dissenting.
[¶ 11] I respectfully dissent. The record in this case includes a judgment by the court with findings sufficient to inform the parties and our appellate review of the factual and legal basis for the trial court’s decision on all critical issues. See Dargie v. Dargie, 2001 ME 127, ¶ 2, 778 A.2d 353, 355 (trial court has a duty to make findings sufficient to inform the parties of the reasoning underlying its conclusions and to provide for effective appellate review). If findings are sufficient to permit reasoned appellate review, a party is not entitled to further findings to address its theory of the case or explain the trial court’s rationale for reaching its result. Id. ¶ 3, 778 A.2d at 355; State v. Greenleaf, 2004 ME 149, ¶ 29, 863 A.2d 877, 883.
[¶ 12] Marie’s brief complains that the court did not make findings in several areas in which she requested findings: (1) whether she was the “primary homemaker” during the marriage; (2) the value of two items of nonmarital property, Edwin’s 50% share in a Florida Condominium and his anticipated share of and income from his mother’s estate; (3) each party’s health and work capacity; and (4) the present income and expenses of each party. Marie contends that findings on these points are essential to permit review of the decisions to equally divide the marital property and to award transitional, but not permanent, spousal support.
[¶ 13] Considering the findings the court did make, findings on none of these points is essential to inform our appellate review. To resolve the permanent spousal support issue, the court found that the “Plaintiff is essentially in a much better position today than when she married the Defendant.” The court went on to find that Marie had not given up her career for the marriage or to raise children, and that “she has *781given up a career for her own purposes which is her privilege.” Regarding property division, the court found that “the defendant made a greater contribution to the marital assets,” but that the marital property was largely acquired “because of the benevolence of the defendant’s family.” These findings were essentially adverse to Marie’s claim of meaningful contribution to the value of the marital estate through her role as a homemaker.
[¶ 14] The parties agreed on the non-marital property that would be set-aside to Edwin. There is no dispute that the value of that property was substantial — over one million dollars. With this amount of value undisputed, there was no need for the court to specify precise values to decide the marital property division and permanent spousal support issues. In fact, precise valuation would have been impossible. Edwin’s mother had died just three and one-half months before the hearing. The value of the shares of any of the heirs of her estate could not be established as of the hearing date.
[¶ 15] Finally, the decision to award transitional spousal support necessarily includes determinations that (1) Marie’s present income and assets are insufficient to meet her needs; (2) she needs assistance, support, and education to return to gainful employment; and (3) with such aids, she ultimately can earn income at an appropriate level. With these determinations, the separate findings sought regarding present income and expenses, health, and work capacity were not essential to inform our appellate review. Thus, under our precedents, if Marie had made a timely request for the findings addressed in her brief, the court could properly have denied the request based on the findings stated in the final divorce judgment. Accordingly, even if the Court is correct that the requested findings should be resubmitted, the result would be the same. Any error by the trial court in stating that the request for findings was moot, rather than simply denying the request for findings, is harmless. M.R. Civ. P. 61.
[¶ 16] The Court’s opinion sidesteps the substantive flaws in the requested findings and, instead, addresses the procedural flaw in the way the request for findings was presented, but not preserved. The court’s findings include those stated on the record on August 1, 2006, and the findings stated in the court’s written order of October 24, 2006, entered after Marie had requested findings. If Marie wanted additional findings after entry of the judgment, she should have requested those findings in accordance with M.R. Civ. P. 52(b). Rule 52(b) is not ambiguous. Once a judgment has been entered, findings may be requested within ten days after notice of the judgment. Such findings may be requested even if, as is often the case, a party has previously made a request for findings during or after a hearing.
[¶ 17] Instead of requesting findings, as was her right, Marie brought this appeal directly. In the past, we have said that we will not permit a party to skip over a necessary process in the trial court to bring an appeal challenging a trial court action they do not like, rather than giving the trial court an opportunity to address the issues the party wishes to appeal. See Jim Mitchell & Jed Davis P.A. v. Lavigne, 2001 ME 67, ¶ 4-6, 770 A.2d 109, 110 (dismissing appeal from grant of an ex parte attachment order because defendant failed to exhaust judicial remedies by not first seeking trial court dissolution of the attachment).
[¶ 18] Here, the Court does not reach the merits in a case where the trial court has entered findings and a party has neglected to file a request for additional findings pursuant to clearly established di*782rection in M.R. Civ. P. 52(b). Instead, the Court excuses Marie’s neglect to follow proper procedure and gives her a second bite at the apple. That second bite at the apple is particularly inappropriate in this case because the findings that Marie had requested were not essential for clarification of the judgment or for reasoned appellate review. As we said in Dargie, 2001 ME 127, ¶¶ 2-3, 778 A.2d at 355, when there are requests for findings, the trial court is not required to adopt whatever findings are requested. Instead, the trial court may adopt findings contrary to those requested, or it may determine, as the trial court determined here, that it had already made findings on all essential issues, in which case, no further findings are required. See Sewall v. Saritvanich, 1999 ME 46, ¶ 10, 726 A.2d 224, 226; Peters v. Peters, 1997 ME 134, ¶ 12, 697 A.2d 1254, 1258.
[¶ 19] Marie should not be given yet another chance to request more findings when she failed to make a timely request for findings after judgment and when the findings she indicates she would request are either covered by the judgment or are not essential to the judgment and, as such, will not require affirmative action by the trial court.
[¶ 20] Because the record fully supports the court’s findings and because the types of findings that Marie has indicated she would request would not affect the court’s judgment on those issues that were contested in the divorce, I would hold that the court’s treatment of Marie’s request for findings as moot should be construed as a denial of her request for findings. So construed, I would affirm the judgment.