concurring.
In this capital-murder appeal, the defendant, James Edward Williams, was convicted of the knowing and purposeful murder of Beverly Mitchell and sentenced to death. I concur in the Court’s conclusion that the defendant’s murder conviction and death sentence must be reversed. While I agree in part with the essential conclusions of the Court, I write separately to point out that reversal of the conviction and sentence, in my view, is required for additional reasons.
I.
This appeal is one of several capital-murder cases that followed the Court’s initial decisions, State v. Biegenwald, 106 N.J. 13 (1987), appeal after remand, 110 N.J. 521 (1988), and State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123 (1987), in which the Court held that New Jersey’s capital murder-death penalty act, N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3, substantially satisfies constitutional requirements. Its holdings, however, evade finality. There are myriad circumstances that constantly affect the critical issues in death-penalty prosecutions. Decisional law regularly presents new and varying applications of capital-murder standards, demographic evidence and statistical data continue to inform us about the ramifications of the death penalty, and the absence of guided prosecutorial discretion and proportionality review creates a gaping void in our death penalty jurisprudence. These factors serve to reshape our perceptions of constitutional doctrine, unsettle the law of capital murder, and mandate constant reconsideration of capital murder-death penalty issues. Because death-penalty law remains in flux, I continue to adhere to my position that the death-penalty statute, as enacted and applied, violates constitutional and fundamental fairness standards. State v. Gerald, 113 N.J. 40, 48 (1988) (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 391 (1988) (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting). I believe it is necessary and important to explain the reasons that justify this position.
*459In State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 345, 382-404, I asserted, among other positions, that the capital-murder statute should be held to violate this State’s constitutional requirement of due process and prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, as well as standards of fundamental fairness. Arbitrary enforcement of the act, in my view, derives in substantial measure from the statute’s broad definition of capital murder in combination with the application of aggravating factors that are vague, susceptible of varying interpretations and fail adequately to guide jury discretion both in defining the class of death-eligible defendants and in imposing the ultimate penalty. Ibid. I acknowledge that the Court has moved in the direction of reducing some of these constitutional shortcomings by narrowing somewhat the definition of capital-murder, see, e.g., State v. Gerald, supra, and clarifying the standards governing aggravating factors, see, e.g., State v. Ramseur, supra, but the constitutional gaps, in my view, remain wide. See, e.g., State v. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. 40, 48-56 (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Rose, 112 N.J. 454, 481-87 (1988) (Handler, J., dissenting). I have stressed, also, that the absence of guided prosecutorial discretion in this statutory framework can lead only to the arbitrary, and thus unconstitutional, enforcement of the act. See State v. Bey (II), 112 N.J. 123, 131 (1988) (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. Koedatich, 112 N.J. 225, 276 (1988) (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 404-08 (Handler, J., dissenting). Further, while the Court appreciates the need and urgency of meaningful proportionality review, see State v. Koedatich, supra, 112 N.J. at 258-59, the continuing absence of proportionality review within this statutory scheme is a fatal constitutional flaw because there is no other way under the statute to correct an arbitrary or discriminatory death sentence. State v. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 72 (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 404-08 (Handler, J., dissenting).
I have, in addition, urged the Court to adopt an express enhanced standard of review that can be applied to eapital-mur-*460der prosecutions, a standard that would address particularly the unique issues of a capital-murder case without inadvertently or unnecessarily distorting the principles that govern other criminal cases. See State v. Bey (I), 112 N.J. 45, 52-65 (1988) (Handler, J., concurring). Under this enhanced standard, courts should engage in a searching review of the trial record, and on finding error, apply a different and stricter measure for determining whether the error is reversible. Ibid. I reiterate that we are dealing with capital crime, the prosecution of which fundamentally implicates community values that can be brought to bear only through the deliberations of the jury. It is therefore imperative to invoke a process of appellate review that directs attention to the jury’s deliberative responsibility, rather than one that simply examines its conclusion. State v. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 391 (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting). The test, as I view it, must concern itself primarily with the direct and indirect impact of trial-level events on the jury itself and, particularly, with the fairness of the presentation and consideration of evidence. Such a test in capital cases must be more critical and incisive than conventional appellate review, which in the ordinary case is strongly influenced by the pragmatic desire to salvage a conviction, and consequently concentrates its criticism on the ostensible correctness of the verdict. Unlike the conventional “harmless error” or “plain error” or “unjust result” analyses, in which the appellate court looks to whether the error contributed to and indeed changed the verdict itself, the enhanced standard concentrates on the intrinsic fairness of the overall prosecution, and, especially, on whether the jury was able fully to engage in unfettered deliberations untainted by error. The question in a capital murder appeal thus should be whether, in the face of error, the State can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there was no realistic likelihood that the error had a prejudicial influence or effect on the jury’s deliberations of guilt. State v. Bey (II), supra, 112 N.J. at 131-44 (Handler, J., dissenting).
