dissenting:
Our jurisdiction, like most, has somewhat grudgingly accepted the evidentiary practices governing cross-examination of character witnesses testifying on behalf of a criminal defendant. This acceptance is attributable, it seems, more to inertia than anything else, for the practices at issue, though widely practiced, have been universally and severely criticized as “illogical”, “irrational”, “nonsensical”, “archaic”, “clumsy”, even “grotesque”. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486, 69 5.Ct. 213, 223, 93 L.Ed. 168 (1948); Morris v. United States, 469 A.2d 432, 435 (D.C. 1983); Awkard v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 165, 170, 352 F.2d 641, 646 (1965).
In Michelson, supra, the Supreme Court, even while accepting the prevailing practices, most eloquently depicted their irrationality. The Court noted the anomaly of disallowing a reputation witness from testi*934fying as to his own knowledge and observation of the defendant, and constraining him to report only about hearsay he has gathered in the community, “although much of it may have been said by persons less qualified to judge than himself.” Id. 335 U.S. at 477, 69 S.Ct. at 219; see also Morris, supra, 469 A.2d at 439 (Newman, J., dissenting). The defendant must pay for this “helpful but illogical” use of character witnesses to prove his good name, by being subjected to an “equally illogical” condition on their use: the prosecution may test the witness’ credibility as a reporter for the community by asking if he has heard rumors of the defendant’s former misconduct, arrests, or convictions, the very type of evidence of character or propensity which is closed to the prosecution in its case-in-chief. Michelson, supra, 335 U.S. at 478-79, 69 S.Ct. at 219-20. This “illogical” practice is notoriously subject to abuse.
“[t]his method of inquiry or cross-examination is frequently resorted to by counsel for the very purpose of injuring by indirection a character which they are forbidden directly to attack in that way ... The value of the inquiry for testing purposes is often so small and the opportunities of its abuse by underhand ways are so great that the practice may amount to little more than a mere subterfuge....
Id. at 474 n. 4, 69 S.Ct. at 217 n. 4, quoting J. Wigmore, Evidences § 988 (3d ed. 1940).
Although recognizing that this practice “at its best opens a tricky line of inquiry as to a shapeless and elusive subject matter[, and a]t its worst ... opens a veritable Pandora’s box of irresponsible gossip, innuendo and smear”1 which, to make matters worse, the defendant has no opportunity to rebut, the majority of the Court went on to countenance the practice. Its reasoning:
We concur in the general opinion of courts, textwriters and the profession that much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and full of compromises and compensations by which an irrational advantage to one side is offset by a poorly reasoned counterprivilege to the other. But ... [t]o pull one misshapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish a rational edifice.
Id. at 486, 69 S.Ct. at 223.
I have heretofore stated my opinion concerning Michelson that “the misshapen stone condemns the entire structure. It is long past time for us to build a new one.” Morris, supra, 469 A.2d at 439 (Newman, J., dissenting). I renew my call now, perhaps even more fervently. It is bad enough to openly tolerate within the law a practice which the profession knows, and any observer can see, is highly prone to abuse and subterfuge. It is even worse when the subterfuge is used to put before the jury, under the guise of testing the character witness’ credibility, otherwise inadmissible evidence of a defendant’s prior juvenile record. I see no need to add to the ill-effects of this “condemned structure” that of subverting our well-established policy protecting the confidentiality of matters pertaining to juveniles.
That policy has long been reflected in our statutes and our case law. Confidentiality of juvenile case records is statutorily mandated, D.C.Code § 16-2331 (1981), and case records, social records, and law enforcement records relating to juvenile proceedings may be sealed two years after the final discharge of a juvenile from custody or supervision. D.C.Code § 16-2335(a). The general public is excluded from juvenile proceedings. D.C.Code § 16-23126(e). The enactment of these statutes
is founded upon strong social policy, and their aim is amnesty and oblivion for the transgressions of youthful offenders. The fundamental philosophy of the juvenile court laws is that a delinquent child is to be considered and treated not as a criminal but as a person requiring care, education, and protection.... It would be a serious breach of public faith, therefore, to permit these informal and presumably beneficent procedures to become the basis for criminal records, *935which could be used to harass a person throughout his life.
Thomas v. United States, 74 U.S.App.D.C. 167, 170-71, 121 F.2d 905, 908 (1941).
The policy respecting confidentiality of juvenile records is likewise reflected in our law of evidence. Thus, evidence of a prior juvenile adjudication may not be used to impeach the general credibility of a witness. Smith v. United States, 392 A.2d 990, 993 (D.C.1978); Brown v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 203, 207-08, 338 F.2d 543, 547-48 (1964); Thomas, supra, 74 U.S.App.D.C. at 169-71, 121 F.2d at 907-09. And recently in McAdoo v. United States, 515 A.2d 412, 418 (D.C.1986), a case which, like the present one, concerned cross-examination of a defendant’s character witness, we held that such a witness may not be impeached by being asked “if he has heard about” the defendant’s prior juvenile convictions. The holding in McA-doo was based upon two considerations. One was a concern for our policy of protecting the confidentiality of juvenile matters. The other was that because of that policy, a reputation witness is unlikely to have heard about the defendant’s prior juvenile adjudications. We concluded, therefore, that while the suggestion of a juvenile record will be highly prejudicial to defendant, the inquiry will have little probative value relative to the witness’ credibility. Id. at 418-19.
