Children and Youth Services of Allegheny County (CYS) appeals from an Order of the juvenile court directing CYS *527to reimburse foster parents for tuition paid by them to enroll Tameka M. in a Montessori preschool program, and to pay the cost of her continuing education in that program. The case was certified for en banc review to consider the following issues of first impression raised in a dependency proceeding under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301-6365: 1) is the order directing CYS to fund the foster parents’ placement of a dependent child in preschool final and appealable; and 2) does a juvenile court judge have authority to order CYS to a) fund the child’s placement in a non-therapeutic preschool not licensed by the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare (DPW), and b) fund the child’s placement in a preschool for which funds are not reimbursable from DPW. To place the issues in proper perspective, we must first consider the facts and procedure that preceded this appeal.
Tameka, bom January 21, 1981, was adjudicated dependent by the juvenile court and placed under supervision of CYS in March of 1983. Tameka was placed in the custody of a friend of Tameka’s natural mother. The placement proved problematic and within two weeks Tameka was placed with a foster family who had earlier received Tameka’s younger brother, Brian.
During this time period Tameka’s natural mother was directed to enroll in a program designed to assess her parenting skills and to facilitate the return of Tameka and Brian to her. She has, however, failed to follow through with the program and is no longer involved with her children. The permanent plan for both children is adoption. Tameka’s natural father has never appeared in any of the proceedings before the juvenile court.
A review of Tameka’s placement with the foster parents was held on August 31,1984. During the hearing, the issue of payment for Tameka’s attendance at preschool was considered. Testimony presented at the hearing revealed that in August of 1983 Tameka had been referred to the Parent-Child Guidance Center (Guidance Center) because of self-abusive behavior such as picking at her arms, nose and *528upper lip until they bled; After an evaluation, the Guidance Center recommended that she be placed in the South Hills Therapeutic Preschool where she was enrolled in September of 1983. The South Hills preschool was funded through Mental Health/Mental Retardation and involved no cost or expense to CYS. In December of 1983, the foster mother removed Tameka from the South Hills preschool because, according to her, Tameka’s behavior had deteriorated; for example, her screaming and tantrums had escalated. The foster mother also believed that Tameka was spending too much time at the school, causing her sleeping pattern to be interrupted. The foster parents then enrolled Tameka in a Montessori preschool in an effort to provide a more structured program for the child. The foster mother testified that Tameka’s behavior improved after the transfer. The cost of the Montessori program was originally $70 per month, but had been increased to $80 per month at the time of the hearing. The foster parents had been paying the tuition for the Montessori. school. At the review hearing, the foster parents sought reimbursement from CYS for Tameka’s attendance at Montessori. Because CYS would receive no reimbursement from DPW for Tameka’s attendance at Montessori, the agency opposed paying her tuition there.
After reviewing the testimony of the caseworker and the foster mother, and a psychological report based on an evaluation of Tameka conducted four months after she enrolled at Montessori, the juvenile court ordered CYS to reimburse the foster parents for Tameka’s attendance at Montessori. Although the court acknowledged the financial limitations of CYS, it found that Tameka’s masochistic behavior demonstrated that she had both special problems and special needs. The court noted that her behavior had deteriorated in the South Hills program, but had improved in the Montessori one and therefore the Montessori program was best suited for her special needs. The court concluded that the highly structured program at Montessori was therapeutic as well as educational and that enrollment *529there was in Tameka’s best interest. This direct appeal followed.
I.
The first issue to be resolved is whether the order is appealable. Although none of the parties have raised the issue, it is incumbent upon us to address the matter sua sponte. Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d 211 (1985); Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Bodge, 352 Pa.Super. 191, 507 A.2d 837 (1986). When the case was certified for en banc review, the parties were directed to address the appealability issue. Both parties argue that the order is appealable. Although CYS did not file a supplemental brief on the issue, it urged us, at oral argument, to so find. The child advocate assumes that the order is interlocutory, but argues that a prompt appeal best serves the interest of justice in a juvenile case and that waiting for a final order could preclude appellate review due to the length of time which may elapse before a final disposition is reached in the trial court in a dependency case.
