dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Under the facts presented here, I see no abuse of discretion. I believe the trial court could have found the deposition warranted on either of two independent grounds: that Randall Rolfe was not an apex witness, or that it was probable he had unique, superior knowledge of discoverable information. Moreover, I believe the trial court could properly weigh as a factor the imminent departure of the witness from this jurisdiction, as well as the convenience to all parties in deposing him locally. I would deny mandamus.
The allegations in plaintiff Wayne Mathews’ suit are twofold: (1) that he suffered a work-related depressive episode because un-derstaffing of the critical care unit forced him to work beyond capacity for extended periods without adequate staff support; and (2) that he was terminated from his employment for reporting a violation of the law regarding staffing and patient care in the critical care unit. Mathews noticed Randall Rolfe’s deposition, with subpoena duces te-cum.3 Rolfe’s deposition was the first noticed in the suit. In response, Mr. Rolfe filed his motion for protective order, urging that the deposition was being sought for the sole purpose of harassment without any attempt by plaintiff to obtain discovery through less intrusive methods, and that he was entitled to protection under Crown Central Petroleum Corp. v. Garcia. Rolfe’s affidavit in support of protective order states:
I am President and Chief Executive Officer of Columbia West Texas Division, Inc. In this capacity I do not have personal knowledge of each employee’s job duties, performance or termination, nor do I have personal knowledge regarding the day-to*76day administration of any specific unit of a hospital.
I have no personal knowledge of Wayne Mathews, his job duties, job performance or termination. I have no personal knowledge of the staffing of the Columbia Medical Center — East ICU/CCU. I was not involved in the day-to-day administrative decisions made regarding the ICU/CCU. I have no expertise in the staffing of an ICU/CCU.
The affidavit does not say that Rolfe was ignorant of corporate policy regarding staffing cuts, nor of directives from Columbia Medical Center’s parent company regarding such policy. This is a central issue in plaintiffs lawsuit, and Rolfe’s failure to deny such knowledge justifies the trial court’s ruling.
At the hearing on the motion for protective order, plaintiffs counsel stated two reasons for needing Rolfe’s testimony. First, that his purpose in taking Rolfe’s deposition was to explore the theory that a decision higher in the corporate structure had caused the staff cuts at issue here. Staffing is the most expensive part of running a hospital, counsel argued, Columbia was trying to increase profits, and he had reason to believe that directives to cut staff came from someone well above Rolfe’s rank. In support of this theory, plaintiff proffered the videotape of a Columbia administrator from Las Vegas, Nevada. This person was on record as having resigned precisely because of staffing cuts similar to those alleged in plaintiffs lawsuit here: I conclude that the trial court was justified in following Crown Central Petroleum’s directive “the trial court should first determine whether the party seeking the deposition has arguably shown that the official has any unique or superior personal knowledge of discoverable information” and determining, presumptively, that plaintiff had made the required showing. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 904 S.W.2d at 128. I see no abuse of discretion.
The trial court specifically accepted the proffers of counsel in lieu of evidence at the hearing.4 I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the evidence was insufficient to rebut the assertion that Rolfe was an apex employee. The majority is correct in noting that the record contains little to enlighten us on the corporate structure of Columbia West Texas Division, Inc., Columbia Medical Center East, or any parent company.5 I disagree with the majority, however, in its conclusion that merely stating one is the CEO of a company and that one has no personal knowledge of the individual plaintiffs plight is sufficient to trigger apex protection. This is not a situation where the deposition sought is of the head of a multi-national corporation. It stands in contrast to other apex cases. See, e.g., AMR Corporation, 926 S.W.2d at 642 (mandamus prohibiting apex deposition of president, CEO and chair of the board of AMR Corp. and American Airlines). If the majority’s standard for triggering apex protection is extended only slightly, every owner of a closely-held corporation, with an carefully drawn affidavit, may invoke apex protection whether deserved or not. This is contrary to the general rule that courts must liberally construe discovery questions in favor of disclosure, to allow litigants to obtain the fullest knowledge of the facts and issues before trial. Axelson, Inc. v. McIlhany, 798 S.W.2d 550, 553 (Tex.1990)(orig.proceeding); Kessell v. Bridewell, 872 S.W.2d 837, 842 (Tex.App.—Waco 1994, no writ).
Moreover, I see no reason why the trial court could not take into consideration that Rolfe lived in El Paso, would be moving out of the jurisdiction shortly, would reasonably be expected to have information about staffing cuts ordered by a higher authority, and *77order the deposition to proceed for those reasons. Nothing in this record smacks of harassment; rather it appears that good reasons existed for the plaintiffs attempt to depose Rolfe early in the proceedings, and that the trial court properly considered those reasons in denying the motion to quash. Although the two questions before the trial court were whether Rolfe had unique or superior knowledge of discoverable information and whether he was an apex witness, that is not the question before this court. This court decides only if the trial court abused its discretion, that is, whether the trial court could reasonably have reached only one decision, and instead reached a decision so arbitrary and unreasonable as to amount to a clear and prejudicial error of law. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839. Relators have not met that burden here.
In sum, I believeCVowro Centralis intended as a shield to protect persons far removed from a lawsuit’s subject matter from proceedings intended to harass a defendant corporation and its high ranking officers. I do not believe it was intended as a sword to prevent relevant, discoverable information from coming to light in an expeditious, convenient manner. I perceive nothing in the trial court’s order that is contrary to the purpose of Crown Petroleum,axid I certainly see nothing arbitrary or unreasonable about it.
For these reasons, I dissent.
. The subpoena requested, among other things, "[a]ny written policies or directives regarding staffing policy which you received from 1992 to the present from any person who did not work at Columbia Hospital at 10301 Gateway West in El Paso County, Texas but was employed or otherwise associated with any parent company of the defendant.”
. The trial court declined to watch the proffered video, instead asking counsel to summarize its contents, which he did. The majority implies that the trial court may not rely on such time-saving measures in discovery hearings without risking mandamus. ("Remarks by an attorney during the course of the hearing on the motion for protective order are not evidence unless the attorney is actually testifying.”) I would not so constrain the trial court. Counsel’s statements in open court, recorded for review, ought to have some value, particularly when they are an explanation of the legal and factual theories upon which the case is based. I do not read Crown Petroleumas requiring a full-blown evidentiary hearing, and I disagree with the majority's expansion of the burden to be placed on the party seeking discovery.
. At oral argument, counsel for Columbia could not shed much light on the corporate structure, either.