*461These considerations, as well as substantive differences, bear on my disagreements with the Court in this case. The majority in this appeal has found grounds other than those of constitutional or statutory invalidity for the reversal of defendant’s capital-murder conviction and death sentence. These relate to the inadequacy of the voir dire and selection of the jury and to prosecutorial misconduct with respect to the introduction of and reference to inadmissible evidence. I do not differ from the Court that grave error attended the impanelling of the jury and the prosecutorial treatment of particular evidence. In my opinion, however, each of these trial deficiencies would separately and independently warrant reversal of the conviction and sentence.
II.
Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to excuse for cause prospective juror Pfeiffer, who expressed strong feelings in favor of applying the death penalty in all murder cases regardless of the specific facts. As a result, defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge to dismiss Ms. Pfeiffer, and ultimately expended all twenty of his allotted peremptory challenges.
I fully agree with the Court that juror Pfeiffer’s answers to voir dire questions disclosed that her ability to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors was substantially impaired by a pro-death penalty bias. In indicating that she would automatically impose a death sentence for deterrence purposes even if the circumstances warranted a life sentence, Ms. Pfeiffer indisputably demonstrated her unfitness to serve as a juror. Ante at 437-39. The Court rules expressly and unequivocally that “on the basis of what was learned of Ms. Pfeiffer’s death penalty views during the voir dire, ... the trial court erred in failing to excuse this prospective juror for cause.” Ante at 440-41.
In finding that the trial court erred despite the fact that juror Pfeiffer never did sit on the jury, the majority thus acknowl*462edges the significance of the right of a peremptory challenge. It finds, further, that whatever prejudice may be attributed to that loss was compounded by a voir dire so inadequate as to leave in doubt the ultimate impartiality of the jury; it is the combination of errors — the failure to discharge Ms. Pfeiffer for cause leading to the loss of a peremptory challenge and the failure to conduct the searching voir dire required in all capital cases — that requires reversal of both the guilt and penalty phases. Ante at 445. The Court, however, chooses not to reach the question whether the wrongful deprivation of one peremptory challenge, when the defendant exhausts his full complement of challenges, warrants reversal. I would address that issue and reverse on that ground.
This Court recently noted that under the Federal Constitution it is not reversible error to fail to excuse for cause a juror who is thereafter peremptorily dismissed by a defendant who exhausts all his peremptory challenges “[s]o long as the jury that sits is impartial....” State v. Bey (II), supra, 112 N.J at 154 (citing Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S.-,-, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d 80, 90 (1988)). The Court posited, however, a sliding scale against which to measure the prejudice of the wrongful denial of a peremptory challenge. It recognized that “forcing a defendant to waste a peremptory challenge could force defense counsel to be more cautious in the exercise of remaining peremptories,” and expressly admonished trial courts to “be particularly sensitive in capital cases to the defendant’s right to a full complement of twenty peremptory challenges.” Ibid. 112 N.J. at 155. “As the defendant approaches the exhaustion of his or her peremptory challenges," the Court continued, “the trial court should become increasingly sensitive to the possibility of prejudice from its failure to dismiss the juror for cause.” Id. at 155 (emphasis added).
Despite the indication in Bey (II), supra, that the standard involved a sliding scale on which prejudice would be reached when all peremptories have been exhausted, the majority here seemingly adopts a jury-bias standard as the operative test for *463reversal. This can be inferred from its approving reference to the standard as formulated in Ross v., Oklahoma, supra, namely, that “[s]o long as the jury that sits is not impartial,” the wrongful denial of a peremptory challenge is not prejudicial or reversible. 487 U.S. at-, 108 S.Ct. at 2278, 101 L.Ed.2d at 90. It also is suggested by the Court’s insistence that the concomitant inadequacy of voir dire is a crucial factor contributing to the potential bias of the jury.
