basis for such finding, as it is not in evidence. If it were necessary to establish a basis for such finding, I would deem it appropriate to remand for the taking of further evidence. However, I believe that a finding of no lack of work is proper even without evidence to establish the promotion of Clouser and Beck.