DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge FRIEDMAN.I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that Matt R. Niebauer (Niebauer) does not have a vested right to continue operating his landscaping business on Lot No. 2 in Cambria Township’s (Township) R-2 zoning district despite the fact that the Township issued a building permit to Niebauer’s family to construct a pole building on Lot No. 2 for use in a landscaping business. For the following reasons, I cannot agree.
In 1997, Niebauer’s family applied to the Township for a building permit for Lot No. 2. As part of the application, Niebauer’s family was required to identify the proposed use of the structure so that the Township could consider that use when *482deciding whether to issue the building permit. Niebauer’s family stated the proposed use as follows: “Pole Bldg — Landscaping Business.” The Township knew that its zoning ordinance did not permit a landscaping business in an R-2 zoning district; nevertheless, the Township issued the building permit. Relying on that building permit, Niebauer’s family constructed the pole building and used it in a landscaping business.
In May of 2002, the Township issued an enforcement notice stating that Niebauer’s landscaping business was not a permitted use in an R-2 zoning district. Niebauer filed an appeal with the Township’s Zoning Hearing Board (ZHB), which determined that Niebauer had a vested right in the continued operation of his landscaping business. However, Niebauer’s aunt and uncle, Richard M. Rudolph and Margaret E. Rudolph (Rudolphs), who live on the property adjacent to Lot No. 2, complained that the noise and odors generated by Niebauer’s landscaping business adversely affected the enjoyment of their property. To address the Rudolphs’ concerns, the ZHB imposed conditions on Niebauer’s continued operation of the landscaping business.
The Rudolphs filed an appeal with the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County (trial court). The trial court agreed with the ZHB that Niebauer had a vested right in the continued operation of the landscaping business, reasoning as follows:
While we concur [with the Rudolphs] that the issuance of the building permit was not “an issuance of a zoning certificate to operate a landscaping business,” the Township when it issued the building permit had knowledge, at least by implication, that the intended use of the building would be for a landscaping business; the building permit application is sufficiently clear in this regard. The building was constructed and for four years, the landscaping business was conducted, yet the Township failed to act during this period despite the fact that the use was obviously impermissible under [the] Township’s Zoning Ordinance. As a result, we find, based on the Zoning Hearing Board’s Findings of Fact, which we conclude are sufficiently supported by the evidence, that the Township acquiesced to this impermissible use and is now estopped from enforcing the Ordinance against the Nie-bauers.
(Trial court op. at 7) (emphasis added). Commenting on the ZHB’s imposition of conditions on the continued operation of the landscaping business, the trial court stated that the ZHB “is to be commended for its efforts to balance the equities involved in this matter.” (Trial court op. at 8.)
I agree with the ZHB and the trial court. In Petrosky v. Zoning Hearing Board, 485 Pa. 501, 507, 402 A.2d 1385, 1388 (1979) (quoting Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources v. Flynn, 21 Pa.Cmwlth. 264, 344 A.2d 720, 724-25 (1975)), our supreme court stated:
Ryan, in his scholarly work, discusses the applicability of the vested right doctrine to situations where a municipality has erroneously issued a building permit. His conclusion ... seems to be that after the appeal period has expired and the owner has incurred significant non-recoverable costs in reliance on the permit, the owner’s good faith reliance on the permit should afford him a vested right to complete the work, albeit the permit was issued in error.
Our supreme court then identified five factors that must be weighed in determining whether one has acquired vested rights as the result of government issued permits: *483(1) due diligence in attempting to comply with the law; (2) good faith throughout the proceedings; (3) the expenditure of substantial unrecoverable funds; (4) the expiration without appeal of the period during which an appeal could have been taken from the issuance of the permit; (5) the insufficiency of the evidence to prove that individual property rights or the public health, safety or welfare would be adversely affected by the use of the permit. Id.
With respect to Niebauer’s vested right to continue operating his landscaping business, the ZHB made the following five findings of fact:
19. [Niebauer is] exercising due diligence by attempting to comply with the ordinance by proposing to conduct all the landscaping operation within the confines of two accessory buildings.
20. [Niebauer is] making a good faith effort to comply with the requirements of the zoning ordinance.
21. Since the application for the issuance of budding permit No. 2014-1977, [Niebauer has] expended substantial unrecoverable funds and ha[s] been operating a landscaping business on the property.
22. No evidence was presented that anyone appealed the issuance of permit no. 2014 issued September 14, 1997 and any applicable appeal period has now expired.
23. Insufficient evidence was presented to prove that individual property rights or the public health, safety or welfare are adversely affected by the use of the permit for a landscaping business.
(ZHB’s Findings of Fact, Nos. 19-23.) I submit that it was reasonable for the ZHB to make these findings from the evidence in the record; therefore, the record contains substantial evidence to support these findings. Based on these findings, I conclude, as the ZHB and the trial court concluded, that Niebauer has a vested right to continue operating his landscaping business. Id.
Although this court’s scope of review requires a determination as to whether the ZHB’s findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, the majority completely ignores Findings of Fact, Nos. 19-23. Moreover, incredibly, the majority states that it is not necessary to address the five-part test for determination of a vested right because the “factual situation presented here is not one, arguably, embracing the doctrine of vested rights.” (Majority op. at 480 n. 9.) However, the “factual situation” here is the one set forth in Findings of Fact, Nos. 19-23. The ZHB is the fact-finder; those are the facts. This court has no authority to create a “factual situation” that is contrary to the ZHB’s findings.1
I would add that the majority has dismantled the local authorities’ equitable solution to a dispute that one witness characterized as “more of a family matter.” (R.R. at 91a.) The Township issued the permit, knowing that the building would be *484used in a landscaping business, and the Township had no problem with Niebauer’s landscaping business from 1997 to 2002. The Township still has no problem with Niebauer’s landscaping business, provided that Niebauer gives due consideration to his relatives next door. Although Nie-bauer has agreed to do so, the majority now has deprived Niebauer of his business without even considering the legal test for a vested right.
For all of these reasons, I would affirm.
Judge SMITH-RIBNER joins this dissent.. The majority states that the vested rights doctrine cannot apply here because the Township’s building permit did not provide for any particular use of the building, and the phrase "landscaping business” on the application cannot, by itself, provide the foundation for a vested right to operate a landscaping business. (Majority op. at 479-80.) However, if a township does not approve of the proposed use in a permit application, the township should not issue the permit. Moreover, the vested rights doctrine never rests on the permit application "by itself”; as indicated above, there are five factors that form the foundation of the vested rights doctrine.