CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.I concur in part and dissent in part from the majority’s decision. I agree with the majority that: (1) sections 9-622(5)(a)(.l) and 9 — 622(5) (a) (.4) of Ordinance No. 060345-AAA (Ordinance) prohibit the sale of identified tobacco products without regard to the seller’s knowledge as to whether such products will be used to ingest illegal drugs; (2) the “strict liability standard in the Ordinance,” (majority op. at 11), conflicts with the scienter requirement contained in section 13(a)(33) of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act (Act);1 and (3) because sections 9-622(5)(a)(.l) and 9-622(5)(a)(.4) conflict with the Act, these provisions of the Ordinance are preempted by state law.2
*1209I also agree that, as interpreted by the majority, section 9-629(1) of the Ordinance is not preempted by the Act. Section 9-629 of the Ordinance is titled “Drug paraphernalia, blunt cigars and similar items,” and section 9-629(1) provides in part as follows:
(1) It shall be unlawful for any person, including any retail business, to sell or offer for sale any of the following:
(a) Any item that constitutes drug paraphernalia, as that term is defined in the Pennsylvania Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. § 780-102, where the seller knows, or under the circumstances reasonably should know, that it would be used to ... introduce into the human body a controlled substance in violation of that Act, especially any of the following:
(.1) Containers ... used, intended for use or designed for use in packaging small quantities of controlled substances, as well as cigars, cigarettes and related items intended for use in concealing or holding such substances;
(.2) Objects used, intended for use or designed for use in ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing marihuana, cocaine, hashish or hashish oil into the human body, such as:
(.a) Cigars sold singly, flavored cigars known as “blunts,” flavored and unflavored blunt wraps, cigarette rolling papers, cigarillos, and tiparillos;....
The Philadelphia Code (Code) § 9-629(1) (emphasis added).
The majority concludes that, because section 9-629(1) of the Ordinance incorporates the definition of “drug paraphernalia” contained in section 2 of the Act, 35 P.S. § 780-102, section 9-629(l)(a) prohibits the sale of cigars sold singly, blunts, and the other specified items only if the seller knows or should know that the item will be used to ingest drugs. Under this interpretation, section 9-629(1) of the Ordinance does not conflict with the Act.
However, in light of the record testimony, as well as representations to this court at oral argument and in the City’s brief, *1210there can be no doubt that the City intends this Ordinance to “dispens[e] with the onerous requirement of proof that the seller knew that the buyer intended to utilize the item to ingest illegal drugs.”3 (City’s brief at 16-17) (emphasis added). Therefore, I would emphasize that, to the extent that the City interprets section 9-629(1) of the Ordinance as excluding a scienter requirement, such interpretation would be in conflict with the Act and render this provision of the Ordinance unenforceable.
Although I concur in part with the majority’s decision, unlike the majority, I believe that the trial court correctly held that section 9-629(2) of the Ordinance, which expressly excludes any consideration of intent, conflicts with and is preempted by the Act. In reaching a contrary conclusion, I believe that the majority disregards the five-part analysis Pennsylvania courts apply to determine whether an ordinance is preempted by a state law. See Liverpool Township v. Stephens, 900 A.2d 1080 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006).
Ordinance section 9-629(2) provides as follows:
(2) It shall be unlawful for any person, including any retail business, to sell or offer for sale within five hundred (500) feet of a school, recreation center, day care center, church, or community center any of the items identified in either Section 9-622(5) or Section 9-629(1), regardless of the intent as to the use of the item.
Code § 9-629(2) (emphasis added). The majority acknowledges that this provision does not require a showing of scienter. However, the majority concludes that section 9-629(2) of the Ordinance is saved from preemption by section 41.1 of the Act.4 I disagree.
Section 41.1 of the Act states that “consistent local ordinance[s], including zoning and nuisance ordinances” are not superseded or invalidated by the Act. 35 P.S. § 780-141.1 (emphasis added). The majority reasons that section 9-629(2) of the Ordinance must be found consistent with the Act because it is a zoning ordinance. According to the majority:
(1) the main purpose of section 9-629(2) is to shield children and churchgoers from “having to observe a blunt sale;” (majority op. at 1207.)
