dissenting:
I begin from the premise that, conceptually, disbarment and reinstatement pose separate questions. Disbarment, as such, speaks solely to one’s exit from the profession; it does not, in itself, preclude reinstatement, either absolutely or presumptively. Put another way, reinstatement “is not a continuation of the prior [disbarment] proceeding”; it “is a new proceeding for admission to the bar.” In re Keenan, 310 Mass. 166, 168, 37 N.E.2d 516, 519 (1941).
This jurisdiction has recognized the inherent separateness of disbarment and reinstatement for over 70 years. See In re Adriaans, 33 App.D.C. 203 (1909) (reinstatement nine years after disbarment); accord, Ex Parte Peters, 195 Ala. 67, 70 So. 648 (1916); In re Lavine, 2 Cal.2d 324, 41 P.2d 161 (1935); Cantor v. Grievance Committees, 189 Tenn. 536, 226 S.W.2d 283 (1949).
This is not to say disbarment has no bearing on one’s prospects for reinstatement. It obviously does. The point, rather, is that the implication of the one for the other in individual cases (or in categories of cases) is a matter of statute, rule, and/or court decision.1 The nexus must be affirmatively established.
*100The question, then, is whether Congress not only mandated disbarment for conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude, In re Colson, D.C.App., 412 A.2d 1160 (1979), but, as an added sanction, precluded reinstatement. In considering the congressional intent, we have only the present statute, D.C.Code 1973, § 11-2503(a), and its immediate predecessor, D.C.Code 1967, § 11-2103. These acts in relevant part provide as follows:2
Section 11-2103
When a member of the bar of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia [which had exclusive disciplinary jurisdiction over attorneys prior to court reorganization] is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, ... the name of the member so convicted may thereupon, by order of the court, be struck from the role of the members of the bar, and he shall thereafter cease to be a member thereof. Upon appeal from a judgment of conviction, and pending the final determination of the appeal, the court may order the suspension from practice of the convicted member of the bar; and upon a reversal of the conviction, or the granting of a pardon, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment or suspension. [Emphasis added.]
Section ll-2503(a)
When a member of the bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude, and a certified copy of the conviction is presented to the court, the court shall, pending final determination of an appeal from the conviction, suspend the member of the bar from practice. Upon reversal of the conviction the court may vacate or modify the suspension. If a final judgment of conviction [of an offense involving moral turpitude] is certified to the court, the name of the member of the bar so convicted shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and he shall thereafter cease to be a member. Upon the granting of a pardon to a member so convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment. [Emphasis added.]
A majority of this court holds that § ll-2503(a) precludes reinstatement, stressing that (1) the words “shall thereafter cease to be a member” implies permanence, and that (2) the last sentence of § ll-2503(a), authorizing the court to “vacate or modify the order of disbarment” in the event of a “pardon,” implies there is only this one exception to permanent disbarment. Although this reasoning has force, I believe there is greater strength in the view that § ll-2503(a) does not generally bar reinstatement.
As I read the two statutes, the only relevant substantive change is from permissive (“may”) to mandatory (“shall”) disbarment *101upon conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.3 This shift in itself says nothing about whether disbarment must be permanent. Thus, for the majority to be correct, it must be prepared to say that even permissive disbarment under D.C.Code 1967, § 11-2103 had to be permanent (absent reversal of the conviction or a pardon), since the relevant language (“shall thereafter,” etc.) under both statutes is the same. Were my colleagues then to reply “Yes; disbarment had to be permanent under § 11-2103,” I would find that answer unpersuasive.
To me, the words “shall thereafter cease to be a member” connote indefiniteness— open endedness — not permanence. The word “thereafter” is a relatively weak word meaning “after that”; it does not necessarily mean “forever.” Common sense reinforces this reading of the statute: it would be anomalous for Congress to say (as it did) that disbarment for an offense involving moral turpitude was merely permissive— could be imposed or not — under § 11-2103, and yet, if invoked, had to be permanent. Although conceptually possible, this position is hardly plausible, for it would be inconsistent with the very flexibility intended by the permissive nature of the disbarment sanction itself. I cannot bring myself to believe that Congress, in adopting § 11-2103, intended such a wide gulf between suspension and disbarment.
