Allphin v. Butler

CLAYTON, Justice,

dissenting.

As in the companion case of Parrent v. Fannin, decided this same day, I agree with the circuit court and the Court of Appeals.

*487As the majority opinion points out, the PVAs submitted their recapitulations of the aggregate value of property in their counties on or before the first Monday in May 1980. The Department then ordered the PVAs to raise the submitted assessments under penalty of having their salaries withheld pursuant to KRS 132.690. The disposi-tive issue becomes whether the Department has the statutory power to reject the tendered assessments.

The gist of the PVAs’ argument is that the Department lacks such power after the PVAs have performed the duties of their office in good faith. Their statutory responsibilities dictate that, “The property valuation administrator shall, subject to the direction, instruction, and supervision of the department of revenue, make the assessment of all property in his county .... ” KRS 132.420. The PVAs act under a constitutional mandate to assess the property in their counties at fair market value. Ky. Const., § 172; Russman v. Luckett, Ky., 391 S.W.2d 694 (1965).

The Department, on the other hand, contends that it has the authority to reject the assessments under its general supervisory powers. KRS 131.130 provides that, “The department may make rules and regulations, and direct proceedings and actions, for the administration and enforcement of all tax laws in this state.”

The intended purpose of the statutes in question is to delegate the powers to regulate the assessment of property for tax purposes. The elected PVAs have the specific duty to assess property subject to the department’s general powers of supervision. Where two or more statutes deal with a common subject matter, the more specific enactment prevails over the general statute. Morton v. Auburndale Realty Company, Ky., 340 S.W.2d 445 (1960).

The Department further agrees that it has the power to reject the recapitulations under its authority to correct assessments contained in KRS 133.150-133.170. These statutes merely provide the power to correct assessments to guarantee equalization among the counties. The statutory requirement of equalization does not authorize the department to raise assessments after the PVAs, in good faith, have submitted their computations. See Ballard County v. Citizens State Bank of Wickliffe, Ky., 261 S.W.2d 420 (1953).

A compatible balance must be reached under which the PVAs acquire at least some autonomy in order to function in their elected offices. Otherwise, their positions become meaningless. The majority opinion characterizes the parties as a “team” in which the department acts as a “team leader.” On the contrary, the practical effect of the court’s decision is to eject the PVAs from the team altogether.

I would affirm the judgment of the trial court and the decision of the Court of Appeals.