concurring.
I concur in the result only. The majority holds that a trial court cannot permit amendments to pleadings after judgment is rendered but during the time when the trial court retains plenary power. I believe that the authority the majority cites does not support this holding. I would hold that a trial court has discretion to permit post-trial amendments to pleadings which conform to the evidence and the jury’s verdict after judgment is rendered and during the court’s plenary period.
The trial court in the instant case signed a judgment reflecting the jury’s verdict after the trial on the merits. Twenty-nine days after the judgment was signed, appellants filed a motion to reform the judgment alleging, among other things, that the jury’s damage award was higher than the amounts pleaded in appellee’s original petition. In response, appellee filed a motion for leave to file a trial amendment asking the trial court to allow appellee to amend its trial pleadings to conform to the evidence and the jury’s verdict. The court granted appellee’s motion.
*500Rules 63 and 329b(e) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure support the conclusion that a trial court can grant post-trial amendments to the pleadings after judgment is signed during its plenary period. Rule 63 provides:
Parties may amended pleadings ... by filing such pleadings with the clerk at such time as not to operate as a surprise to the opposite party; provided, that any pleadings ... offered for filing within 7 days of the trial date, or thereafter ... shall be filed only after leave of the judge is obtained, which leave shall be granted by the judge unless there is a showing that such filing will operate as a surprise to the opposite party.
Tex.R.Civ.P. 63. Parties have a right to amend their pleadings under Rule 63. International Bhd of Elec. Workers v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 498 S.W.2d 504, 506 (Tex.Civ.App.—Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); City of Waco v. Texas Coffin Co., 472 S.W.2d 800, 804 (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco, 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This rule is liberally construed. Cuellar v. Garcia, 621 S.W.2d 646, 648 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Keelin v. Hamilton, 430 S.W.2d 268, 272 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1968, no writ).
Nowhere does Rule 63 specify an outer limit on the trial court’s power to allow amendments. It merely states the point after which a showing of surprise becomes necessary. No rule prohibits the filing of a post-judgment amendment to the pleadings.
In Greenhalgh v. Service Lloyds Ins., 787 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.1990), the case upon which the majority relies for its holding, the Texas Supreme Court wrote: “Without a showing of surprise the trial court must grant leave for a party to file the amendment when requested within seven days of trial or thereafter.” (emphasis added)1 A long list of cases permits post-trial amendments to pleadings after verdict seeking recovery of the full amount the jury assesses. See e.g. Candelier v. Ringstaff, 786 S.W.2d 41, 43 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1990, writ denied); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 610 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1984, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Adams v. Morris, 584 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex.Civ.App.—Tyler 1979, no writ); Trial v. McCoy, 581 S.W.2d 792, 795 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1979, no writ); Santa Rosa Medical Center v. Robinson, 560 S.W.2d 751, 758-59 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1977, no writ); Irwin v. Whirley, 538 S.W.2d 150, 152-53 (Tex.App.—Waco 1977, no writ); Tom’s Toasted Peanuts, Inc. v. Doucette, 469 S.W.2d 399, 402 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Texas Indus. Inc. v. Lucas, 634 S.W.2d 748, 759 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1982), reversed on other grounds Lucas v. Texas Indus., 696 S.W.2d 372 (Tex.1984) (finding no error in the trial court’s refusal to permit post trial amendment to increase the amount of damages pleaded).
Rule 329b(e) provides:
If a motion for new trial is timely filed by any party, the trial court, regardless of whether an appeal has been perfected, has plenary power to grant a new trial or to vacate, modify, correct, or reform the judgment until 30 days after all such timely-filed motions are overruled, either by written or signed order or by operation of law, whichever occurs first, (emphasis added)
Tex.R.Civ.P. 329b(e). Obviously, the trial court in this case, at any time during its plenary power, had the power to vacate its judgment, grant the post-trial amendment appellee offered and then enter a new judgment reflecting this post-trial amendment to the pleadings. See Candelier, 786 S.W.2d at 43. I see no reason why a trial court should be required to vacate its first judgment in order to grant leave to file post-trial amendments to the pleadings and then enter the exact same judgment so that the granting of the post-trial amendments can indisputably be valid under Greenhalgh, Rule 63, and Rule 329b(e). As with other post-judgment orders entered within *501the court’s plenary power, the order granting leave to file the post-trial amendments is simply a modification of the original judgment. Cf. Homeowners Funding Corp. v. Scheppler, 815 S.W.2d 884, 886-87 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1991, no writ). The trial court’s order granting leave to file the post-trial amendments is incorporated into, and becomes part of, the original judgment. Thus, an order permitting post-judgment amendments increasing damages is an order which modifies the judgment to make it conform to the pleadings and the evidence.
In addition, I would hold that the appellants waived error by failing to bring this alleged error to the trial court’s attention before judgment was rendered. Appellant had an opportunity to present evidence of surprise and object, but failed to do so.
I would hold that the trial court has the power to permit post-judgment amendments to the pleadings without going through the motions of vacating the first judgment, permitting the amendment, and then rendering a second identical judgment.
I concur only because there was no evidence to support a damage award greater than $74,008.55 under the proper standard.
. The holding of Morris v. Hargrove, 351 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex.App.—Austin 1961, writ refd n.r.e.), upon which the majority also relies, is inapplicable because it involves post-summary judgment amendments. Rule 166a(c) expressly requires that summary judgment shall be based on the pleadings on file before the summary judgment is rendered.