dissenting:
Because I believe that the evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain a conviction for *1085recWessly endangering another person, I re-speetfully dissent.
The Crimes Code defines the offense of recklessly endangering another person as follows:
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705. It further defines the requisite mens rea:
A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302 (emphasis supplied).
Following a domestic dispute, appellant was reported to be operating a vehicle in a possibly illegal manner. Responding thereto, an officer followed and observed the vehicle being operated slowly and crossing the double yellow line on three occasions. The officer then stopped the vehicle, which was being operated by appellant and was also occupied by her eleven year old son. Neither was wearing a safety belt. At trial, the parties stipulated that, based upon the officer’s experience, training and observations, appellant was under the influence of alcohol to a degree which rendered her incapable of safe driving. The parties also stipulated that testing revealed that her blood alcohol level was .168 and that additional testing also revealed the presence of marijuana in her urine.1
Based on the totality of the circumstances presented in this ease, I believe that the evidence was sufficient to establish each element of reckless endangerment beyond a reasonable doubt. Our decision in Commonwealth v. Scofield, 360 Pa.Super. 552, 521 A.2d 40 (Pa.Super.1987) is instructive. There, defendant, while operating his vehicle under the influence of alcohol and a controlled substance, hit a pedestrian, severely injuring him. Defendant was acquitted of DUI but was found guilty of aggravated assault and reckless endangerment.2 On appeal, a panel of this Court affirmed these convictions and stated:
[T]he fact that some degree of intoxication was present is relevant in considering whether the elements of related offenses have been established. We would hold that the observations of the officer and witness on the record and the evidence from the urinalysis and breathalyzer were sufficient to establish that the defendant was suffering from some degree of alcohol/drug intoxication. While evidence of drinking is alone insufficient to establish driving under the influence, it most certainly may be considered in determining whether [defendant] was driving while consciously disregarding a substantial and unjustifiable risk of injury to others. More specifically, the causal connection between the ingestion of alcohol with or after use of drugs, capable of an enhancement effect beyond what either alone might produce, is culpable recklessness.
Id. 521 A.2d at 43 (citations omitted). Appellant operated her vehicle with a blood alcohol level substantially above the legal limit and after she had ingested a controlled substance. It is foreseeable that a person operating a vehicle under these circumstances would imperil the fives of others. The officer’s observation of appellant’s vehicle crossing the double yellow fine three times despite *1086travelling at a low rate of speed establishes a nexus between her behavior of driving after ingesting alcohol and controlled substances and the placement of her son in peril from her erratic driving. The danger to her young son was exacerbated by her failure to secure his safety belt. Her behavior amounted to a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk of injuries to others. I believe the facts of this case support the conviction and that further evidence of reckless driving is unnecessary.3 I would affirm the conviction for reckless endangerment.4
. We note that the trial court dismissed the counts in the criminal information for driving under the influence of a controlled substance and under the combined influence of alcohol and a controlled substance.
. In light of our Supreme Court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. O'Hanlon, 539 Pa. 478, 653 A.2d 616 (1995) and Commonwealth v. Comer, 9 E.D. Appeal Docket 1996 (filed August 7, 1998), discussed more fully infra, the continued validity Scofield’s holding, with respect to defendant’s conviction for aggravated assault, is questionable. We, nonetheless, conclude that the holding of Scofield remains a correct application of the law with respect to reckless endangerment.
. The majority relies on Commonwealth v. O'Hanlon and Commonwealth v. Comer. It notes that neither case relied exclusively on the respective defendant’s intoxication but rather focused on the reckless driving that occurred prior to the accident. Both of these cases, however, involved convictions for aggravated assault, which requires a degree of recklessness far greater than that required for reckless endangerment. As such, neither O'Hanlon nor Comer is relevant to the present case. We do note, however, that the respective defendant's intoxication was a factor considered by the court in deciding whether the quantum of recklessness required for an aggravated assault conviction was present. We further note that Comer also involved a conviction for involuntary manslaughter, which requires proof of the same degree of recklessness as required for reckless endangerment. Though the court only addressed this issue briefly, its discussion demonstrated the far lesser quantum of recklessness necessary to sustain the conviction. I would find that such a level of recklessness was demonstrated by the Commonwealth in this case.
. I agree with the majority's disposition of appellant's sentencing issue and would, therefore, affirm the judgment of sentence in all respects.