To resolve the appealability question we first consider whether the order is a final one. Tameka was found to be dependent as that term is defined in the Act and a dispositional order was entered. An appeal cannot be taken from a dependency determination; instead, an aggrieved party must wait until an order of disposition is entered. In Interest of K.B., 276 Pa.Super. 380, 419 A.2d 508 (1980) (by Spaeth, J., with Hoffman, J. concurring in the result, and Van der Voort, J. dissenting.); In Interest of C.A.M., 264 Pa.Super. 300, 399 A.2d 786 (1979). In the present case, no appeal was taken from the dispositional order. Therefore, the case will remain active until one of the following events occurs: 1) Tameka is returned to her natural parent(s); 2) parental rights are terminated and Tameka is adopted, see In re D.K.W., 490 Pa. 134, 415 A.2d 69 (1980) (once court terminated parental rights under the Adoption Act, issue of custody under Juvenile Act became moot and it was unnecessary to make a finding whether the minor was depend*530ent), or 3) Tameka attains majority. The present plan for Tameka is adoption. Viewed in this context, the order directing CYS to pay for Tameka’s placement and continued enrollment in the preschool program at Montessori is not a final order, but is interlocutory. “[A]n order is final where it puts a litigant out of court or otherwise terminates the litigation by precluding a party from presenting the merits of a claim or defense to the trial court.” Fidelity Bank v. Duden, 361 Pa.Super. 124, 128, 521 A.2d 958, 960 (1987) (citations omitted). The present order achieves none of these results.
In addition to the fact that the order is interlocutory because the parties are not out of court and there has been no final disposition, it has been suggested that the appeal is premature because CYS has not been adjudged to be in contempt of the order and no sanctions have been imposed. Two cases are cited in support of this proposition: Hester v. Bagnato, 292 Pa.Super. 322, 437 A.2d 66 (1981) and McManus v. Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, 342 Pa.Super. 405, 493 A.2d 84 (1985). In Hester, the Appellees requested that Appellant be held in contempt of an order enforcing a settlement agreement. A hearing was held on the petition for contempt and Appellant appeared with counsel at the contempt hearing. The trial court entered an order finding Appellant in contempt for refusing to obey a prior order enforcing the settlement agreement. An appeal was taken and this Court quashed the appeal, holding that until sanctions are imposed pursuant to an order of contempt, the order holding a party in contempt is interlocutory. In McManus, plaintiff appealed from an order holding her in contempt and assessing costs for her failure to abide by prior orders of court directing her to comply with discovery. This Court quashed the appeal, finding first that the order appealed from did not dismiss the underlying assumpsit action and that sanctions had not been imposed on the finding of contempt. Plaintiff, in that case, also argued that the assessment of costs, entered pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 4019(g), was a final order. Applying the excep*531tion to the final judgment rule set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), this Court rejected plaintiffs claim, finding that the right to appellate review would not be lost if plaintiff waited until final judgment in the underlying assumpsit action.
After having carefully considered the applicability of the two cases cited to the present one, we conclude that they do not compel a finding that the entry of sanctions is a prerequisite to appealing from the order in question. In both Hester and McManus a party initiated the contempt proceedings when the contemnor failed to comply with an order of court directing them to perform an act: i.e., obey a prior order of court. Here, CYS has chosen to directly challenge the payment of school funds from the start, even before an order of contempt was sought or entered or a hearing was held on the matter. The underlying order was entered and a direct appeal was then undertaken by CYS. If this Court sua sponte were to require the initiation of contempt proceedings and the imposition of sanctions under the guise of considering the appealability issue, we would be encouraging foot dragging. The present order is complete in itself and orders CYS to pay a sum of money. Requiring contempt proceedings would add nothing to the record. Moreover, the current posture of the case reveals that if a finding of contempt and sanctions were required to make the present order appealable, CYS would have to first refuse to comply with the present order; appellee would have to initiate contempt proceedings; the trial court would have to hold a hearing and adjudge CYS in contempt of the order; and then sanctions could be imposed. Matter of Elemar, Inc., 44 Pa.Commw. 515, 520, 404 A.2d 734, 737 (1979) (“Pennsylvania Supreme Court has said that the process necessary to hold one in civil contempt requires several steps — a rule to show cause, answer and hearing, rule absolute, hearing on the contempt citation, and adjudication of contempt.”). Thus, we conclude that the absence of the entry of sanctions does not preclude a finding that the present order is appealable. However, this leaves us *532with the question of whether the present order is appealable even though it is interlocutory.