(2) section 9-629(2) creates a 500-foot barrier between the sale of specified tobacco products and schools, churches and day-care centers;
(B) pursuant to Municipality of Monroeville v. Chambers Development Corporation, 88 Pa.Cmwlth. 603, 491 A.2d 307 (1985), because section 9-629(2) cre*1211ates a buffer zone, it is a zoning ordinance;
(4) section 41.1 of the Act expressly permits “consistent local ordinances, including zoning and nuisance ordinances;”
(5) by this language, the legislature has identified zoning ordinances as a type of consistent ordinance allowed by the Act; and
(6) because it is a zoning ordinance, section 9-629(2) is saved from preemption by section 41.1 of the Act.
Initially, I disagree with the majority that the “main purpose of Section 9-629(2)” is to shield children and churchgoers from “having to observe a blunt sale ... not to restrict drug use.” (Majority op. at 1207.) Contrary to the majority’s assertion, the record evidence allows no room for doubt that the only goal of the Ordinance is to combat drug use.5 In addition, the majority fails to explain how the mere sight of a cigar sale can have a deleterious effect on children and/or churchgoers. Moreover, I cannot comprehend how the sale of a blunt or a single cigar could be more injurious to the health or sensibilities of children and churchgoers than the sale of multiple cigars and other tobacco products, which is not prohibited under section 9-629(2).
I also disagree “[t]hat there can be little doubt that Section 9-629(2) is a zoning or nuisance ordinance.” (Majority op. at 1207.) In addition to the stated purpose of the Ordinance and the testimony of record, the placement of Ordinance section 9-629(2) in Title 9 of the Code supports a contrary conclusion. Title 9 of the Code contains the City’s regulation of businesses, trades and professions, whereas the City’s zoning regulations are contained in Title 14 (Zoning and Planning). The majority suggests that this is of no moment, but the Code reflects that the city council makes distinctions between the regulation of conduct and the regulation of location. For example, the Code regulates “adult bookstores” in both Title 9 and Title 14. Section 9-624(b) of the Code provides that, “regulations in addition to those contained in existing zoning regulations are necessary to reduce the nighttime hours during which adult bookstores operate” and specifically restricts the hours of operation of business that are located within 1000 feet of specified places. It is section 14-1605, however, which prohibits an adult bookstore from being located within 500 feet of churches and schools. Thus, where the Code intends to create a buffer zone, the regulation is included in Title 14’s zoning regulations.6
*1212I also note the Code contains numerous provisions wherein a particular activity or condition is deemed to be a “nuisance”;7 however, in contrast to those provisions, there is no similar language in the Ordinance. Because there is no evidence indicating that the City intended the Ordinance, or any part of it, to be a zoning or nuisance regulation, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion in this regard.
More important, although the majority acknowledges that section 41.1 of the Act specifically allows any “consistent local ordinance, including zoning and nuisance ordinances,” 35 P.S. § 780-141.1 (emphasis added), the majority construes this language as identifying every zoning and nuisance ordinance as being a type of ordinance that is consistent with the Act. Under the majority’s analysis, every zoning ordinance is consistent with the Act as a matter of law. I submit that this is an absurd result, one that can only be reached by ignoring the law governing preemption, and, in particular, the prinei-pie that “home rule municipalities are not generally authorized to legislate in a way that contradicts a state statute.” (Majority op. at 1203.)8
Finally, I believe that the majority’s statement that “zoning legislation will not be found preempted by a state regulatory statute unless that statute expressly states an intention to preempt zoning,” (majority op. at 1207), confirms that the majority’s analysis is flawed. The majority recognizes that state preemption can be found in three forms, which are commonly known as “express preemption,” “field preemption” and “conflict preemption.” The issue here involves’ “conflict preemption,’ which acts to preempt any local law that contradicts or contravenes state law.” Nutter v. Dougherty, 595 Pa. 340, 346, 938 A.2d 401, 404. Clearly, the majority’s statement that preemption will not be found unless a statute “expressly states an intention to preempt zoning” applies only to an analysis of “express preemption” and is not at all relevant here.9 The issue here is *1213whether section 9-629(2) conflicts with the Act because it explicitly precludes the consideration of intent that the Act requires. I believe that it does, and, therefore, I would hold that, under the established principles of conflict preemption, section 9-629(2) of the Ordinance also is preempted by the Act.
Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s decision in its entirety.
. Act of April 14, 1972, P.L. 233, as amended, 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(33). In relevant part, this section prohibits the delivery of, the possession with intent to deliver or the manufacture with intent to deliver drug paraphernalia, knowing, or under circumstances where one reasonably should know, that it would be used to ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of the Act. Id.
. I agree that sections 9 — 622(5)(a)(. 1) and 9-622(5)(a)(.4) of the Ordinance conclusively establish that specified items, including cigars sold singly and all flavored cigars, constitute drug paraphernalia per se. (See Judge Cohn Jubelirer’s concurring and dissenting op. at 1213; majority op. at 1205-06.) However, I cannot agree that the Ordinance’s explicit identification of these items as drug paraphernalia obviates the need for a scienter requirement as is contained in the Act, (Judge Cohn Jubelirer’s concurring and dissenting op. at 1216-17). Respectfully, I suggest that Judge Cohn Jubelirer’s concurring and dissenting opinion overlooks the fact that the items *1209deemed to be drug paraphernalia by the Ordinance are legal products sold by legitimate businesses.
The Act recognizes that many legal products, including scales, blenders, bowls and even balloons, can be drug paraphernalia if they are products "which are used, intended for use or designed for use in ... processing, preparing ... ingesting, inhaling or otherwise introducing into the human body a controlled substance” in violation of the Act. Section 102 of the Act, 35 P.S. § 780-102. By repeating the phrase "used, intended for use or designed for use” thirteen times, and by setting forth a fifteen-part test to determine whether such legal products constitute drug paraphernalia, (see majority op. at 9), the Act reflects the General Assembly's awareness that “all equipment, products and materials of any kind” can constitute drug paraphernalia, if they are so used, are intended for such use or are designed for such use. 35 P.S. § 780-102 (emphasis added). I believe that the same language also reflects the General Assembly’s intent to protect legitimate businesses selling legal products where the unlawful use or intended unlawful use of these products is not established.
I do not disregard the fact that the deliberate omission of a scienter requirement in the Ordinance is part of the City’s pursuit of a laudable goal: to reduce drug use and the injurious effects of drug use on the community and on children in particular. Nor do I disregard the fact that the manner in which the City addresses this emotionally charged issue impermissibly converts a specific intent offense into a strict liability offense, thereby subjecting legitimate businesses selling legal dual-use products to the arbitrary enforcement of the City’s Department of Licenses and Inspections. Simply put, Ordinance sections 9-622(5)(a)(.l) and 9 — 622(5)(a)(.4) forbid that which is permitted by state law. For that reason, in my view, sections 9-622(5)(a)(.l) and 9-622(5)(a)(.4) of the Ordinance conflict with and are preempted by the Act.
. The Ordinance refers to the Act’s "definition” of drug paraphernalia, but it omits any reference to the fifteen factors that, according to the Act, a court should consider when determining whether an item falls within that definition. As the trial court observed, inclusion of these factors reflects the General Assembly's intent to protect legitimate businesses selling legal products. Because the City's acknowledged purpose in enacting the Ordinance is to avoid having to prove a seller’s knowledge of the intended use of the specified items, I submit that the exclusion of the fifteen factors from section 9-629(1) of the Ordinance reflects the City's intent to recognize single cigars, blunts and other specified items as drug paraphernalia per se.