Nor do I believe that permanence is implied by the language in § 11-2103 expressly authorizing this court to “vacate or modify the order of disbarment or suspension” upon “a reversal of the conviction, or the granting of a pardon.” (Emphasis added.) The majority’s conclusion that such language provides the exclusive basis for resumption of practice overlooks and confuses the inherent separateness of disbarment and reinstatement. Vacation or modification of an order of disbarment is not legally equivalent to an order of reinstatement. Rather, such an action is, in effect, a ruling that the original order of disbarment is void from the beginning and therefore must be erased or supplanted. That ruling does not represent a conclusion that an individual had violated a disciplinary rule but now is rehabilitated, which is the relevant concern when reinstatement is at issue. See D.C. App.R.XI, § 21(5). By interpreting the statute to mean that authority to “vacate or modify” provides the only avenue to “reinstatement,” the majority strains to make these concepts congruent when they more properly should be said to exist side-by-side.
Even if vacation or modification of disbarment could be deemed a legal, as well as functional, equivalent of reinstatement, each would comprise only a subset of this broader concept of reinstatement. Pardon and reversal of a conviction are such obvious, categorical bases for restoration of an attorney disbarred for a crime that the disbarment provision itself would appear unfair on its face (or at least to have a material omission in drafting) if these avenues of relief were not expressly recognized.4 Accordingly, I would not inflate the “vacation” or “modification” concepts to fill the entire space occupied by “reinstatement” in order to achieve the severest possible interpretation.
In short, I am not persuaded that Congress, in adopting § 11-2103, intended a double sanction: if disbarment, then permanent disbarment.
If I am correct, then there is no basis for holding that the successor statute applicable here, § ll-2503(a), requires permanent disbarment. The only change in language from § 11-2103 to § ll-2503(a) related to disbarment (from permissive to mandatory) not to reinstatement. Because the authority to “vacate or modify” the disbarment order in the event of a pardon is conceptu*102ally distinct from, or at least narrower than, the authority to grant reinstatement, I perceive no basis for saying that § 11-2503(a) retained, - let alone added, a reinstatement bar.5
Even if the foregoing discussion is not conclusive, it does suffice, I trust, to demonstrate at least that the statutory language is ambiguous as to reinstatement, not a clear mandate for permanent disbarment. Under these circumstances, given the serious deprivation of the right to earn a particular livelihood caused by disbarment, and given the substantial precedent for reinstatement, upon rehabilitation, after a period of disbarment, see note 1 supra, I would resolve the ambiguity in § ll-2503(a) by drawing upon the rule of lenity applicable to criminal cases: “When Congress leaves to the Judiciary the task of imputing to Congress an undeclared will, the ambiguity should be resolved in favor of lenity.” Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81, 83, 75 S.Ct. 620, 622, 99 L.Ed. 905 (1955). Again, by analogy: “[w]hen choice has to be made between two readings of what conduct Congress has made a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the harsher alternative, to require that Congress should have spoken in language that is clear and definite.” United States v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 344 U.S. 218, 221-22, 73 S.Ct. 227, 229, 97 L.Ed. 260 (1952). Accord, Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 695 n.10, 100 S.Ct. 1432, 1440 n.10, 63 L.Ed.2d 715 (1980); Simpson v. United States, 435 U.S. 6, 15, 98 S.Ct. 909, 914, 55 L.Ed.2d 70 (1977); Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169, 178, 79 S.Ct. 209, 214, 3 L.Ed.2d 199 (1958). Indeed, the analogy is appropriate not merely because the deprivation is so severe but, more significantly, because disbarment under § 11-2503(a) is tied directly to the criminal conviction, as an inevitable consequence.6
In summary, the majority has reached unnecessarily — and unwisely — for a result not dictated by statute.7 Whereas § 11-2503(a) is clear as to mandatory disbarment (“shall"), it can be said with assurance only that the statute makes disbarment indefi-*103mte (“thereafter ), not permanent. Accordingly, it is up to the court by way of disciplinary rules to decide whether reinstatement shall be permitted and, if so, under what terms. See D.C.Code 1973, §§ 11-2501, -2502. We have done so. D.C. App.R.XI § 21(2), (5). I therefore would resolve Ms. Kerr’s petition for reinstatement on its merits. From the court’s judgment to the contrary, I respectfully, dissent.