We find that the present order is appealable under the exception to the final judgment rule set forth in Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 69 S.Ct. 1221, 93 L.Ed. 1528 (1949), adopted in Pennsylvania in Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Company, 465 Pa. 225, 348 A.2d 734 (1975), and recently reaffirmed in Fried v. Fried, 509 Pa. 89, 501 A.2d 211 (1985):
In Cohen, the Supreme Court of the United States carved out an exception to the final judgment rule for situations where postponement of appeal until after final judgment might result in irreparable loss of the right asserted. Under Cohen, an order is considered final and appealable if (1) it is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action; (2) the right involved is too important to be denied review; and (3) the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost.
Id. 337 U.S. at 546, 69 S.Ct. at 1226, 93 L.Ed. at 536. Fried, 509 Pa. at 94, 501 A.2d at 214 [emphasis in original; quoting Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 73, 394 A.2d 542, 545 (1978)]. The Cohen test does not determine finality; instead, it creates an exception to the rule allowing appeals solely from final orders and applies only to orders which are interlocutory. Fidelity Bank v. Duden, supra.
As to the first requirement of Cohen, a review of the Juvenile Act reveals the following relevant purposes which the legislature sought to achieve by implementing the Act:
(1) To preserve the unity of the family whenever possible and to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this chapter.
(3) To achieve the foregoing purpose[] in a family environment whenever possible, separating the child from parents only when necessary for his welfare or in the interests of public safety.
*533(4) To provide means through which the provisions of this chapter are executed and enforced and in which the parties are assured a fair hearing and their constitutional and other legal rights recognized and enforced.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b). The Act provides for a bipartite proceeding consisting of 1) an adjudication of dependency, § 6341, and 2) a disposition of the dependent child, § 6351. Helsel v. Blair County Children & Youth Services, 359 Pa.Super. 487, 519 A.2d 456 (1986). Thus, the main cause of action consists of a dependency determination and disposition. The primacy of the dispositional order is further reflected by the fact that it constitutes a final, appealable order. Here, the order of disposition was entered in March of 1983 and it was not until August of 1984 that the present order was entered. We find that the order directing payment of the preschool funds is clearly separable from and collateral to the order of disposition; therefore, it satisfies the first part of the Cohen test.
The second requirement of Cohen is that the right involved is too important to be denied review. The purpose of the order appealed from is to assure the continued attendance of Tameka in what the trial court perceives to be a beneficial and necessary preschool program for a ward of the court. The important right at stake is Tameka’s proper mental development and receipt of the treatment necessary to insure that development, a matter which is one of the concerns addressed in the purpose section of the Juvenile Act. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1). The failure to provide Tameka with proper treatment currently may result in a lasting problem for her. Thus, the right involved is too important to be denied review since Tameka should be provided now with the care necessary for her wholesome mental development.
The final requirement of Cohen is that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claimed right will be irreparably lost. In Fried v. Fried, supra, our Supreme Court concluded that an order awarding interim counsel fees and expenses and payment of master’s fees *534and stenographic costs in a divorce action subject to the Divorce Code of 1980 did not meet the third requirement of Cohen. If it were determined that the trial court erred in making the award, the Court noted that the amounts paid under the interim order could be recovered by appropriate “adjustments in the final settlement via the equitable division of marital property, permanent alimony, and/or the final award of attorney’s fees and costs.” Id. 509 Pa. at 96, 501 A.2d at 215 (footnote omitted). Compare Beasley v. Beasley, 348 Pa.Super. 124, 501 A.2d 679 (1985) (order denying petition to bifurcate economic claims from cause of action for divorce not appealable under Cohen since right involved was not too important to be denied review and would not be irreparably lost) with Katz v. Katz, 356 Pa.Super. 461, 514 A.2d 1374 (1986) (order directing that hearings pertaining to equitable distribution of marital property be open to public is immediately appealable under Cohen due to fact that any information disclosed during hearings is not subject to recall and it would be impossible to recompense party for alleged harm resulting from disclosure of marital and financial circumstances).
