dissenting. I dissent from the majority opinion because I believe the lease under consideration was nothing more than a financial arrangement whereby appellee, Pioneer Leasing Corporation, was to loan money to Mr. Sawyer for the purchase of the ice-making machine. The record conclusively shows that such was the purpose of this arrangement. Mr. Don Barnett told Mr. Sawyer, “Well it was just like buying a car, after yon pay so many payments it’s your box.” Mr. O. H. Turner, treasurer of Pioneer Leasing Corporation, stated that they purchased the machine from the C. M. Lingle Company because Mr. Sawyer had selected it as the machine he wanted.
Prior to the Uniform Commercial Code and our usury decisions, this transaction would have been handled by a conditional sales contract. Therefore, Pioneer stands in the same position as would the bank if Mr. Sawyer had borrowed the money from the bank — i. e., it is entitled to collect the money it loaned. I would affirm the trial court without prejudice to the rights of the parties to sue the vendor of the machine for breach of warranty.
A The same is true of appellee’s argument as to waiver; the fact that appellant made payments for approximately six months after learning of the malfunction, does not, of itself, operate as a waiver. The general rule, of course, is that a notice of a breach of any type of warranty must be given within a reasonable time after becoming aware of the breach. The determination of what is reasonable depends upon the factual situation presented in each individual case. See Dailey v. Holiday Distributing Corporation (Iowa), 151 N. W. 2d 477, where the plaintiffs continued to use purchased equipment' for eleven months after learning of defects, and endeavored during that period to remedy such defects.
TMs paragraph was added by amendment May 27, 1968, after petition for rehearing. [See page 960.]