On exceptions. The respondent’s demurrer to an indictment intended to charge the statutory crime of cheating by false pretenses was overruled below. The respondent contends that the indictment is fatally defective.
We are concerned here only with so much of the indictment as purports to allege the false pretenses and the negation of the truth thereof. Those portions recite that the respondent “did falsely pretend to (the complainant) that he (the respondent), the duly elected and qualified Mayor of the City of Biddeford, Maine, for the year 1960, and ex officio, by virtue of his office, a member of the Board of Education for the City of Biddeford, Maine, and also a member of the Biddeford High Building Committee, which last mentioned Committee was charged with the responsibility of making all arrangements in contracting for the construction of a new Biddeford High School in Biddeford, Maine, had through the color of his office, been one of the persons responsible for the said (complainant) to obtain the contract for the building and construction of the said new Biddeford High School for the City of Biddeford, Maine, and that for services rendered by him, for and in behalf of the said (complainant), the said (respondent), in his said capacity as aforesaid, for all the work he had performed with respect thereto, should have and receive the sum of $12,000.00 for use in his political campaign; whereas, in truth and in fact, the said (respondent), in his said capacity as the duly elected Mayor, ex-officio member of the Board of Education and member of the new Biddeford High Building Committee did not, by virtue of his office or otherwise, influence the action of the Board of Education and Biddeford High Building Committee resulting in the said (complainant) obtaining the contract for the construction of the new Biddeford High School Building, * * (Emphasis supplied.)
*218The guiding principles are set forth in the leading case of State v. Paul, 69 Me. 215, 217. A mere expression of opinion will not suffice to support a criminal prosecution for cheating by false pretenses. There must be a “direct and positive assertion” negating the truth of the alleged false pretenses.
We are concerned here only with the italicized portions of the indictment as above set forth. Whether or not the respondent was “one of the persons responsible” was a matter of opinion rather than fact. It reflected the judgment and conclusion of the speaker upon a matter as to which opinions might well differ. The representation smacks of political puffing. It falls far short of the requirement that the pretenses must relate to facts. The indictment is in no way strengthened by the additional italicized phrases. Whether the respondent rendered any unspecified services or performed any work which was of value to the complainant, and more particularly of the value of $12,000, was certainly more a matter of opinion than of fact. There is included no recitation as to what comprised the “services” or “work performed.” As was stated in State v. Paul, supra, at page 217: “The terms are indefinite. What one man would regard as valuable another might not. Where the representations embraced no details or particulars they should not be relied on.”
The indictment is fatally defective in another respect. The attempted negation that the respondent “did not by virtue of his office or otherwise, influence the action of the Board * * * and * * * Committee” is not a “direct and positive assertion” negating the truth of the pretenses. The respondent is not charged with having pretended that he influenced the action of any Board or Committee. There is here no denial that the respondent was “one of those responsible” or that he “rendered services” or “performed work.” If the respondent had done no more than vote for *219the letting of a contract to the complainant, he might in his own opinion have been “one of those responsible,” rendering valuable service to the complainant without otherwise influencing the action of his fellow board members. We cannot supply the requisite collision between the alleged false pretenses and the negation of the truth thereof “by any intendment, argument or implication.” State v. Paul, supra, at page 118; see State v. Perley, 86 Me. 427, 431; State v. Beattie, 129 Me. 229, 232.
For the purposes of this case it can be said that the respondent can be compelled to answer only to an indictment which charges him clearly and explicitly with having made false pretenses as to matters of fact, which facts are directly and positively alleged not to be true. (See R. S., Chap. 133, Sec. 11, as amended for statutory exception not pertinent here).
For all of the foregoing considerations the entry must be
Exceptions sustained.