concurring and dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s reversal of a jury verdict in favor of Ann Bargerstock for the reasons which follow.
*416First, I disagree with the majority’s holding which appears in its first footnote. I believe that the rehiring of one employee (Carolyn Ross) after suspending both employees (Ross and Bargerstock) for the same alleged impropriety is capable of defamatory meaning. Furthermore, in light of the jury’s determination that the circumstances of the Bargerstock’s continued suspension otherwise fulfilled the elements for a claim in defamation, WGCAC’s decision to reinstate Ross but . not Bargerstock after both were suspended for the same reason is clearly directed at Bargerstock.
The jury made a determination that the investigation proceeded in a way which falsely and unjustifiably targeted Ms. Bargerstock as the guilty party in the fraud. When it has already been established that a fraud occurred, it is unrealistic to conclude, as a matter or law,1 that an employer’s decision to reinstate, and therefore exonerate, one of the two potentially guilty individuals does not at least imply that the second individual was the guilty party. It is for the properly instructed jury, and not this appellate court, to determine whether an action is defamatory in fact and to decide whether the defamation was in fact directed at the plaintiff. Moreover, under the circumstances of this case, it was not unreasonable for the jury to have determined that the reinstatement of Ross during Bargerstock’s continued suspension was defamatory by implication.2
In its first footnote, the majority implies that the fact that Ross, but not Bargerstock, was a union employee whose union filed a grievance on her behalf is an extenuating circumstance which somehow excuses WGCAC’s actions in reinstating Ross but not Bargerstock. I fail to see why a union employee, who presumably has greater protection *417against employer misconduct, should enjoy more freedom from defamation by an employer than a non-union employee or, for that matter, why Bargerstock’s cause of action should fail merely because WGCAC chose to avoid conflict with the union at the expense of a non-union employee. WGCAC could very well have avoided problems with the union by reinstating both Ross and Bargerstock until it had determined which was the guilty party. Since WGCAC did not know who had taken the money, it was equally probematic to have reinstated Ross as Bargerstock in any event.
Lastly, with respect to the majority’s sweeping holding in footnote one, I note that employers who in future wish to shield themselves from justifiable suits in defamation, without making reasonable investigation into alleged wrongdoing or using discretion to protect the reputations of their employees, need only temporarily suspend or fire more employees than could actually have committed the alleged improprieties, claim that an investigation is under way, and reinstate those employees who are least suspected, only later using care in carrying out the most significant portions of the investigation. The majority even permits the employer to retain pay withheld during the suspension after a suspended employee is cleared of any wrongdoing.
Second, I disagree with the majority’s assertion that the court’s charge to the jury was insufficient or erroneous so as to warrant a new trial. The entire charge, except for that relating to punitive damages, see infra, was sufficient and substantially correct in all respects.
Where a motion for a new trial is based on the sufficiency of the jury charge, this court must examine the charge in its entirety against the background of the evidence to determine whether error was committed. If the appellate court concludes that the charge was erroneous, a new trial will be granted only if the jury charge might have prejudiced appellant; the extent of the prejudice, however, need not be certain. Sweitzer v. Dempster Systems, 372 Pa.Super. 449, 539 A.2d 880 (1988). A review of the entire charge is necessary to determine whether error has occurred; a *418new trial will be granted only where the instruction was fundamentally erroneous. Id.; Commonwealth v. Proscodimo, No. 24 W.D. Appeal Docket 1989, Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, (filed August 17, 1990).
The majority finds that the court never adequately defined conditional privilege for the jury in order that they could determine whether a conditional privilege was abused. In fact, the trial court found that a conditional privilege existed as a matter of law and explained why the privilege attached:
Now I am instructing you as a matter of law that the defendants were privileged to discuss and communicate certain comments, and those comments were the statements that took place at the meeting on the 19th ... That meeting was, as a matter of law, a privileged conversation. The persons who were at that meeting had a right to be there because they were involved in a business decision and a business investigation. However, when those parties leave that meeting, then any action by any of them must be determined independent of that first meeting. Now that doesn’t mean that there still cannot be privileged communication or privileged statements made at a later date, but it just means that each communication must be determined upon its own merit.
(Notes of Testimony, p. 367.)
Further instruction in the same vein gave the jury more than adequate guidance as to what a privilege is and how it can be abused by indicating to the jury that communications under certain circumstances are protected because they are motivated by legitimate business concerns — which was the only kind of privilege at issue in this case. Rather than delving into the esoterics surrounding the entire law of privilege, the court communicated to the jury concrete, closely related examples of privilege upon which they could base their determinations with respect to other statements. This was entirely proper and certainly not so fundamentally erroneous as to require a new trial.
