Huisinga v. Kemmerer (In Re Kemmerer)

SCHERMER, Bankruptcy Judge.

Wesley B. Huisinga, Trustee (“Trustee”) appeals the bankruptcy court order overruling the Trustee’s objection to the exemption claimed by the Debtor Jon Kem-merer (“Debtor”) in a certain individual retirement annuity. We have jurisdiction over this appeal final the final order of the bankruptcy court. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b). For the reasons set forth below, we reverse.

ISSUE

The issue on appeal is whether the Debtor’s individual retirement annuity is an individual retirement account within the scope of Iowa Code Section 627.6(8)(f) which the Debtor can exempt from property -of his bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2). We conclude that the Debtor’s individual retirement annuity does not fall within the scope of Iowa Code Section 627.6(8)(f) and therefore cannot be exempted from the Debtor’s bankruptcy estate.

BACKGROUND

The Debtor worked as an employee of Midland Press • Corporation (“Midland”) from 1992 through 1996. While employed at Midland, the Debtor participated in a retirement plan at Midland which qualified as a retirement plan pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 401(k) (the “Midland 401(k) Plan”). During the course of his employment, the Debtor contributed $7,903.67 to the Midland 401(k) Plan and Midland contributed $4,780.06 to the plan on the Debtor’s behalf. At the time the Debtor’s employment with Midland terminated in 1996, the Debtor had a vested balance in the Midland 401(k) Plan of $16,426.91.

On November 6, 1996, the Trustee and Administrator of the Midland 401(k) Plan issued a check in the amount of $16,426.91 payable to “Equitable of Iowa/ TTEE/IRA fbo Jon A. Kemmerer,” which amount was deposited into a newly established Equi-Select # 1466982-OP Individual Retirement Annuity account (the “Equi-Select Account”). The Equi-Select Account is an individual retirement annuity and not an individual retirement account. The Debt- ,or has not contributed any amounts to the Equi-Select Account since November 7, *521996. The Debtor has had unlimited access to the funds in the Equi-Select Account since November 7,1996.

On June 2, 1999, the Debtor and his wife, Elaine Marie Kemmerer, filed a joint petition for relief under Chapter 7 of the United States Bankruptcy Code. In his schedules filed with the bankruptcy court, the Debtor listed his interest in the Equi-Select Account as personal property on Schedule B, under item 10 entitled “Annuities”1 and claimed his interest in the Equi-Select Account as exempt under Section 627.6(8)(f) of the Iowa Code on Schedule C.

On September 2,1999, the Trustee timely filed an objection to the Debtor’s claimed exemption in the Equi-Select Account. The Debtor and the Trustee stipulated that the Equi-Select Account had a value of $21,027.82 as of June 2, 1999. After a hearing, the bankruptcy court overruled the Trustee’s objection to the Debtor’s claimed exemption in the Equi-Select Account

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The facts are not in dispute. We review the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law de novo. Fed.R.Bankr.P. 8013; Minnesota Department of Revenue v. United States, 184 F.3d 725, 727-28 (8th Cir.1999); Eilbert v. Pelican (In re Eilbert), 162 F.3d 523, 525 (8th Cir.1998); Waugh v. Internal Revenue Service (In re Waugh), 109 F.3d 489, 491 (8th Cir.1997).

DISCUSSION

Pursuant to Section 522(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor may exempt from property of the estate either. (1) certain property listed in Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, or (2) property which is exempt under applicable non-bankruptcy federal law and the state and local laws of the place where the debtor has been domiciled for the longest portion of the 180 days preceding the bankruptcy filing. A state may opt out of the exemptions enumerated in Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code, in which case a debtor whose domicile is in such state is limited to the exemptions applicable under non-bankruptcy federal law and the laws of such state and locality. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1).

The Debtor’s domicile is Iowa which has opted out of the exemptions set forth in Section 522(d) of the Bankruptcy Code. Iowa Code § 627.10 (1998). Therefore, the only exemptions available to the Debtor are those recognized by Iowa and non-bankruptcy federal laws.

Section 627.6(8)(i)of the Iowa Code permits a debtor who is a resident of Iowa to hold exempt from execution the following:

f. Contributions and assets, including the accumulated earnings and market increases in value, in any of the plans or contracts as follows:
(1) Transfers from a retirement plan qualified under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq., to another ERISA-qualified plan or to another pension or retirement plan authorized under federal law, as described in subparagraph (3).
(3) For simplified employee pension plans, self-employed pension plans, Keogh plans (also known as H.R. 10 plans), individual retirement accounts, Roth individual retirement accounts, savings incentive matched plans for employees, salary reduction simplified employee pension plans (also known as SARSEPs), and similar plans for retirement investment authorized in the future under federal law, the exemption for contributions shall not exceed, for each tax year of contributions, the actual amount of the contribution or two thousand dollars, whichever is less....

*53(Emphasis added.) Iowa Code § 627.6(8)00(1) and (3) (Supp.2000).

The issue before this Court is whether Section 627.6(8)(f) of the Iowa Code permits the Debtor to exempt the Equi-Select Account. We conclude that it does not.