In the present case, the right will be irreparably lost if review is postponed. To carry out the purposes of the Juvenile Act it is important to afford immediate treatment to a child subject to its terms. Although divorce proceedings, such as the one confronted in Fried, may last for many years, a dependency proceeding is unique since it presents a very real possibility that the case may continue until Tameka reaches majority. Even more important is the principle that a developing child be provided with the appropriate treatment immediately, otherwise he or she may suffer permanent damage. Unlike the parties in Fried, there is no amount of money that could repair such a tragedy. Although the foster parents have paid for Tameka’s attendance at the Montessori school, there is no assurance that they can or will continue to do so. On the other hand, if the trial court was without authority to enter the order, as is argued by CYS, it is unlikely that CYS would be able to seek return of the money paid out pursuant to the *535court order if review is delayed. There will be no fund available at the conclusion of a juvenile proceeding from which adjustments can be made if the order is reversed. Therefore, we hold that the order is appealable under Cohen.
II.
Having determined that the order appealed from is properly before us, we now turn to a consideration of the merits of the two issues CYS has raised on appeal. CYS argues that a juvenile court judge does not have the authority to order it to fund a child’s placement and enrollment in a non-therapeutic, Montessori preschool because (1) the preschool is not licensed by DPW, and (2) CYS will not be reimbursed by DPW for the placement.1 Set against a backdrop of limited funding, CYS submits that because funding is not available to enroll dependent children in educational preschool programs, as opposed to therapeutic preschool programs, the court does not have the authority to order CYS to fund a preschool for all of its children. Instead, CYS argues, in unique situations such as Tameka’s, special schools with Mental Health/Mental Retardation funding should be utilized. Alternatively, CYS submits that entry of the order constituted an abuse of discretion. Since it would be unnecessary to address the abuse of discretion claim if the trial court was without authority to enter the order initially, we first examine the claim concerning the court’s authority to act.
The juvenile court found that the Act gives broad discretion to a judge in determining the appropriate disposition for a dependent child, including the authority to impose whatever conditions or limitations are necessary to meet the *536best interests of the child. Looking to the disposition section of the Act, the court viewed the order for the payment of school funds as a condition or limitation on the previously entered order of disposition. The disposition section provides in relevant part as follows:
Disposition of dependent child
(a) General rule. — If the child is found to be a dependent child the court may make any of the following orders of disposition best suited to the protection and physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child:
(1) Permit the child to remain with his parents, guardian, or other custodian, subject to conditions and limitations as the court prescribes, including supervision as directed by the court for the protection of the child.
(2) Subject to conditions and limitations as the court prescribes transfer temporary legal custody to any of the following:
(i) Any individual resident within or without this Commonwealth who, after study by the probation officer or other person or agency designated by the court, is found by the court to be qualified to receive and care for the child.
(ii) An agency or other private organization licensed or otherwise authorized by law to receive and provide care for the child.
(iii) A public agency authorized by law to receive and provide care for the child.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6351. The court noted that CYS was required to 1) provide services and care ordered by the court under the Act, 55 Pa.Code § 3130.34(4); In re Lowry, 506 Pa. 121, 484 A.2d 383 (1984); 2) financially support its dependent children, Schade v. Allegheny County Institution District, 386 Pa. 507, 126 A.2d 911 (1956); and, 3) develop and carry out a treatment plan consistent with the dependent child’s individualized needs, Janet D. v. Carros, 240 Pa.Super. 291, 362 A.2d 1060 (1976).
*537In response to the final point, CYS maintains that a treatment plan tailored to Tameka’s specialized needs was already in place when she attended South Hills Therapeutic Preschool and that Montessori is a non-treatment facility. CYS argues that the trial court’s reading of the Juvenile Act and of the Supreme Court’s decision in In re Lowry are overly broad. Specifically, CYS submits that the trial judge misconstrued the dispositional section of the Act by reading it to allow him the authority to impose “whatever” conditions were necessary to carry out the ordered disposition. It is submitted that the legislature limited the phrase disposition, and the judge’s discretion, to the residential placement of the dependent child, which was the subject at issue in Lowry, and not to the payment of tuition for attendance at school programs.
