dissenting.
I cannot agree that summary judgment for the Dallas County Hospital District (the “Hospital District”) was proper because the Hospital District failed to establish, as a matter of law, that Smith was not in the course of her employment when the accident occurred. Accordingly, I would reverse and remand the cause for trial on the merits. Consequently, I must dissent.
The majority has ignored well-settled principles for reviewing the granting of a summary judgment. For example, a mov-ant, in order to be entitled to summary judgment, must show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Gibbs v. General Motors Corp., 450 S.W.2d 827 (Tex.1970). The reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, Valley Stockyards Co. v. Kinsel, 369 S.W.2d 19 (Tex.1963), and must indulge every reasonable inference and resolve all doubts in favor of the non-movant, Hudnall v. Tyler Bank & Trust Co., 458 S.W.2d 183 (Tex.1970). Additionally, courts are to give the Workers’ Compensation law a liberal construction in order to accomplish its purposes and to, at the same time, promote justice. Goldman v. Torres, 161 Tex. 437, 341 S.W.2d 154 (1960). The Workers’ Compensation law should be liberally construed for the protection of the worker. Goldman, 341 S.W.2d at 158.
I begin my consideration of the issue before us by noting that Texas adheres to the “coming and going” rule, under which an injury received while using the public streets and highways in going to or returning from the place of employment is not compensable. American General Insurance Co. v. Coleman, 157 Tex. 377, 303 S.W.2d 370 (1957). The rationale of the “coming and going” rule is that such an injury is suffered as a consequence of risks and hazards to which all members of the traveling public are subject rather than risks and hazards relating to and originating in the work or business of the employer. Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Bot*74tom, 365 S.W.2d 350 (Tex.1963). Thus, under this rule an injury received by an employee while traveling to and from his place of employment is considered not to be sustained in the course of his employment.
The Texas Workers’ Compensation law covers injuries sustained in the course of employment. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8306, § 3b (Vernon 1967). TEX.REV. CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967) provides that, with certain exceptions not applicable here, the term “injury sustained in the course of employment” includes:
all other injuries of every kind and character having to do with and originating in the work, business, trade or profession of the employer received by an employee while engaged in or about the furtherance of the affairs or business of his employer whether upon the employer’s premises or elsewhere. (Emphasis added).
Under section 1 a claimant must show that the injury was of a kind and character that had to do with and originated in his employer’s work, business, trade, or profession and was received while he was engaged in or about the furtherance of his employer’s affairs or business. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d at 352-53. On summary judgment, however, the movant has the burden of establishing that the injury, as a matter of law, was not sustained in the course of employment.
I would hold that Smith has at least raised a fact issue as to whether her injury was related to and originated in her employer’s work or business and was received while she was engaged in or about the furtherance of her employer’s business. In this respect, it is clear that Smith’s injury occurred while she was engaged in the furtherance of the Hospital District’s business because the hospital, under a written personnel policy memorandum, paid Smith on a “portal-to-portal” basis. Thus, her employment commenced when she left her home in response to a call from the hospital to come in to work and continued until she returned home. Since this written memorandum is an unambiguous part of her contract of employment, the Hospital District is bound by its terms. Consequently, summary judgment evidence by the Hospital District purporting to construe this memorandum is barred by the parol evidence rule. Thus, the majority’s reliance upon the explanation of the memorandum by the Hospital District is misplaced.
Smith’s injury was also related to and originated in her employer’s work or business. The Hospital District is, inter alia, in the business of providing radiology services. Smith’s “on call” travel, as a result of which her injury occurred, directly facilitated the Hospital District’s ability to provide these services. The “on call” arrangement benefited the Hospital District in at least two ways: (1) it enabled the Hospital District to provide radiology services at nights and on weekends; and (2) it enabled the Hospital District to provide these services at a lower cost to the Hospital District, in that it is doubtless less expensive to bring in “on call” personnel to provide radiology services at nights and on weekends than it would be to maintain a twenty-four hour per day, seven day per week radiology staff.
TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8309 § lb (Vernon 1967) limits the definition of “injury sustained in the course of employment” with respect to injuries related to transportation or travel. Section lb provides, in pertinent part:
Unless transportation is furnished as a part of the contract of employment or is paid for by the employer, or unless the means of such transportation are under the control of the employer, or unless the employee is directed in his employment to proceed from one place to another place, such transportation shall not be the basis for a claim that an injury occurring during the course of such transportation is sustained in the course of employment_ (Emphasis added).