I strongly disagree with the Court’s approach and analysis. I think it is entirely illusory to posit a jury-bias test for determining the significance of a wrongful denial of a peremptory challenge. As noted, under that test prejudice occurs only if “the jury that sits is not impartial.” Ibid. Jury bias, however, will almost never be provable, at least if there is adequate voir dire. It is self-evident that jurors who are impanelled will not have been excused for cause, presumably because such cause had not been shown. By definition, then, it will not be possible for a defendant, in objecting to the wrongful denial of a peremptory challenge, to show that the impanelled jury is “not impartial.”
If, on the other hand, there has been inadequate voir dire, resultant jury bias may readily be presumed and the deficient voir dire itself could be a sufficient basis for reversal. The denial of the peremptory challenge in that posture of a case becomes nothing but a procedural peccadillo.
The denial of a peremptory challenge, however, is surely not a matter of trial trivia, particularly when all peremptories have been used. An analysis that trivializes this particular error misperceives the objectives of proper jury selection. Unfortunately, the jury-bias test endorsed by this Court does just that. The jury-bias test fails wholly to appreciate that the ultimate object of jury selection embraces a combination of values. The goal is to enable the parties, within the bounds of reasonable practicability as determined by our rules of procedure, to select fair and impartial jurors and, further, to select from among *464such jurors those who conform to each party’s perception of jurors who are especially suited to determine the issues in the particular case being tried. The key to the selection of such jury is the peremptory challenge. See State v. Brunson, 101 N.J. 132, 136-38 (1985). However, in this case, the point of the peremptory challenge is lost. By concentrating attention solely on the voir dire and resultant jury bias, the test espoused by the Court treats the wrongful denial of a peremptory challenge as virtually irrelevant.
Thus, jury bias as such is not a meaningful standard and cannot be the critical test for determining the significance to a defendant of the wrongful deprivation of a peremptory challenge. I submit the standard should be whether the defendant was unfairly deprived of the opportunity, through the exercise of peremptory challenges, to secure a jury that consists not only of impartial and qualified persons impanelled in accordance with the rules governing jury selection, but who are otherwise satisfactory and suitable to the defendant.1
There is some suggestion in our cases that jury bias is important, if not dispositive, in determining whether the wrongful deprivation of a peremptory challenge is prejudicial and justifies a reversal. See, e.g., Wright v. Bernstein, 23 N.J. 284 (1957). Nevertheless, we have not adopted a jury-bias standard. See, e.g., State v. Pereira, 202 N.J.Super. 434, 438 (App.Div.1985); State v. Hammond, 107 N.J.Super. 588, 589-90 (App.Div.1969). Undoubtedly, the existence of such bias, or even the presence of potential, albeit unexplored bias, can be *465relevant. In State v. Deatore, 70 N.J. 100, 105 (1976), for example, the Court held that the trial court’s refusal to question a prospective juror about the extent of her relationship with the victim justified reversal, notwithstanding the fact that the defendant challenged her peremptorily. In that case, as here, defendant ultimately exhausted his peremptory challenges and was denied additional challenges. The Court indicated that the error was indeed prejudicial because the exhaustion of defendant’s peremptories prevented defendant from challenging a subsequent juror who mentioned two relatives employed as corrections officers.
Regardless of the relevance of jury-bias as a viable test in civil cases, e.g., Wright v. Bernstein, supra, or in ordinary criminal cases, e.g., State v. Deatore, supra, it cannot serve as the standard in á capital case. The presence of actual bias or even the possibility of potential or latent bias of impanelled jurors cannot become the exclusive or controlling consideration in assessing the inherent fairness of a capital-murder prosecution.
As noted, the jury-bias test is suggested by Ross v. Oklahoma, supra, 487 U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80. We should not, however, accept Ross v. Oklahoma as an influential or persuasive precedent. We have acknowledged that federal decisions are unreliable authority in determining our own constitutional death-penalty jurisprudence. We have just recently repudiated a similar federal lead. In both State v. Gerald, supra, 113 N.J. at 70-80, and State v. Marie Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 300-01 (1988) the Court adopted the rationale of Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and refused to follow the Supreme Court’s later decision Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 107 S.Ct. 1676, 95 L.Ed.2d 127 (1987), which significantly curtailed the Enmund decision. There is even less compulsion for us to follow the Supreme Court in Ross.
