dissenting:
While I agree with many of the concerns expressed by the majority, I find that I am constrained to respectfully dissent.
This case involves a Commonwealth appeal from a post-verdict order vacating appellees’ convictions of reckless endangerment based upon the trial court’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the verdict. I find the limited scope of the trial court’s authority in such matters critical to my analysis of this case.
The law in such matters is well-settled. The Commonwealth has a right to appeal from a post-verdict order vacating a conviction based upon an alleged insufficiency of the evidence. On appeal, we are constrained to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth must be given the benefit of all *124reasonable inferences derivable from the evidence. Commonwealth v. Grayson, 379 Pa.Super. 55, 58, 549 A.2d 593, 594 (1988); Commonwealth v. Pearsall, 368 Pa.Super. 327, 329, 534 A.2d 106, 108 (1987); Commonwealth v. Cardwell, 357 Pa.Super. 38, 47, 515 A.2d 311, 315 (1986); Commonwealth v. Reddix, 355 Pa.Super. 514, 523-24, 513 A.2d 1041, 1045 (1986). In this respect it is important to note that the effect of a motion in arrest of judgment is to admit all the facts which the Commonwealth’s evidence tends to prove, and that the trial court has no authority to engage in a post-verdict redetermination of credibility or a re-assessment of the weight to be accorded the evidence in determining the legal question of sufficiency. See Commonwealth v. Coleman, 367 Pa.Super. 108, 120, 532 A.2d 477, 483 (1987) (collecting cases).
The evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to Commonwealth as we must, establishes the following. Appellees were aware that their thirteen year old daughter was engaging in sexual intercourse with an eighteen year old man in their home (N.T. 1/24/89 at 21-22); that appellees were aware of the dangers involved in a thirteen year old’s pregnancy (Id. at 6-7); that appellees failed in any way to prevent their daughter from continuing to have sexual relations in their home (Id. at 21-22); that appellees failed to talk to their daughter about the consequences of her sexual activities (Id. at 6); that appellees allowed their daughter to go unsupervised into her bedroom alone with the man whom they knew was having sexual intercourse with her while appellees were home (Id. at 11 and 22); and that appellees’ daughter became pregnant as a result of these sexual relations. The jury found this evidence to be sufficient to convict the appellees under the relevant statute. Due to our narrow scope of review, I find the trial court exceeded its authority and in this particular case, and I feel compelled to dissent.