dissenting.
This appeal requires that we determine whether a sand dune in the form of a berm lawfully erected by a property owner on beach property constitutes a “fence,” either under a restrictive covenant or under a municipal ordinance, both of which restrict, in their respective terms, the height and composition of a “fence.” After hearing the witnesses and considering the evidence before him, the Chancery Division judge ruled that the sand berm erected in this case by defendants Jack and Joyce Kassin did not constitute a “fence,” and thus denied the application of plaintiffs Sophie Bubis and Aleides Ferreira. The Appellate Division similarly held that defendants’ sand berm was not a “fence” and also denied relief to plaintiffs. The majority now holds that both the Chancery Division judge and the Appellate Division were wrong as a matter of law. According to the majority, defendants’ sand dune is a “fence,” ante, 184 N.J. 622, 878 A.2d at 821, and, although it is subject to the provisions of the Coastal Area Facility Review Act (CAFRA) governing sand dunes, see N.J.S.A. 19:9-3; N.J.A.C. 7:7E-3.16(a), defendants’ sand dune nonetheless is subject to fence restrictions in both a restrictive covenant and a municipal ordinance. Ante, 184 N.J. 624-25, 626-27, 878 A.2d at 822-23, 823-24 (2005).
Because I would affirm the determination of both the Chancery Division judge and the Appellate Division that defendants’ sand dune was not a “fence” and that “a vegetated berm, a man-made sand dune topped with trees and shrubbery, along the western portion of defendants’ property did not violate a restrictive covenant or a Village of Loch Arbour zoning ordinance limiting fence heights,” and because plaintiffs had no right to an unobstructed view across defendants’ property, I respectfully dissent.
*632I.
With respect to the application of the restrictive covenant discussed by the majority — that “no fence shall ever be erected on said lot nearer the line of said Edgemont Avenue higher than four feet” — the Appellate Division, in an unpublished opinion, held that
[t)he judge’s conclusion that the vegetated berm is not a fence is supported by the record. It is also a commonsense interpretation of the term “fence,” in the geographic location and context of the property involved.
As defendants point out, it is significant that the property is a beachfront and at the time the restrictive covenant was executed, the property contained sand dunes. ----Thus, under the factual circumstances which existed at the time the restrictive covenant was adopted, if the drafters had meant to equate fences with sand dunes, we would have expected them to so state. The fact they were not explicit indicates that they did not consider sand dunes to be fences at the time.
Finally, the judge’s conservative interpretation of the word “fence” is consistent with the general principle that private restrictions on the use of land are generally disfavored. Restrictive covenants must always be strictly construed.
I would adopt the panel’s cogent, reasonable and straightforward analysis in its entirety, noting solely that the majority ignores the fact that, to me, is dispositive in this analysis: the existence of sand dunes at the time the restrictive covenant was adopted.
II.
On the question whether defendants’ sand dune violates the municipal ordinance restricting the height and composition of a “fence,” I also concur with the Appellate Division’s analysis that “the vegetated berm is a man-made sand dune; it is not a traditional ‘fence.’ Language from the zoning ordinance supports this interpretation.” The panel rejected plaintiffs’ strained interpretation of the municipal ordinance thusly:
plaintiffs’ interpretation of the pre-1996 ordinance is unreasonable because it would have the illogical effect of making a man-made sand dune an impermissible use on a beach. It also conflicts with the intent of the drafters, who expressed clearly that the very purpose of the beach zone is “to preserve the existing natural beach area and dunes which are present in the Village for their unique beauty and recreational assets.” (emphasis added). Therefore, plaintiffs’ interpretation must be avoided. State, Tp. of Pennsauken v. Schad, 160 N.J. 156, 170 [733 A.2d 1159] (1999) (municipal ordinance should be interpreted to effectuate legislative intent in light of language used and objects sought to be achieved, and should not be construed in *633manner that leads to absurd results). The vegetated berm does not violate the Loch Arbour Land Development Regulations Ordinance.
I am in complete accord with the panel’s reasoning and adopt it as my own.
I also agree with the Appellate Division when it held that “[w]e need not address the preemption issue” for the following reasons:
Here, CAFRA preemption was only an alternative basis for the Chancery Division’s judgment on the question of whether the vegetated berm was prohibited under the Village zoning ordinance. Moreover, the judge’s opinion on CAFRA preemption was theoretical because he concluded that the Village zoning ordinance did not regulate the height of sand dunes.
That reasoning is, to me, dispositive of the question.
III.
Finally, it is important to recognize precisely what is at issue here. Implicitly, the majority subordinates a beach owner’s property rights to the following concept: plaintiffs’ purported right to “view[ ] the beach and ocean from [their] home.” Ante, 184 N.J. 617, 878 A.2d at 818 (2005). I find that concept unpersuasive, particularly in these circumstances where such “right to view the beach and ocean” was ephemeral, at best.
“[I]n the absence of a restrictive covenant, a property owner has no right to an unobstructed view across a neighbor’s property.” Bubis v. Kassin, 323 N.J.Super. 601, 616, 733 A.2d 1232 (App.Div. 1999) (citing Harwood v. Tompkins, 24 N.J.L. 425, 427 (Sup.Ct. 1854)). The very restrictive covenant on which plaintiffs and the majority rely to require the demolition of defendants’ sand dune— the deed recorded on September 5, 1887 from Stout and Johnson to Fields — specifically provides, in the clause immediately preceding the restrictive covenant concerning the fence, that the owner of defendants’ lands may build a hotel on those premises, but that hotel must accommodate a minimum of 200 guests. If plaintiffs’ acquired their property on notice of and subject to the fence restriction — something the majority concedes, ante 184 N.J. 617, 878 A.2d at 818 (2005) — then plaintiffs perforce also acquired their adjacent property on notice of and subject to the deed restriction *634concerning the construction of a hotel accommodating not less than 200 guests.1 Clearly, plaintiffs could not have had any reasonable expectation that the beach and ocean view they enjoyed was a right to be enjoyed in perpetuity; that view was subject to the same restrictive covenant plaintiffs here sued to enforce and which, in my view, defeats, as a matter of simple logic, plaintiffs’ claim of an unobstructed view across defendants’ property-
TV.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent.
Justice WALLACE joins in this opinion.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice PORITZ, Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ZAZZALI, and ALBIN — 5.
For affirmance — Justices WALLACE and RIVERA-SOTO — 2.