Brown v. State

KAPLAN, Justice,

dissenting.

I respectfully dissent. I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in requiring the court reporter to read back more of Latonya Williams’s testimony than was necessary to answer the jury’s question.

Latonya testified that she and her cousin were visiting three male friends at an apartment. A group of young men entered the apartment and started to rob the occupants. Ken Covington, one of the occupants, recognized appellant and called him by name. Another robber ordered all five occupants to strip and to get into the bathtub. Some of the robbers also went into the bathroom, while others ransacked the apartment.

The jury sent a note stating, “[W]e ... are in disagreement of who Latonya said was in the bathroom.” The trial court had the reporter reread over two pages of testimony that recapitulated appellant’s shooting of Ken Covington. Appellant was not charged with shooting Covington. Rather, appellant was tried as a party to the murder of Júniores Ray Mahan. The trial court ordered the following testimony read back to the jury. I italicize those portions that do not respond to the jury’s question:

Q. And did Junior [the complainant’s nickname], Youngster and Covington [the three males whom Latonya and her cousin were visiting] come into the restroom?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did they come in with or without clothes?
A. Without clothes.
Q. What happened then?
A. A few minutes later Ken was calling Baby Face and asked him was he going to shoot him, he can have everything he got, just let him go.
*852 Q. Where were y’all when he was talking to Baby Face?
A. In the tub.
Q. All five of y’all were in the tub? A. Yes.
Q. Was the water on or off?
A. On.
Q. Was it a shower or just a regular? A. It was a regular bathtub.
Q. No shower?
A. No sir.
Q. Did this man, the one you called Baby Face [appellant’s nickname], did he say anything to Covington?
A. He made a smart remark, I couldn’t tell you what he had said at this moment. And the next thing you know he had shot Ken in the head. Q. Shot Ken in the head. Did he in fact take his eye out?
A. Yes.
Q. After they shot Ken Covington in the head, what happened then? What’s the next thing you recall?
A. I had looked down there at Ken and when I seen his head go down, Money Mike shot me in my arm, I had passed out.
Q. Where was Money Mike when he shot you?
A. He had like one foot out the bathroom and one in the hallway.
Q. So he was halfway in the restroom and halfway out?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How many of the boys were in the restroom?
A. Just two.
Q. Two was in there and Money Mike was halfway in and halfway out?
A. Yes.
Q. So three boys were near the restroom?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where was the one that you knew as Baby Face, where was he?
A. Standing in front of the bathtub.
Q. Was he near the door too?
A. No, he was standing right in front of the bathtub.

Appellant told the police that he started to leave the apartment after the robbery when he heard shots being fired. Latonya testified that all five victims were forced into the bathroom, while some of the robbers guarded them and others went through the apartment. In context, the jury’s question was simple — did Latonya testify that appellant was one of the robbers who remained in the bathroom with the victims? The italicized portion of Latonya’s testimony could easily have been excised, and the remainder would have sufficed to answer the jury’s question. Instead, the jury once more heard damaging testimony graphically describing the shooting of another victim — a shooting that was not even the subject of the trial.

Article 36.28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that “if the jury disagree as to the statement of any witness they may ... have read to them from the court reporter’s notes that part of such witness testimony or the particular point in dispute, and no other ...” Tex.Code CRiM. ProcAnn. art. 36.28 (Vernon 1981) (emphasis added). The majority correctly notes that the trial court has discretion in determining what testimony will answer the jury’s inquiry. This formulation, however, does not mean that the trial court’s decision is entirely beyond appellate review or that a trial court cannot abuse its discretion. See Jones v. State, 706 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex.Crim.App.1986).

The jury asked a simple question — which robbers remained in the bathroom with the victims? The trial court was obligated to interpret the jury’s communication, determine what sections of the testimony would best answer the query, and limit the testimony accordingly. See Iness v. State, 606 S.W.2d 306, 314 (Tex.Crim.App.1980). The jury had before it appellant’s exculpatory statement that he was leaving the apartment when he first heard gunshots. The jurors could not agree whether Latonya had testified that appellant was one of the robbers remaining in the bathroom when the shooting occurred. No more than the last five questions and answers in the quoted portion of Latonya’s testimony would have sufficed to answer this question.

*853The majority points to the fact that the excerpted testimony begins with the statement that the three male robbery victims were in the bathroom. It concludes with the statement that appellant was standing in front of the bathtub. The majority then disingenuously states, “The remaining testimony relates to the conversations and actions of the people while they were in the bathroom.” The jury merely wanted to know whether Latonya had affirmatively placed appellant in the bathroom when the shooting occurred. The trial court permitted the court reporter not only to read back Latonya’s testimony placing appellant in the bathroom, but also permitted testimony about a shooting for which appellant was not even charged at trial. This testimony was some of the most damaging evidence presented by the State and far exceeded the scope of the jury’s inquiry.

The majority acknowledges that “this testimony may have been prejudicial to appellant.” I agree. The majority concludes that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring the reporter to read back as much as he did. I do not agree.

I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand the cause for new trial.