OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.Before this court are the consolidated appeals from the March 27, 2007, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County (trial court) granting in part and denying in part the Borough of Green-ville’s (Greenville) petition to vacate and/or modify an interest arbitration award rendered pursuant to what is commonly known as Act 111.1
*701On May 8, 2002, the Secretary of the Department of Community and Economic Development declared Greenville to be a financially distressed municipality pursuant to the Municipalities Financial Recovery Act (Act 47).2 A Recovery Plan, dated December 27, 2002, was approved by Greenville on January 9, 2003, pursuant to section 245 of Act 47, 53 P.S. § 11701.245.
At the time the Recovery Plan was approved, there was a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between Greenville and the International Association of Firefighters Local 1976 (Local 1976), which acts as the exclusive bargaining representative for all firefighters employed by Greenville. The CBA expired on December 31, 2005, and Greenville and Local 1976 participated in bargaining negotiations pursuant to Act 111, but were unable to reach an agreement. Thereafter, the parties requested that the matter be referred to arbitration proceedings pursuant to Act 111, and the Board of Arbitrators issued an arbitration award (Award) on August 28, 2006.
Thereafter, Greenville filed a petition with the trial court to vacate and/or modify the Award to conform to Act 47. Green-ville argued that the Award violates several provisions in the Recovery Plan and, thus, is unlawful under a strict reading of section 252 of Act 47, which states that “[a] collective bargaining agreement or arbitration settlement executed after the adoption of a [Recovery P]lan shall not in any manner violate, expand or diminish its provisions.” 53 P.S. § 11701.252 (emphasis added).
In ruling on Greenville’s petition, the trial court first held that the word “shall” in section 252 of Act 47 must be construed as mandatory, reasoning that to interpret “shall” as merely permissive would run counter to the legislative intent behind Act 47, as stated in section 102(b),3 and would conflict with section 249 of Act 47.4 Accordingly, the trial court properly concluded that any Award provisions that violate *702any provision of Greenville’s Recovery Plan must be stricken or modified as being in excess of the arbitrator’s power.5
The trial court then went on to consider Greenville’s contention that: section 2 of the Award violates section 167 of the Recovery Plan; section 4 of the Award violates sections 164 and/or 179 of the Recovery Plan; and section 14 of the Award violates section 173 of the Recovery Plan. After comparing the relevant Award and Recovery Plan sections, the trial court concluded that section 2 of the Award violates section 167 of the Recovery Plan in five ways; however, the trial court determined that sections 4 and 14 of the Award do not violate any provisions of the Recovery Plan. Accordingly, the trial court issued an order granting Greenville’s petition to the extent that section 2 of the Award was modified to comply with the Recovery Plan and section 252 of Act 47; in all other respects, the trial court denied the petition and affirmed the Award.
Greenville and Local 1976 have filed appeals with this court from the trial court’s order. Greenville would have this court issue an order that: (1) affirms that portion of the trial court’s decision concerning section 2 of the Award; (2) amends section 4 of the Award; and (3) vacates section 14 of the Award. Local 1976 would have this court: (1) affirm that portion of the trial court’s decision concerning sections 4 and 14 of the Award; (2) reverse that portion of the trial court’s decision concerning section 2 of the Award; and (3) direct Green-ville to comply with all provisions of the Award.
We have carefully considered the positions set forth by each party. However, finding no error in the trial court’s analysis of the relevant issues and arguments, we now affirm the trial court’s order in its entirety based on the well-reasoned opinion of Judge Thomas R. Dobson in Borough of Greenville v. International Association of Firefighters Local 1976, (No. 2006-3194, filed March 27, 2007).
ORDER
AND NOW, this 22nd day of April, 2008, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County is hereby affirmed on the basis of the opinion issued by the court in Borough of Greenville v. International Association of Firefighters Local 1976, (No. 2006-3194, filed March 27, 2007).
. Act of June 24, 1968, P.L. 237, as amended, 43 P.S. §§ 217.1-217.10.
. Act of July 10, 1987, P.L. 246, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 11701.101-11701.501.
. Legislative intent with respect to Act 47 is expressly addressed in section 102(b), which provides, in relevant part:
(b) Legislative intent.—
(1) It is the intent of the General Assembly to:
(i) Enact procedures and provide powers and guidelines to ensure fiscal integrity of municipalities while leaving principal responsibility for conducting the governmental affairs of a municipality, including choosing the priorities for and manner of expenditures based on available revenues, to the charge of its elected officials, consistent with the public policy set forth in this section.
53 P.S. § 11701.102(b) (emphasis added). The trial court determined that a permissive interpretation of section 252 would undermine the stated intent of Act 47 to place principal responsibility for conducting governmental affairs with elected municipal officers because it would mean that the municipality’s power to choose "the priorities for and manner of expenditures” would be shared with Act 111 arbiters.
. Section 249 of Act 47, which deals with amendments to a recovery plan, provides that such an amendment may be initiated by the coordinator, the chief executive officer or the governing body of a municipality and, further, that adoption of an amendment shall be done by ordinance. 53 P.S. § 11701.249. The trial court concluded that a permissive interpretation of section 252 would conflict with section 249, reasoning that, if Act 111 arbiters are permitted to disregard provisions of a recovery plan, they would essentially have the power to amend that plan even though amendments are only permitted to be initiated by the coordinator, the chief executive officer or the governing body and only by ordinance.
. The scope of review of an Act 111 arbitration award is limited to four things: "(1) jurisdiction of the arbitrator; (2) regularity of the proceedings; (3) excess of the arbitrator’s powers; or (4) deprivation of constitutional rights.” City of Scranton v. E.B. Jermyn Lodge No. 2 of the Fraternal Order of Police, 903 A.2d 129, 133 (Pa.Cmwlth.2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 717, 919 A.2d 959 (2007).