Entranced by the logic of the latter consideration, and without even such as a nod to the former, the majority now decides that while the character witness cannot be questioned about the defendant’s juvenile conviction, he may be questioned about the juvenile’s arrest. The majority reasons that because a juvenile’s arrest, unlike his conviction, is a public act of which the community will likely become apprised, knowledge of such an arrest is an appropriate test of a witness’ claim to be a reporter of the community’s view of defendant. Although the majority does mention that our decision in McAdoo was motivated in part by a concern for the confidentiality of the juvenile justice system, Maj.Op. at 932,2 it then conveniently ignores this policy when it comes to discuss the basis for its decision. There, we hear only about the fact that questions about juvenile arrests are more probative of the witness’ credibility than those about convictions. We hear nothing about the obvious fact that the prejudice inherent in such questions may likewise be greater, because not only do they divulge confidential information, they may also impugn the defendant’s character by insinuating wrongdoing when none may actually have taken place.
“[T]he general public has a pronounced tendency to view even arrest by the police — let alone actual appearance in court— as conclusive evidence of guilt, irrespective of the result of an adjudication.” Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts and Individualized Justice, 79 Harv.L.Rev. 775, 801 (1966). Thus, by the mere asking of the question, the prosecutor, “in spite of all theory and of the judge’s charge,”3 succeeds in “telling the jury what it could not prove directly and what the [defendant] had no chance to deny, namely, that he had been so arrested; and thereby either insinuating that he had been convicted of the crime or leaving to the jury to guess that this had been the outcome.” Michelson, supra, 335 U.S. at 495, 69 S.Ct. at 227 (Rutledge, J., dissenting). If it is a “breach of public faith” to allow a juvenile adjudication to be “used to harass a person throughout his life,” Thomas, supra, 74 U.S.App.D.C. at 170-71, 121 F.2d at 908-09, how much more inequitable it is for that person to be harassed with a juvenile arrest which may not even have culminated in conviction.
The majority, like the division in Devore, is content to leave the weighing of prejudice against probity to the discretion of the *936trial court. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in Michelson, supra, expressed his concerns about this solution: “Nor is it enough, in my judgment, to trust to the sound discretion of trial judges to protect the defendant against excesses of the prosecution. To do this effectively they need standards. None are provided under the Court’s ruling....” 335 U.S. at 494, 69 S.Ct. at 227. These doubts, which I share, are amplified in cases involving the disclosure of juvenile matters. In such cases, the prejudice of placing before the jury otherwise inadmissible propensity evidence is compounded by that of divulging conduct committed as a juvenile which the law, for reasons of sound policy, protects from public view. We have not seen fit to leave to the trial court’s discretion the admissibility of juvenile records to impeach a witness’ general credibility, see Smith, supra, 392 A.2d at 993, nor their use in impeaching a defendant’s character witness. See McAdoo, supra, 515 A.2d at 418. I see no reasoned basis for a different rule when the issue is not juvenile adjudications, but the wrongful acts or arrests underlying them.
Of course, I recognize that the interest in confidentiality of juvenile proceedings is not absolute. See Devore, supra, 530 A.2d at 1175; cf. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). But it takes a strong countervailing interest to overcome it. The Supreme Court has ruled that the interest in protecting the confidentiality of juvenile records must give way to the defendant’s Sixth Amendment Right to conduct effective cross-examination by showing a witness’ bias. Id. But in Smith, supra, 392 A.2d at 991-93, we drew the line on the use of juvenile convictions to impeach, holding that while they may be used to show bias, they may not be used to impeach the witness’ general credibility.
“In this as in all areas of the law, the legal principles supporting our decisions must be reasoned and consistent.” Towles v. United States, 521 A.2d 651, 661 (D.C. 1987) (en banc) (Newman, J., dissenting). If the interest in confidentiality of juvenile proceedings is sufficient to outweigh a defendant’s right to impeach the general credibility of a witness, it most certainly outweighs the prosecution’s right to “test the credibility” of a defendant’s reputation witness. McAdoo, supra. If the principles supporting confidentiality justify non-disclosure of juvenile convictions for such purposes, they must also justify non-disclosure of the wrongful act or arrest underlying the conviction. The decision in Devore and the majority’s decision in this case let in through the back door what McAdoo forbids through the front, for reasons which are, in my view, specious. It is time for the en banc court to build a new structure.
Before PRYOR, Chief Judge, MACK, NEWMAN, FERREN, BELSON, TERRY, ROGERS, and STEADMAN, Associate Judges.PER CURIAM.
ORDER
On consideration of appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc, and the opposition thereto; and it appearing that the majority of the judges of this court has voted to grant the petition for rehearing en banc, it is
ORDERED that appellant’s petition for rehearing en banc is granted and that the opinion and judgment of December 9, 1987, are hereby vacated. It is
FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk shall schedule this matter for argument before the court sitting en banc as soon as the business of the court permits. Counsel are hereby directed to provide ten copies of the briefs heretofore filed to the Clerk on or before March 21, 1988.
. 335 U.S. at 480, 69 S.Ct. at 220.
. In so doing, the majority is more candid than the division in Devore v. United States, 530 A.2d 1173 (D.C.1987), upon which the majority relies. That case held that a defendant’s reputation witness may be questioned about the wrongful acts underlying the defendant’s juvenile conviction, even if she may not be asked about the conviction itself. In the position of having to distinguish McAdoo, the Devore division, incredibly, did not even acknowledge that McAdoo was motivated in part by a concern for confidentiality of the juvenile justice system. It glossed over that concern, describing McAdoo as being "primarily based" on the lack of probity of questions regarding confidential juvenile convictions, and concluding that wrongful acts, being public, do not suffer from this problem. I regard this description of McAdoo as a distortion. The court in McAdoo plainly acknowledged our policy regarding confidentiality of the juvenile justice system, as well as the philosophy behind it. 515 A.2d at 418. These considerations played as much a part in its decision as did considerations of probity.
. Michelson, supra, 335 U.S. at 474 n. 4, 69 S.Ct. at 217 n. 4, citing J. Wigmore, supra, § 988.