Fernandez v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance

PER CURIAM.

The judgment of the Appellate Division is affirmed substantially for the reasons expressed in the thorough and thoughtful opinion by Judge Gilroy. Fernandez v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 402 N.J.Super. 166, 952 A.2d 1156 (App.Div.2008). As the panel aptly concluded, this matter is governed by the principles previously set forth in Knox v. Lincoln General Insurance Co., 304 N.J.Super. 431, 701 A.2d 445 (App.Div.1997), and reaffirmed in David v. Government Employees Insurance Co., 360 N.J.Super. 127, 821 A.2d 564 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 251, 837 A.2d 1094 (2003). Applying that precedent to the instant matter required that the cost of providing PIP benefits to the victim be *593borne by the insurer of the responsible party, here the tortfeasor. We add only the following.

Unlike our colleagues in the dissent, we are not persuaded that there is a compelling policy need or statutory basis to justify reinterpretation of the No-Fault Law,1 specifically N.J.S.A. 39:6A-9.1, to achieve a result different from that reached by the appellate panel. The Appellate Division’s decision correctly held that the insurer of the responsible party, and not the injured victim’s insurer, was liable for the expense of PIP benefits for the victim. Simply because that conclusion diminishes the total amount available to the victim from the tortfeasor’s policy of insurance does not produce an unjust result. Rather, that conclusion advances stability in the insurance marketplace by requiring that the ultimate cost of PIP benefits be borne by the insurer of the responsible party, not by the insurer of the victim. That result has been the controlling application of the No-Fault Law in this state for more than a decade, undisturbed by any legislative disapproval. It is sophistic to declare that interpretation to be suddenly unreasonable or contradictory to the No-Fault Law as presently written.

We recognize that the Legislature may decide that a different policy is preferable and may alter the law; that is its province. Until that occurs, we affirm the Appellate Division’s application of settled law in this matter.

New Jersey Automobile Reformation Reform Act, N.J.S.A. 39:6A-1 to -35.