By its express terms, Section 627.6(8)(f) of the Iowa Code permits the exemption of a transfer from an ERISA-qualified plan to another ERISA-qualifíed plan or to another pension or retirement plan authorized under federal law, as described in subparagraph (3). The Midland 401(k) Plan was clearly an ERISA-qualified plan. In dispute is whether or not the Equi-Seleet Account into which the funds from the Midland 401(k) Plan were transferred is “another pension or retirement plan authorized under federal law, as described in subparagraph (3).” Iowa Code § 627.6(8)00(1) (Supp.2000).

Where a statute’s language is plain, the court’s sole function is to enforce such language according to its terms. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company v. Union Planters Bank, N. A., — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 1947, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000). Exemption statutes are construed liberally in favor of the debtor, however, the purpose of such construction is to achieve the legislative intent as set forth in the statutory language, not to extend the provisions of the legislative grant. Eilbert v. Pelican (In re Eilbert), 162 F.3d 523, 526 (8th Cir.1998) (citing Iowa Methodist Hosp. v. Long, 234 Iowa 843, 12 N.W.2d 171, 175 (1943), Wertz v. Hale, 212 Iowa 294, 234 N.W. 534, 535 (1931), In re Wiley, 184 B.R. 759, 766 (N.D.Iowa 1995), Matter of Knight, 75 B.R. 838, 839 (Bankr.S.D.Iowa 1987)); Huebner v. Farmers State Bank, 986 F.2d 1222 (8th Cir.1993); see also Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 14(f) (“In construing statutes the court searches for the legislative intent as shown by what the legislature said, rather than what it should or might have said,”).

The language of Section 627.6(8)(f) of the Iowa Code is clear. It lists as within its purview specific types of pensions and retirement funds authorized under federal law. It also expressly includes similar plans for retirement investments authorized in the future under federal law. It does not, however, include similar plans for retirement investments which were authorized under federal law at the time of its enactment.2 Individual retirement annuities were authorized under federal law at the time of the enactment of Section 627.6(8)(f) but are not listed therein and therefore are not subject to exemption under Section 627.6(8)(f). Where the statutory language is clear, our inquiry need go no further.

Notwithstanding the clarity of the statutory language, the Debtor argues that the term “individual retirement account” in Section 627.6(8)(f) of the Iowa Code includes both individual retirement accounts authorized under Section 408(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and individual retirement annuities authorized under Section 408(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. 26 U.S.C. § 408. The Debtor argues that the term “individual retirement account” is a general term which includes both individual retirement accounts and individual retirement annuities. For example, .the Debtor points to Section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code which is captioned “Individual retirement accounts” yet pertains to both types of accounts. A statutory caption does not supersede the actual statutory language, however. In enacting Section 408 of the Internal Revenue Code, the United States Congress separately defined the term “individual retirement account” and the term “individual retirement annuity.” Congress neither used the terms interchangeably, nor used the term “individual retirement annuity” as a subset of “individual retirement accounts.”

*54Furthermore, throughout the Iowa Code, the Iowa legislature has separately-identified individual retirement accounts authorized under Section 408(a) of the Internal Revenue Code and individual retirement annuities authorized under Section 408(b) of the Internal Revenue Code. See, e.g., Iowa Code § 97A.6B(l)(b)(l) and (2); Iowa Code § 97B.53B(l)(b)(l) and (2); Iowa Code § 411.6B(l)(b)(l) and (2); Iowa Code § 508.36(6)(c)(2) and (7); Iowa Code § 508.38(1); Iowa Code § 602.9105(l)(b)(l) and (2). The Iowa legislature thus clearly knew how to include individual retirement annuities within the ambit of a specific provision. The lack of a reference to individual retirement annuities in Section 627.6(8)(f) is therefore a clear indication that such retirement investment vehicles do not fall within its ambit'.

We acknowledge the severity of this result for the Debtor; however, the role of this court is to enforce the statutory language according to its terms, not to expand the exemptions provided by the Iowa legislature. Hartford Underwriters Insurance Company v. Union Planters Bank, N.A., — U.S.-, 120 S.Ct. 1942, 1947, 147 L.Ed.2d 1 (2000); Eilbert v. Pelican (In re Eilbert), 162 F.3d 523, 526 (8th Cir.1998).

In his appeal, the Trustee alternately argues that if the Debtor’s individual retirement annuity falls within the scope of Iowa Code Section 627.6(8)(f), the amount which is subject to exemption is limited by Section 627.6(8)(f)(3) to either $2,000 (plus increases), assuming the transfer into the Equi-Select Account constituted a single contribution, or to $2,000 (plus increases) for each year during which contributions to the Midland 401(k) plan were made, assuming the transfer to the Equi-Select Account was a rollover and not a “single contribution.” We need not address this issue because we have determined that the Equi-Select Account does not fall within the scope of Iowa Code Section 627.6(8)(f).

CONCLUSION

As an Iowa resident, the Debtor’s exemption options are limited to those provided for by the Iowa legislature. The Debtor’s individual retirement annuity does not fall within the scope of Iowa Code Section 627.6(8)(f). The-Debtor therefore cannot exempt his interest in the Equi-Select Account from property of his bankruptcy estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(2).

. The Debtor did not list the Equi-Select Account under item 11 of Schedule B entitled "Interests in IRA, ERISA, Keogh, or other pension or profit sharing plans.”

. Subsection (f) of Iowa Code Section 627.6(8) was enacted in 1999. Individual retirement annuities were authorized under federal law at that time. See 26 U.S.C. § 408(b).