dissenting.
The PCRA judge in this case, who also presided over appellee’s capital murder trial, specifically found that appellee’s motion for recusal was meritless, ie., that appellee had failed to prove the existence, or appearance, of any partiality, bias, prejudice, or unfairness on the part of the PCRA judge that would warrant recusal. Nevertheless, the court inexplicably proceeded to grant the meritless motion, on collateral grounds that a failure to do so might lead appellee “to pursue review” of the ruling and thereby delay the disposition of the PCRA petition. In my view, to grant a recusal request despite its lack of merit, and upon collateral grounds that are inherent in any judicial decision, is an abuse of discretion. Indeed, to grant a meritless motion merely in the hope of forestalling an appeal amounts to a total abdication of judicial discretion.
The lead opinion accurately notes that President Judge Eby “thoughtfully considered all of the grounds for recusal alleged by appellee and concluded that he was not required to recuse himself on those grounds.” Op. at 325, 839 A.2d at 241. The lead opinion does not dispute the accuracy of President Judge Eby’s assessment of the merits. In addition, it is undisputed that there was no other reason independently invoked by *329President Judge Eby rendering him incapable of presiding over this PCRA matter fairly and impartially, which would have warranted his recusal sua sponte. Thus, in affirming the recusal, the lead opinion essentially holds that motions to recuse may achieve their desired result, despite their lack of merit, merely because the unsuccessful movant might seek interlocutory appellate review of the denial. I cannot accept such a finding and I respectfully dissent.
Any party forwarding any motion may attempt to appeal an adverse decision, thereby causing potential delay. Since the prospect of an appeal and concomitant delay attends virtually every legal ruling made by a trial judge, it is capricious, at best, to grant a meritless motion merely to forestall the disgruntled party’s appeal. This case proves the point: the recusal order entered by the PCRA court led the Commonwealth to seek appellate review of the order, and the PCRA court certified that interlocutory appeal, thereby incurring the very delay President Judge Eby sought to prevent. Moreover, it is particularly capricious to invoke a concern with appellate delay as a reason to grant a meritless recusal motion. The denial of a recusal motion is not appealable as of right; thus, delay is not, in fact, inevitable even if the aggrieved party seeks to “pursue review.” Rather, delay will occur only if discretionary review is granted by an appellate court and a stay is issued.
The lead opinion properly notes that, although it is well-settled that a judge’s denial of recusal is subject to review under an “abuse of discretion” standard, see Commonwealth v. Council, 491 Pa. 434, 421 A.2d 623 (1980), neither party cites any case in this Commonwealth where an appellate court has reviewed the opposite scenario — i.e., a judge’s allegedly erroneous grant of recusal. However, both the parties and the lead opinion appear to accept the proposition that an abuse of discretion standard ought to apply when a judge grants recusal. “Judicial discretion” has been defined as, “the exercise of judgment by a judge ... based on what is fair under the circumstances and guided by the principles of law.” Black’s Law Dictionary 479 (7th Ed. 1999) (emphasis added). As the *330lead opinion notes, “the term ‘discretion’ imports the exercise of judgment, wisdom, and skill so as to reach a dispassionate conclusion, within the framework of the law. Discretion must be exercised on the foundation of reason, as opposed to prejudice, personal motivations, caprice or arbitrary actions.” Op. at 323, 839 A.2d at 240 (citing Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745, 753 (2000)) (quoting Coker v. S.M. Flickinger Co., 533 Pa. 441, 625 A.2d 1181, 1185 (1993)) (emphasis mine).
In the recusal arena, that framework of law is concerned with situations where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. See Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(1); Commonwealth v. Tharp, 830 A.2d 519, 534 (Pa.2003) (quoting Commonwealth v. Abu-Jamal, 553 Pa. 485, 720 A.2d 79, 89 (1998)). Where a jurist upon “conscientious determination” has decided that his impartiality cannot reasonably be so questioned, the fact that an aggrieved or disgruntled party may disagree and seek to appeal that ruling cannot operate to imbue the meritless motion with a validity it lacked under the framework of the law governing recusal.
I have no quarrel with deeming decisions granting recusal to be subject to an abuse of discretion standard. But, in analyzing that discretionary decision, I would be careful to distinguish between grants of recusal which are based upon the judge’s assessment of his ability to preside impartially (or the appearance of that prospect) and decisions — such as that at issue here — where the recusal was based upon some potential collateral consequence having nothing whatsoever to do with the jurist’s assessment of his impartiality. Review of a recusal based upon the judge’s determination that he is unable to preside fairly and impartially over a matter, or that appearances are such that his impartiality may fairly be questioned, properly is deferential, since the jurist at issue is in the best position to assess the effect of the alleged disqualifying factors). Indeed, in many instances, recusal properly occurs sua sponte for personal reasons which remain known only to the jurist.
*331On the other hand where, as here, a party’s recusal request is granted for reasons having nothing to do with the jurist’s alleged partiality, but instead for reasons deriving from a generic concern such as the appellate delay that may result if the aggrieved party appeals, there is no reason to defer to the self-disqualifying jurist’s determination at all. As has been noted above, appellate delay is a possibility anytime the trial court rules upon a contested issue because such rulings always leave one party aggrieved. If that generic prospect properly warrants recusal in one case, it necessarily warrants recusal in all cases. Since the generic concern with appellate delay is ever-present, the question of whether and when the prospect of avoiding the delay justifies granting a meritless recusal motion should not vary from case to case or judge to judge. It is a question which should be definitively answered by this Court, and its answer should apply equally in all similar cases. Therefore, I would hold as a matter of law that the ever-present prospect that the losing party may seek an interlocutory appeal is not a proper ground upon which to grant a meritless motion for recusal.
The lead opinion ultimately cites to the “interests of justice” standard in Pa.R.Crim.P. 903(C) as justifying the PCRA judge’s recusal decision. But, the only “interest of justice” cited by the PCRA judge was the prospect of appellate delay, a prospect which inheres in every contested decision. The interests of justice are not served by converting the party which should lose a motion on the merits into the prevailing party, merely in an attempt to appease that party and prevent it from seeking appellate review.1 Accordingly, I dissent.
Chief Justice CAPPY joins this dissenting opinion.. It is notable in this regard that appellee candidly does not attempt to defend the recusal decision on the grounds cited by the PCRA court or the lead opinion, but instead renews her merits-based recusal argument. I would reject that argument on the basis of the opinion below.