*419The majority also states that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that it could only find an abuse of privilege if it determined that the defendant acted with negligence, that is, knew or should have known of the falsity of the statement. While that portion of the instruction quoted in the majority’s opinion did not contain a clear expression of the level of intent (negligence) necessary to find that a privilege was abused, at another point in the court’s instructions3 it told the jury that it would need to find that Bargerstock’s employers acted recklessly in order to find an abuse of privilege.
Examining the charge in its entirety, as we are bound to do, reveals that the court instructed the jury that it would have to find a higher level of intent (recklessness) than is actually needed (negligence) in the making of the false statement in order to find that defendants abused their privilege. The court’s instruction, far from inappropriately prejudicing appellants, actually benefitted them. The court’s instruction also included every element which the majority states is necessary for the jury to evaluate properly the plaintiff’s assertion that a conditional privilege was abused. Reversal on this ground is therefore inappropriate.
Third, I disagree with the majority’s reversal of the trial court’s refusal to grant appellants’ post-trial motion for judgment non obstante verdicto on Bargerstock’s 42 U.S. C.A. § 1983 action.
At the outset, I note that judgment n.o.v. should be entered only in the clearest of cases, when the facts are such that no two reasonable persons could fail to agree that the verdict was improper. Any doubts should be resolved *420in favor of the verdict winner. Geyer v. Steinbronn, 351 Pa.Super. 536, 506 A.2d 901 (1986). On appeal, the sole duty of the appellate court is to decide whether there was sufficient competent evidence to sustain the verdict, granting the verdict winner the benefit of every favorable inference which can reasonably be drawn from the evidence. Id.
Contrary to the majority’s assertions, Bargerstock had alleged sufficient facts to sustain a Section 1983 action. In addition to proving injury to reputation, Bargerstock proved a change in her employment status at WGCAC. See, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972) (wherein the Court held that proof of such allegations would be sufficient to sustain a Section 1983 action).
The damages Bargerstock sought to recover were not only, as the majority asserts, her ability to secure future employment, but also damage to her reputation and her inability to work during the five-month period when she was suspended. While loss of wages does not necessarily rise to the level of an infringement of civil rights, as the majority notes, damage to reputation or the inability to pursue one’ career may. See, McKnight v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 583 F.2d 1229 (3rd Cir.1978). Contrary to the majority’s assertions, Bargerstock was entitled to be compensated for damage to her reputation and for having been unjustifiably prevented from working and pursuing her career during the five-month suspension period.
The case cited by the majority, Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976), to support its reversal of the trial grant’s refusal to grant judgment n.o.v. is completely inapposite. First, Paul did not involve defamation of an employee by the state employer and no break in employment was suffered by the defamation plaintiff. Second and more importantly, McKnight v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, a Third Circuit case which referred to Pennsylvania law in determining the scope of the “liberty” interest to be protected under § 1983, *421distinguished Paul, in which Kentucky law was at issue, because the Pennsylvania Constitution enunciates a state policy of protecting the right of reputation with which a federally-based cause of action would be consistent. Kentucky law, on the other hand, does not extend to its citizens any legal guarantee of present enjoyment of reputation which was been affected by the actions of government officials in Paul. Therefore, the instant case is governed by McKnight rather than Paul and the majority’s reversal of judgment n.o.v. is inappropriate.
I do concur, however, in the majority’s assertion that the court’s instructions regarding punitive damages were insufficient. While I disagree with the majority’s finding that the court did not give a definition of actual malice, I find that the court did neglect to instruct the jury that it would need to find clear and convincing evidence of actual malice before awarding punitive damages. Because the court failed to instruct the jury that a higher burden of proof is required in order to award punitive damages, I would remand for a trial on that issue alone.
. This is the clear and explicit import of the majority’s holding.
. I also note that at the trial court adequately instructed the jury that the defamatory statement must apply to the plaintiff:
... You must also consider whether or not the application of that [defamatory] statement was to the plaintiff. Certainly Mrs. Bargerstock would not make up a claim for a defamatory statement made against myself or you; it must be against her____
. At pages 362-63 of the trial transcript, the court instructed the jury properly that plaintiff has the burden of proving abuse of privilege.
At page 386, the court instructed the jury as follows:
“Now if you find that a defamatory communication was made with disregard as to whether it was true or false, then you may find that the privilege which I just discussed was abused.”
This instruction actually required the plaintiff to produce evidence of recklessness, which is a higher standard than the law requires, before the jury could find liability. Thus the charge unfairly benefitted, rather than prejudiced, appellants.