dissenting.
From the disposition and analysis of this negligent entrustment case, I respectfully dissent.
Two points of error are before this court, the first, whether Esperanza Transmission Company’s entrustment of a company truck to Havelka was a proximate cause of Barry Schneider’s injuries, and the second, whether there was sufficient evidence in the trial court to support a judgment of punitive damages against Esperanza. I would hold Esperanza’s actions in entrusting the vehicle to Havelka as a proximate cause of Schneider’s injuries for two reasons. Having found that Esperanza’s actions were a proximate cause of the injuries to Schneider, I would then hold there is evidence to support a judgment for punitive damages in this case.
Regardless of how neatly the elements of negligent entrustment are set forth in the majority opinion, the theory of negligent entrustment is premised on the combined negligence of two parties, the owner’s negligent entrustment of the vehicle and the entrustee’s negligent actions causing an injury. To hold otherwise would be to elevate form over substance. The theory of a cause of action for negligent en-trustment is a theory of direct or immediate liability of the entrustor undisturbed by subsequent intervening tortfeasors. The entrustee’s negligence does not excuse or break the chain of causation set in motion by the entrustor’s original negligent en-trustment. Hence, the entrustor, owner of the vehicle, does not become vicariously liable for the entrustee’s negligence, but remains directly liable for his own negligence. Therefore, I see no reason why the subsequent entrustment, by Havelka, to the second entrustee, Schroeder, should break a causal chain set in motion by Esperanza. It is a well settled principle of law that if an intervening cause was foreseeable by the initial wrongdoer, then the initial wrongdoer’s negligence may be considered a proximate cause of the injury, notwithstanding the intervening cause. See Bonner v. Wingate, 78 Tex. 333, 14 S.W. 790 (1890); Texas & P.R. Co. v. Bigham, 90 Tex. 223, 38 S.W. 162 (1896); City of Austin v. Schmedes, 154 Tex. 416, 279 S.W.2d 326 (1955).
The evidence at trial clearly showed that Esperanza had foreseen the possibility that Havelka might get drunk and entrust the company vehicle to another. Therefore, Esperanza’s original negligent entrustment remains a proximate cause, unbroken by the independent and intervening cause of Havelka’s entrustment, of Schneider’s injuries.
The second reason why I would hold Esperanza’s entrustment as a proximate cause of Schneider’s injuries would be because the jury found so in special issues.
Special Issue No. 5 stated:
Was Esperanza Transmission Company’s entrustment of the truck in question to Alfred Havelka a heedless and reckless disregard of the rights of others affected by it?
Answer "Yes” or “No.”
*598ANSWER: Yes.
Special Issue No. 6a stated:
Was such entrustment a proximate cause of the occurrence in question?
Answer “Yes” or “No.”
ANSWER: Yes.
These findings would remove the analysis of the case from a negligent entrustment theory to a regular negligence theory. Under this type of analysis, the issue would be whether Esperanza’s actions were the proximate cause of Schneider’s injuries. Undoubtedly, Esperanza could have foreseen that Havelka would have entrusted the vehicle to a third party and there is no question that such entrustment by Havelka was the cause in fact of the injuries. There is testimony that Esperanza gave Havelka complete discretion in deciding when, how and who could drive the truck. In letting Havelka have such broad discretion, Esperanza could foresee that Havelka might entrust the vehicle to an intoxicated driver. Esperanza testified through its vice president that Esperanza had anticipated that Havelka would use the truck to drive to bars.
Once having established that Esperanza’s entrustment of the vehicle was a proximate cause of Schneider’s injuries, the issue of whether there is evidence to support a claim for punitive damages is, in my opinion, easily answered in the positive.
In general, punitive damages can be awarded to punish the grossly tortious conduct of a wrongdoer. Specifically, the wrongdoer must have acted with an “entire want of care” which results in a knowingly indifferent attitude towards the hazards he has created as a result of the entrustment. See Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911, 920 (Tex.1981).
Esperanza had no policy of checking employees’ past driving records before entrusting vehicles to them. Before Havelka was employed, he had eleven citations for speeding. While employed by Esperanza, Havelka received four more speeding citations which culminated in the State’s intent to suspend Havelka’s license. Esperanza was aware of the proposed suspension. Esperanza, through its vice president, additionally testified that it could have anticipated that Havelka would probably use the vehicle to drive to bars. Combining the two, reckless driving and anticipated drinking, Esperanza should have been aware that Havelka was unable to maturely make responsible decisions as to the operation of the vehicle to which he was entrusted, and he represented a substantial risk to others.
To hold that this evidence, which was before the jury, was no evidence to support punitive damages would be to deny the constitutional right of the plaintiff to have the jury decide the issues and the credibility of the witnesses before them. See TEX.CONST, art. I, § 15 (Vernon 1984).
For these reasons, I would affirm in all respects the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the trial court.
RAY, KILGARLIN and MAUZY, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.