To recover under the Workers’ Compensation law when, as in the instant case, transportation or travel is the basis of the claim for injury, a claimant must show that the *75requirements of both section 1 and section lb have been met. Bottom, 365 S.W.2d at 353-54. Consequently, the provisions of section 1 and section lb are limited exceptions to the “coming and going” rule which allow a claimant, in those situations specified therein, to recover for travel-related injuries sustained in the course of his employment. The question before us, then, is whether the Hospital District has established as a matter of law that Smith’s injuries were not suffered in the course of her employment.
Turning to section lb, I would hold that Smith has, at the very least, raised a fact issue as to whether she was “directed in [her] employment to proceed from one place to another place.” This provision of section lb includes situations in which the employee proceeds from one place to another “under the terms of an employment which expressly or impliedly requires that he do so to discharge the duties of his employment.” Jecker v. Western Alliance Insurance Co., 369 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tex.1963). In this respect, Smith worked a regular, forty-hour, Monday through Friday work week. The law is clear that her travel to and from work during this regular work week is within the purview of the “coming and going” rule and, consequently, injuries incurred during such travel are not compensable because they fall within the range of risks to which all members of the traveling public are subject. In addition to her regular work week, however, Smith was “on call” for one week and weekend per month. While “on call” it was not unusual for Smith to be directed by her employer to come to the hospital to perform her radiology duties two or more times per twenty-four hour period. On the average, she was called back to the hospital about fifteen times per week. Smith’s trips to and from the hospital while “on call” were made at the direction of her employer, pursuant to the terms of her “on call” employment, in order for Smith to discharge her duties at the hospital. By virtue of these numerous trips, Smith was subjected to a greater risk of injury during travel than were other members of the traveling public. Thus, the rationale underlying the “coming and going” rule does not apply to these trips made while “on call.”
I would hold that Smith has at least raised a fact issue as to whether she was “directed in [her] employment to proceed from one place to another place” and, therefore, that the injury suffered by Smith during such travel falls within one of the specified exceptions to the section lb provision mandating that a travel-related injury “shall not be the basis for a claim that an injury occurring during the course of such transportation is sustained in the course of employment.”
I am not unmindful of Loofbourow v. Texas Employer’s Insurance Association, 489 S.W.2d 456 (Tex.Civ.App.-Waco 1972, writ ref’d n.r.e.), which is heavily relied upon by the Hospital District and by the majority in its opinion. Loofbourow does not, however, control the ease at bar. Lo-ofbourow concerned a nurse who was injured in an auto accident while on her way to work. She was “on call” and had been called in to the hospital to perform her duties. The Waco Court of Appeals held that, under section lb, her injury was not compensable. Because all of her job duties were performed at the hospital, that court held that she was not directed “in her employment” to proceed from one place to another. Loofbourow is distinguishable from our case in two important respects. First, nurse Loofbourow was “on call” only — she was required to report to the hospital only when called in. In contrast, Smith, while “on call”, was required to report to the hospital for her regular Monday through Friday work week in addition to reporting when called. Thus, the risks of travel-related injury to which Smith was exposed were greater than those to which Loofbourow was exposed. Second, Loof-bourow was compensated by a monthly salary plus $30 for each twenty-four hour period during which she was “on call.” Smith, in addition to being compensated at one and one-half times her regular hourly rate for the time spent on her radiology *76duties at the hospital after being called in, was paid one hour “portal-to-portal” time for each trip to and each trip from the hospital made while “on call.” “Portal-to-portal” time is defined by the Hospital District as “the travel time compensated for which is needed to transport an employee from their residence to the Hospital and back to their residence for work time over and above the ordinary scheduled day.” (Emphasis added). This practice of paying employees for their travel time, both to and from the hospital, shows that the Hospital District considered an employee’s travel that was necessitated by the hospital’s direction to come in as being “in [the employee’s] employment.” At minimum, a fact issue has been raised.
In conclusion, Smith should not be penalized as a consequence of the Hospital District’s decision to provide its night and weekend radiology services by means of the “on call” system, which exposed Smith to risks greater than those borne by the general traveling public. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the trial court and remand the cause for trial on the merits.