Justice, dissenting.
I dissent from this Court’s denial of a motion for en banc hearing of points of error four, five, six, and eight, regarding mental anguish damages. I do not believe there is any evidence that Steve Shevack suffered mental anguish damages.
The panel’s statement of the evidence on damages is correct. I reproduce the same testimony to make a distinction between She-vack’s testimony about his mental anguish caused by the tort (italicized) from Shevack’s testimony about his condition immediately before the tort (non-italicized). On direct examination Shevack testified as follows:
Q: Is there any other damages that you have sustained as a result of this?
A: Yes.
Q: What are those?
A: Mental anguish.
Q: And what mental anguish have you suffered?
A: At the time I took the car in to be serviced, I had gone through some very bad times. I didn’t want to bring it up. I don’t know why counsel did.
I had been diagnosed with pancreatic— Counsel, I only have a few more months to go — I had gone through a severe financial problem and I had lost my business. My *424credit was already terrible. I had several judgments.
[Objection by defense lawyer — Star did not cause any of this, and it is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial to Star. Court overruled objection.]
******
Q: Continue, Mr. Shevack.
A: I had lost my business and lost my house. Several banks were suing me. I had a tremendous amount of medical bills, unpaid medical bills; and then this happened at a time when I was just, you know, just another thing that was just hitting me. And it was nothing I could do. I had to borrow money from my sister to make repairs on the car. There was just no other place I could go and it was just a tremendous hardship at this particular time.
1 thought the car would be ready in a week or so. I had to go rent a car and spend another $1700 for jive weeks because they couldn’t get the car out on time which was another expense I certainly didn’t need.
It was just adding insult to injury at this particular time.
Q: Now, have you consulted any doctors regarding your mental anguish?
A: Yes.
[Objections and court’s ruling]
Q: Who did you consult:
A: My doctor at M.D. Anderson.
Q: And did you consult him about this particular problem?
[Objections and court’s ruling]
Court: And you may answer the question. A: Yes.
(Emphasis added.)
This is all the evidence offered on the issue of Shevack’s mental anguish damages. There is nothing else in the record about it.
As the panel states, a tortfeasor takes a plaintiff as he finds him. Coates v. Whittington, 758 S.W.2d 749, 752-53 (Tex.1988). The panel’s point is that Shevack was a particularly vulnerable plaintiff. Even in such a case, the plaintiff is entitled to recover only for the mental distress he proves was caused by the incident, not for his condition as it existed before the tort. To recover damages for mental anguish, Shevack was required to show more than mere worry, anxiety, vexation, embarrassment, or anger. See Phar-Mor, Inc. v. Chavira, 853 S.W.2d 710, 712 (Texpp.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ denied). Shevack was required to prove painful emotions, such as grief, severe disappointment, indignation, wounded pride, shame, despair, or public humiliation. Id. at 712.
The portion of Shevack’s testimony that is not italicized does not address Shevack’s mental anguish caused by the tort. It only addresses his condition at the time of the tort. The portion of Shevack’s testimony that is italicized is the only evidence about mental anguish caused by the tort. There is no testimony in this record about Shevack’s state of mind after the incident on which this suit is based.
The panel analyzes a number of cases (dwelling more on the tort than the emotional damages) and decides that the quality of Shevack’s testimony on mental anguish damages is at least as good as that in Phar-Mor, Inc., 853 S.W.2d at 712; State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590, 599-601 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1991, writ denied), Automobile Ins. Co. of Hartford v. Davila, 805 S.W.2d 897, 907 (Texpp.—Corpus Christi 1991, writ denied), and Tidelands Auto. Club v. Walters, 699 S.W.2d 939, 945 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1985, writ refd n.r.e.).
Of the cases cited by the panel, the only one that supports its opinion is Davila. In Davila, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that even though neither of the plaintiffs testified about their emotional condition, the jury was entitled to infer the plaintiffs suffered emotional distress from the unre-paired condition of their home, their shortage of elothes and furniture, their living conditions, and testimony concerning friction between them after the fire, which indicated that they were emotional people who overreacted to stress. 805 S.W.2d at 907-8. I respectfully disagree with the Davila opinion. I do not think a court may infer emotional damages from the injury itself.
*425Although the panel cites Pkar-Mor, that opinion does not support the panel’s opinion. In Pkar-Mor, this Court reversed mental anguish damages because we found no evidence to support them. In that case, Mrs. Chavira’s husband testified his wife had headaches, was nervous, and could not sleep. Mrs. Chavira testified that “it had been rough on” her. She said she was nervous and upset. We said that Mrs. Chavira suffered only minimal discomfort from the incident; nothing that would rise to the level of grief, severe disappointment, indignation, wounded pride, shame, despair, or public humiliation. 858 S.W.2d at 713. In this case, even through Shevack was a more vulnerable plaintiff, Shevaek’s proof was not as strong as that offered by the plaintiff in Pkar-Mor, which we rejected as insufficient.
In the other opinions on which the panel relies, the plaintiffs offered far more testimony on emotional damages than did Shevack. See Tidelands Auto. Club, 699 S.W.2d at 945 (plaintiff testified he was so upset he closed himself up alone in a room for several days and did not want to see or talk to anyone; he could not sleep; he was preoccupied by the false report and could not concentrate; and became ill, disoriented and angry); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 808 S.W.2d at 599-601 (plaintiffs testified at length about their emotional reaction to the insurer’s treatment of their claims).
The panel distinguishes four other cases, unsuccessfully, I think. In those cases, the courts held that a plaintiff seeking mental anguish damages had to prove more than Shevack offered in this case. See Cronin v. Bacon, 837 S.W.2d 265, 269 (Tex.App.— Fort Worth 1992, writ denied) (plaintiff testified he was angry, which was not enough for mental anguish damages); Elliott v. Dow, 818 S.W.2d 222, 224-25 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ) (plaintiff testified he was upset and worried about the future, which was not enough for mental anguish damages); Town East Ford Sales, Inc. v. Gray, 730 S.W.2d 796, 803 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, no writ) (plaintiff testified he was anguished and felt a continuing strain, which was not enough for mental anguish damages); Roberts v. U.S. Home Corp., 694 S.W.2d 129, 136 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1985, no writ) (plaintiff testified he was mad, embarrassed, and “felt like scum,” which was not enough for mental anguish damages); North Star Dodge Sales, Inc. v. Luna, 653 S.W.2d 892, 897 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1983), aff'd in part and rev’d in part, 667 S.W.2d 115 (Tex.1984) (plaintiff admitted she was nervous, anxious, frustrated, depressed, and angry, which was not enough for mental anguish damages).
Based on this Court’s opinion in Pkar-Mor, as well as the analysis in Cronin, Elliott, Town East Ford Sales, Inc., Roberts, and North Star Dodge Sales, Inc., I would sustain points of error four, five, six, and eight.
WILSON and HEDGES, JJ., join this dissent.