concurring.
I concur in the judgment and agree with the majority’s overall analysis. I write separately because I disagree with the majority’s position that Lind v. Gresham, 672 S.W.2d 20 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no writ), is in conflict with Lorentzen v. Klies-ing, 810 S.W.2d 16 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ). The majority’s characterizations of both Lind and Lorentzen are correct as far as they go. As I read Lind and Lorentzen, however, they are distinguishable from each other and are not in conflict.
In Lind, Gresham had filed a motion for sanctions in which he asked the trial court to: (1) strike Lind’s answer; (2) hear evidence on damages; and (3) enter judgment for actual and punitive damages. 672 S.W.2d at 21.1 It was undisputed that Lind received this sanctions motion along with notice of the sanctions hearing. Id. at 21-22. Because the sanctions motion requested that the trial court hear evidence immediately and render judgment on damages, Lind had notice of that possibility. Hence, Lind had notice that the sanctions hearing could become a hearing on entry of default judgment on liability and a trial on damages. Id. Lind’s right to due process was not violated.
In Lorentzen, it was uncontroverted that Lorentzen did not receive notice of the trial setting. 810 S.W.2d at 20. The trial court violated Lorentzen’s right to due process by hearing evidence and rendering judgment without notice of that possibility. Lind would not have controlled Lorentzen. Therefore, the fact that the Lorentzen court failed to mention Lind is irrelevant.
The trial court in this case relied upon Lind for its authority to hear evidence in a pretrial conference without first notifying the answering defendant of that possibility. I agree with the majority that Lind does not authorize the trial court to do what it did.
Rather than conclude that Lind was wrongly decided, however, I would distinguish Lind on two grounds. First, in Lind, the plaintiff, Gresham, had moved for sanctions, specifically asking the trial court to strike the pleadings and hear evidence of *440damages immediately. Id. In this case, the court sanctioned Masterson on its own motion.2 And second, Lind had received notice of the hearing on Gresham’s motion for sanctions, as well as notice of the resetting of that hearing, and he knew that Gresham was requesting that the trial court strike his pleadings and hear evidence on damages. Id. at 22. In this case, without a motion for sanctions, Masterson could not have received notice of a sanctions hearing. Lind is distinguishable from Lorentzen.
Under facts comparable to those in Lind, it might be appropriate for a trial court to take such action. That situation is not before us. I would not conclude that Lind was wrongly decided.
I agree with the remainder of the majority opinion.
. "On May 3, 1983, in response to appellee’s motion for sanctions, the trial court struck appellants’ answer, heard evidence on damages, and entered judgment for appellee in the sum of $211,732.34 in actual damages, $290,000.00 in punitive damages, and $84,692.93 in attorney’s fees.” 672 S.W.2d at 21 (emphasis added).
. Masterson has consistently characterized the trial court’s action as a sanction. On appeal, Cox calls it a sanction, but in her response to Masterson's motion for new trial, Cox expressly denied that it was a sanction. The trial court did not use the word "sanction” in the pretrial conference, in the findings of fact and conclusions of law, or in the judgment, but did refer to its imposition of a sanction in the hearing on motion for new trial.