dissenting:
The probation revocation hearing in this case took place over six months after appellant’s conviction of murder on March 30, 1977. In evaluating the reasonableness of this delay under Pa.R.Crim.P., Rule 1409, we must focus on three factors: the length of the delay; the reasons for the delay; and the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. Commonwealth v. Young, 262 Pa.Super. 253, 396 A.2d 741 (1978); Commonwealth v. Holmes, 248 Pa.Super. 552, 375 A.2d 379 (1977); see Commonwealth v. Smith, 266 Pa.Super. 234, 403 A.2d 1326 (1979). After purporting to apply this tripartite test to the facts of this case, the majority nevertheless holds that appellant’s rights under Rule 1409 were not violated. I dissent. The record in this case contains absolutely no explanation or excuse for the delay. Moreover, appellant was clearly prejudiced by the delay as his term of probation had expired on July 2, 1977, some three months prior to the revocation hearing on October 5, 1977.
The situation presented in this case is indistinguishable from the situation presented in Commonwealth v. White, 218 Pa.Super. 188, 279 A.2d 768 (1971). In White this court held the five month delay improper where the Commonwealth offered no excuse for the delay and the hearing took place five weeks after the probationary term had expired.
The decision in White has not been overruled and not any of this court’s decisions since White have undercut it in any significant way. This court’s decisions in Commonwealth v. *60Waters, 252 Pa.Super. 357, 381 A.2d 957 (1977); Commonwealth v. Jones, 250 Pa.Super. 116, 378 A.2d 481 (1977), and Commonwealth v. Parker, 244 Pa.Super. 113, 366 A.2d 941 (1976), where delays of, respectively, five, six and one-half, and four months were held not to violate Rule 1409, are all consistent with the decision in White, for in each of those cases there was an explanation of the delay and there was no prejudice caused by the delay since the defendant’s probationary term had not expired before the revocation hearing. This court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Long, 264 Pa.Super. 465, 400 A.2d 179 (1979), likewise did not undercut the decision in White, for in Long, while the period of probation had expired before the hearing was held, the majority held that there was an adequate explanation of the delay on the record. Similarly, the decision in Commonwealth v. Williams, 254 Pa.Super. 202, 385 A.2d 979 (1978), where a five and one-half month delay was held not to be improper, does not undercut the decision in White, for while in Williams there was no explanation of the delay, there was also no prejudice resulting from it, since the probationary term had not expired before the hearing was held. Finally, the decision in Williams was followed in Commonwealth v. Diaz, 258 Pa.Super. 346, 392 A.2d 827 (1978). In Diaz, a majority of this court held that counsel was not ineffective for failing to raise a claim under Rule 1409 where the defendant’s probationary period had not expired before the revocation hearing was held and the delay was only four and one-half months. Diaz not only does not undercut the decision in White, but Judge PRICE, speaking for the majority in Diaz, cited White, saying:
Our cases have held that something less than actual prejudice may tip the balance in an appellant’s favor. Thus in Commonwealth v. White, 218 Pa.Super. 188, 279 A.2d 768 (1971), a delay of five and one-half months was held unreasonable where the original period of probation had expired five weeks prior to the revocation. We do not find that the appellant in the instant case was even technically prejudiced as was the defendant in White. *61Commonwealth v. Diaz, 258 Pa.Super. at 350 n.3, 392 A.2d at 829 n.3.
The majority in this case does not try to distinguish White, nor could it, for White is indistinguishable. In apparent recognition of its inability to distinguish White from this case the majority chooses to cite White with a prefatory “but cf.” Majority at 666. I cannot ignore an en banc decision with such ease. Since White cannot be distinguished, and since it controls (or should control) a decision by a mere panel of this court, I should hold that appellant’s rights under Rule 1409 were violated by the delay in this case.
The order of the lower court revoking probation should be reversed and the judgment of sentence vacated.