dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
There is no rational or reasonable basis to deny appellants’ ownership of agricultural land for the purpose of farming.
In Carney v. Hanson Oil Co., Inc., 690 S.W.2d 404, 407 (Mo. banc 1985), this Court stated that:
[t]he Equal Protection Clause requires states to treat uniformly all who stand in the same relation to the statute at issue. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 12 L.Ed.2d 506 (1964).... In making classifications, the state must proceed upon a rational basis. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc., v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 79 S.Ct. 437, 3 L.Ed.2d 480 (1959). *809The classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920).
The object of § 350.015 appears to be to keep corporate and foreign investment out of farming. There is no reasonable, rational basis to explain why corporations that owned or leased agricultural land prior to September 28, 1985 may keep their property and continue farming, including expansion of that property by 20% every five years, while denying corporations not owning or leasing land as of that date the opportunity to own land for farming. See also Petitt v. Field, 341 S.W.2d 106 (Mo. 1960) (excluding retail merchants that trade in commodities or other articles of personal property from obtaining a license to issue checks is arbitrary).
Section 350.030 violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the U.S. Constitution because it does not provide any guidance to the trial court in determining the appropriate penalty.
A statute can be void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 2298, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972).
Vagueness, as a due process violation, offends two important values. One is that notice and fair warning require that “laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294-2298-99, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972). See Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S.Ct. 126, 127, 70 L.Ed. 322 (1926); Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 607, 93 S.Ct. 2908, 2913, 37 L.Ed.2d 830 (1973); State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d 223, 233 (Mo. banc 1982). Additionally, the vagueness doctrine assures that guidance, through explicit standards, will be afforded to those who must apply the statute, avoiding possible arbitrary and discriminatory application. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. at 108, 92 S.Ct. at 2299; State ex rel. Williams v. Marsh, 626 S.W.2d at 233.
State v. Brown, 660 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Mo. 1983).
Section 350.030 provides that a corporation owning land in violation of §§ 350.-010-.030 must “comply with the orders of the court.” The legislature did not define “orders of the court.” Section 530.030 is vague because it does not set forth the penalties for a violation, which may result in discriminatory application of penalties by the trial court.
The cause should be reversed.