Moreover, to the extent this is true, I question why the City would consider a cigar sold singly to be drug paraphernalia per se but would not consider cigars sold in quantity to be drug paraphernalia per se. Certainly the effect of the Ordinance is unduly burdensome to those members of society who cannot afford to purchase more than one cigar at a time.
. Added by section 4 of the Act of December 4, 1980, P.L. 1093, 35 P.S. § 780-141.1.
. See transcript of the October 26, 2006, session oí the City Council Committee on Licenses and Inspections, R.R. at 86a-171a. See also Bill No. 060345-AAA, adopting the Ordinance and stating that its provisions were added to Chapter 9-600 of the Code "to prohibit the sale ... of ‘blunts,’ ‘loosies,’ cigarette papers, cigars and other items that may be otherwise legal but that are commonly used as drug paraphernalia....” (Bill No. 060345-AAA at 1.)
. I do agree that, in general, an ordinance that purposefully creates a buffer zone in the interest of public health and safety is likely a zoning ordinance; however, I disagree that section 9-629(2) of the Ordinance is such a provision.
In concluding otherwise, the majority misinterprets our decision in Municipality of Monroeville v. Chambers Development Corporation, 88 Pa.Cmwlth. 603, 491 A.2d 307 (1985), as a case which "explained that an ordinance requiring a 'buffer zone’ ... was a zoning ordinance.” (Majority op. at 1207.) This case includes no such explanation. The issue in Municipality of Monroeville was whether, through the Solid Waste Management Act, Act of July 7, 1980, P.L. 380, 35 P.S. §§ 6018.101-6018.1003, the state had preempted the regulation of landfill operations. The only reference to a “buffer zone” in Municipality of Monroeville is contained in its discussion of another case, which "involved a zoning ordinance requiring a buffer *1212zone around a proposed hazardous waste disposal facility." Municipality of Monroeville, 491 A.2d at 310. The ordinance requiring a buffer zone was distinguished from the ordinance at issue in Municipality of Monroeville because the ordinance in Municipality of Monroeville did not regulate the physical location of a proposed landfill, but only regulated the hours and days of operation. Similarly, section 9-629(2) of the Ordinance does not regulate the location of any type of business but only regulates the manner in which they operate.
. See e.g., section 9-608(1) (concerning real estate signs); section 9-305(4) (concerning false alarms); section 9-703 ("a nuisance shall include the sale of illegal drugs or paraphernalia on or about the premises” of a special assembly occupancy); section 10 — 11— 1(1) (concerning obscenity); and section 14-2109 (relating to subdivisions).
. The majority implicitly recognizes that a zoning ordinance might not he consistent with the Act. (See majority op. at 1208 n. 16.) To the extent that the majority means to say that the Ordinance is a type of ordinance that may be saved from preemption by section 41.1 of the Act if it is consistent with the Act, then the necessary inquiry is whether the Ordinance's provisions conflict with the statute. Merely determining that the Ordinance is "a type” of ordinance that may be saved from preemption does not answer that question. In fact, such analysis treats the word "consistent” as mere surplusage.
. Therefore, the majority's reliance on Greene Township v. Kuhl, 32 Pa.Cmwlth. 592, 379 A.2d 1383 (1977), which undertook an "express preemption” analysis, also is misplaced.
Importantly, the decision in Nutter specifically did not involve a "conflict preemption” analysis. Instead, the court made clear that the "conflict preemption” argument asserted on appeal “essentially sounds in field preemption rather than conflict preemption. Accordingly, the discussion collapses into that single inquiry." Nutter, 595 Pa. at 358, 938 A.2d at 412 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). Be*1213cause Nutter expressly excluded the issue of conflict preemption from its analysis, it provides no authority for the proposition that a conflicting ordinance can be upheld as a valid exercise of a home rule municipality's powers. (See Judge Cohn Jubelirer’s concurring and dissenting op. at 1217-19, concluding that the deferential standard set forth in Nutter requires this court to defer to the City’s exercise of municipal powers.)