. Compare Levenson v. Mills, 294 F.2d 397, 399 (1st Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 954, 82 S.Ct. 397, 7 L.Ed.2d 387 (1962) (“although the [disbarment] order is permanent in form it . . . does not necessarily prevent the appellant from reinstatement”); In re Spriggs, 90 Ariz. 387, 388, 368 P.2d 456, 457 (1962) (“the law does not intend that disbarred members remain out of their profession indefinitely if the disbarred member has rehabilitated himself in society and has shown himself to be a person of good moral character”); Florida Bar v. Whiting, 157 So.2d 690 (Fla.1963) (unqualified judgment of disbarment does not preclude an attorney from ever seeking reinstatement); In re Hiss, 368 Mass. 447, 333 N.E.2d 429, 434 (1975) (“Disbarment is not a permanent punishment imposed on delinquent attorneys as a supplement to the *100sanctions of the criminal law.... Such a harsh, unforgiving position is foreign to our system of reasonable, merciful justice.") with People v. Buckles, 167 Colo. 64, 453 P.2d 404, 405 (1968) (en banc) (statute mandating disbarment for felony conviction also precludes reinstatement); In re Sugarman, 64 App.Div.2d 166, 409 N.Y.S.2d 224 (1978) (same).
The rules of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia provide that an attorney convicted of a felony “shall cease to be a member of the bar of this court” and his or her name “shall be struck from the roll of members of the bar”; however, the attorney may apply for reinstatement upon “the expiration of at least five years from the effective date of the disbarment.” D.C.D.C.R.4-3(I)(a), 4 3(VII)(b). The District Court did not have this rule as of July 29, 1970, when Congress enacted the legislation transferring the authority to admit and discipline attorneys from that court to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. See note 2 infra.
. Section 199 of the District of Columbia Court Reorganization Act of 1970 (the Act), Pub. L.No. 91 358, 84 Stat. 521, provided in part that the effective date generally would be the first day of the seventh calendar month which begins after the date of enactment, July 29, 1970, resulting in a February 1, 1971 effective date. Section 199, however, specifically deferred the provisions relating to attorneys (including § 11 2503(a)) until April 1, 1972, except that it deemed § 11 2103 amended as of February 1, 1971 with the new language of § 11 2503(a). In effect, therefore, § 11 2503(a) became the law as of February 1, 1971, although citable as § 11 2103 until April 1, 1972.
. In addition, § ll-2503(a) mandates suspension (but only suspension) until there has been a “final judgment of conviction” warranting disbarment, whereas § 11-2103 permitted disbarment pending appeal.
. If a statute providing for disbarment solely on the basis of a certificate of conviction for a crime (in contrast with the underlying facts) did not permit resumption of practice after reversal of the conviction or a pardon, due process might well require it.
. I have read the majority opinion several times. Each occasion has reinforced my impression that its only underpinning is the mandatory disbarment feature of § 11 2503(a). The opinion is premised on the fallacious assumption that this automatic sanction somehow forces the court to take a second, though logically separate, step to make the sanction even more severe: permanent disbarment. By not treating § 11 2103 and § 11 2503(a) sequentially (indeed, by not treating § 11 -2103 at all), my colleagues have slid over the significant sameness of the two statutes on the distinct, reinstatement issue.
. This relationship between the conviction and disbarment is of special concern because of the complexity, on occasion, of determining whether the crime does or does not involve moral turpitude. While some crimes, as such, inherently involve moral turpitude, we have recognized in Colson, supra, 412 A.2d at 1164-65 & n.10, 1167; id. at 1183 & n.8 (Ferren, J., concurring), that in other cases the question of moral turpitude will turn on the facts, not simply on the nature of the charge. I am therefore concerned that, by virtue of this court’s declining to use lenity to resolve any ambiguity, the Board on Professional Responsibility and, ultimately, this court will confront the added burden of trying to prevent the severity of permanent disbarment from influencing the determination as to moral turpitude.
.The result here will cause additional problems under the disciplinary rules. For example, the rules permit the Board and this court to impose reciprocal discipline based on disbarment in another jurisdiction, including disbarment attributable to a criminal conviction. D.C.App.R.XI, § 18. This is obviously more efficient than conducting a de novo inquiry in this jurisdiction. Because this court now holds that § 11 2503(a), if applicable, makes disbarment permanent, an attorney confronted by reciprocal disbarment proceedings will not necessarily have a way to resolve the moral turpitude question until he or she applies for reinstatement no earlier than five years later. D.C. App.R.XI, § 21. (For the sake of argument here I assume that the reciprocal disbarment, essentially, was for the underlying criminal offense, not on some other basis that would avoid the § 11 2503(a) issue.) This court, therefore, in fairness ought to resolve whether reciprocal disbarment based on a criminal conviction can implicate § 11 -2503(a); then, if we conclude that it does, we should amend the disciplinary rules to assure any attorney facing such reciprocal disbarment that he or she may, instead, precipitate a de novo inquiry to resolve the moral turpitude issue up front, rather than years later at a reinstatement proceeding, when evidence may have been lost and memories faded.