The child advocate argues that the disposition and purpose sections of the Juvenile Act authorize the entry of the present order and that the trial court found that placement of Tameka in Montessori was in her best interest. It is argued that the order is a condition and limitation on her placement in the foster parents’ home as contemplated by the disposition section of the Act and that whether CYS is reimbursed by DPW for the tuition is rendered legally irrelevant by Lowry in assessing the authority of the juvenile court to enter the order. The child advocate further argues that because the order appealed from also ordered Tameka to remain with the foster parents, the order constituted a disposition under § 6351(a)(2)(i). Therefore, it gave the foster parents legal custody of Tameka and conferred the rights and duties of a legal custodian as set forth in § 6357. It is claimed that under § 6357 the foster parents are charged with the duty of providing for Tameka’s education.
CYS’ argument raised a fundamental question as to the extent of the authority the juvenile court may exercise over a child subject to its jurisdiction in a dependency proceeding and the court’s authority to order CYS to act. To define the *538extent of that authority, and to resolve the issues raised on appeal, we look to Lowry and the Juvenile Act.
In re Lowry presented our Supreme Court with the issue of whether the juvenile court had the authority under § 6351 of the Juvenile Act to order CYS to supervise and fund a court-ordered transfer of legal custody of a dependent child to an individual without the prior certification of the individual’s home as an approved foster-care home. CYS had opposed entry of the order because without certification it could not be reimbursed by DPW for the cost associated with the plácement. The trial court had transferred custody of the dependent children to the individuals under § 6351(a)(2)(i). Our Court had determined that the juvenile court was without authority to either place the children in uncertified homes, or to order CYS to supervise and fund such placement because DPW regulations required certification before the child could be placed in the foster home. The Supreme Court rejected this decision, finding that the rule-making authority of DPW, as delegated by the legislature, was binding only on CYS, not the juvenile court, see 62 P.S. § 703, and that the plain language of § 6351(a)(2)(i) required that the qualifications of the individual seeking custody are to be judged by the court.
In ordering a disposition under Section 6351, the court acts not in the role of adjudicator reviewing the action of an administrative agency, in which case, the regulations promulgated to bind that agency could not be ignored; rather the court acts pursuant to a separate discretionary role with the purpose of meeting the child’s best interests.
Id. 506 Pa. at 127, 484 A.2d at 386. The Court then considered the question of whether the juvenile court had the authority to order CYS to supervise and fund the placements. The Court noted that the Public Welfare Code and Public Welfare regulations imposed a duty on CYS to provide services and care when ordered to do so by the juvenile court pursuant to a dispositional order. Thus, the *539Supreme Court concluded that the court had the authority to enter the orders in question. In considering the fact that DPW regulations did not provide reimbursement for placement in unapproved facilities, the Court pointed out that this fact did not preclude the juvenile court from entering the order, and that any disposition of a dependent child is “guided by the overriding principle of acting 'to provide for the care, protection, and wholesome mental and physical development of children coming within the provisions of this chapter.’ 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6801(b)(1).” Id., 506 Pa. at 130, 484 A.2d at 388. The Court noted that its conclusion would help the foster parents meet the expense of caring for the dependent child and would expedite the county’s certification of the home so that it would be able to seek reimbursement from DPW for the placement.
In arguing that Lowry and the disposition statute are limited to where the child is placed, CYS seeks to capitalize on the following distinction between Lowry and the present case: in Lowry the order appealed from was a dispositional order transferring legal custody of the dependent child to the foster parents; in our case the order directs CYS to pay school funds. Based on the language of the Act, the purposes which the Act seeks to achieve, and the temporary nature of foster care, we find that the difference between the orders is immaterial in resolving the issues raised on appeal.
The Act itself provides that an order of disposition entered under § 6351(a)(1) or (2) may be made “subject to conditions and limitations as the court prescribes____” This language is repeated in the section of the Act setting forth the rights and duties of the legal custodian.
A custodian to whom legal custody has been given by the court under this chapter has the right to the physical custody of the child, the right to determine the nature of the care and treatment of the child, including ordinary medical care and the right and duty to provide for the care, protection, training, and education, and the physical, mental, and moral welfare of the child, subject to the *540conditions and limitations of the order and to the remaining rights and duties of the parents or guardian of the child.
42 Pa.C.S. § 6357 (emphasis added). The language evinces the legislature’s intent that a juvenile court judge’s order of disposition need not be limited to where the dependent child is housed, but that the order may provide for, inter alia, the wholesome mental development of the child. See § 6301(b)(1); § 6351(a). Lowry establishes that this is one of the overriding concerns of the Act. If Tameka had exhibited behavioral problems before the dispositional order was entered, the statute explicitly provides the court with the latitude to order that she receive treatment for the problem as a condition of the disposition order. We see no reason to make a distinction in the present case merely because Tameka began to exhibit problems after the order of disposition was entered.
Foster care is, by its very nature, temporary and it has been characterized as a state of limbo. In re Angry, 361 Pa.Super. 180, 522 A.2d 73 (1987); Priester v. Fayette County Children and Youth Services, 354 Pa.Super. 562, 512 A.2d 683 (1986); In re Damon B., 338 Pa.Super. 597, 488 A.2d 53 (1985). Accord In re E.F.V., 315 Pa.Super. 246, 461 A.2d 1263 (1983) (DPW has promulgated policy that no child should be allowed to drift in an out-of-home placement without the specific decision that he or she will be returned to his parents or be freed from parental custody and placed for adoption). In both In re Frank W.D., 315 Pa.Super. 510, 462 A.2d 708 (1983) and In Interest of Black, 273 Pa. Super. 536, 417 A.2d 1178 (1980) this Court noted, in dicta, that to safeguard “the permanent welfare of the child, decrees concerning children are temporary and subject to modification to meet changing conditions.” Black, 273 Pa. Superior Ct. at 549, 417 A.2d at 1185. Further, the present issue arose during a regularly scheduled review hearing of Tameka’s placement.
In light of the realities of foster care, it is essential that the juvenile court exercise its authority over the de*541pendent child until the case is finally concluded so that the child’s best interests are met despite changes in the child’s condition or environment. The juvenile court’s jurisdiction over a dependent child does not end with the entry of an order of disposition. To hold otherwise would place unfettered discretion in the hands of CYS, or any individual receiving temporary custody of a dependent child under an order of disposition, to make many of the important decisions concerning the child. One of the purposes of the Juvenile Act is “[t]o provide means through which the provisions of this chapter are executed and enforced____” 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(4). By finding that the court has the authority to enter the present order, we advance one of the purposes of the Act which is to provide for the wholesome mental development of the child.
We hold that the Supreme Court’s holding in Lowry, that the juvenile court is not bound by DPW regulations and that it may order CYS to act, applies with equal force to a decision concerning the payment of school tuition and that the trial court had the authority to enter the order here under review.
We now turn to CYS’ argument that the order constituted an abuse of discretion. CYS argues that the juvenile court erred in considering the convenience of the foster parents in entering the order. This claim is apparently based on the fact that the foster mother testified that Montessori was within walking distance of the foster home. However, our review of the record fails to reveal that the trial court gave any consideration to this factor. It is also suggested that the trial court misconstrued a psychological report on Tameka in arriving at its decision. At the hearing, CYS introduced a psychological report prepared by a clinical psychologist four months after Tameka had enrolled at Montessori. According to the court, the report indicated that Tameka benefitted from a highly structured preschool program and that she should continue to be involved in such a program. The court noted that although the report did not mention Montessori by name, it could infer that the *542psychologist considered the program in her recommendation because Tameka was enrolled there at the time, the foster mother had discussed the Montessori program with the psychologist during the evaluation, and Montessori fits the description of a structured program. After having reviewed the trial court’s opinion and the testimony presented at the hearing held on August 31, 1984, we conclude that the trial court properly considered the psychological report in arriving at its decision.
Order affirmed.
TAMILIA, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which DEL SOLE and POPOVICH, JJ., join.. CYS also argues that In re Adoption of Crystal D.R., 331 Pa.Super. 501, 480 A.2d 1146 (1984) (foster parents do not have standing to petition for termination of natural parents' rights) should be extended to the present case so that the foster parents’ rights are made subordinate to those of CYS which stands in loco parentis to Tameka. We need not consider this point because it is the juvenile court’s order we are reviewing, entered after an evidentiary hearing, and not the foster parents’ actions.