*466The application of Ross to our law is misguided and unfortunate because Ross itself represents a dramatic retrenchment from the view taken by the Supreme Court just a year ago in Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 107 S.Ct. 2045, 95 L.Ed.2d 622 (1987). In Gray, a majority of the Court rejected as “unpersuasive” the argument that the erroneous exclusion for cause of a death-scrupled juror was harmless because the State retained a peremptory challenge that it could have used to excuse the juror. As the Supreme Court stated in Gray, “the relevant inquiry is ‘whether the composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly have been affected by the ... error.’” Id. at 665, 107 S.Ct. at 2055, 95 L.Ed.2d at 637 (quoting Moore v. Estelle, 670 F.2d 56, 58 (5th Cir.), (specially concurring opinion), cert. den., 458 U.S. 1111, 102 S.Ct. 3495, 73 L.Ed.2d 1375 (1982)). The Ross Court’s contrary position, which focuses exclusively on the actual impartiality of a given jury, simply ignores the due process-related argument that “everyone concedes that the trial judge could not arbitrarily take away one of the defendant’s peremptory challenges. Yet, that is in effect exactly what happened here.” Ross v. Oklahoma, supra, 487 U.S. at-, 108 S.Ct. at 2280, 101 L.Ed.2d at 92 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.).
The Court in this case should conclude that an erroneous failure to dismiss a juror for cause, leading to an expenditure of one of defendant’s peremptory challenges and the ultimate exhaustion of defendant’s allotment of challenges, warrants reversal. The Court in State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55 (1979), while finding that the trial court had not erred in refusing to dismiss the juror in question for cause, noted the gravity of the issue when a defendant has thereafter exhausted all his peremptory challenges. The Court emphasized that “[j]ury selection is an integral part of the process to which every criminal defendant is entitled” and that “ ‘the denial of the right of peremptory challenges is the denial of a substantial right.’ ” Id. at 62 (quoting Wright v. Bernstein, supra, 23 N.J. at 295. *467Three dissenting justices, moreover, determined under the circumstances that the denial of the peremptory challenge in that case was indeed error, with one concluding that “the denial to defendant of the full range of choice accorded by the allowance of the right to challenge jurors peremptorily constituted reversible error.” Id. at 82.
The view that the denial of a single peremptory challenge warrants reversal has been adopted by the Appellate Division. State v. Pereira, supra, 202 N.J.Super. at 488; State v. Hammond, supra, 107 N.J.Super. at 590; accord People v. O’Hare, 117 A.D.2d 757, 759, 498 N.Y.S.2d 478, 480, app. den., 67 N.Y.2d 948, 494 N.E.2d 126, 502 N.Y.S.2d 1041 (1986) (New York court rule requires reversal where erroneous denial of challenge for cause prompts defendant to exhaust peremptories prior to completion of jury selection). Further, while the Supreme Court now adheres to the view that the Federal Constitution does not require the automatic reversal rule, see, e.g., Ross v. Oklahoma, supra, a number of federal courts have taken the position that automatic reversal results from the denial of a peremptory challenge where defendants’ peremptory challenges are ultimately exhausted. See, e.g., United States v. Ricks, 776 F.2d 455 (4th Cir.1985), cert. den. sub nom. King v. U.S., 479 U.S. 1009, 107 S.Ct. 650, 93 L.Ed.2d 705 (1986); United States v. Martin, 749 A.2d 1514, 1518 (11th Cir.1985); United States v. Allsup, 566 F.2d 68, 71 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Turner, 558 F.2d 535, 538 (9th Cir.1977); United States v. Nell, 526 F.2d 1223, 1230 (5th Cir.1976); United States v. Boyd, 446 F.2d 1267, 1275 n. 27 (5th Cir.1971). But see United States v. Brown, 644 F.2d 101, 104 (2d Cir.) (2-1 decision taking the opposite view), cert. den., 454 U.S. 881, 102 S. Ct. 369, 70 L.Ed.2d 195 (1981). This rule does not “[r]est on constitutional grounds but on the common-law principle that the ‘denial or impairment of the right is reversible error without a showing of prejudice.’ ” Celestine v. Blackburn, 750 F.2d 353, 360 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219, 85 S.Ct. 824, 835, 13 L.Ed.2d 759, 772 (1965)), cert. den., 472 U.S. 1022, *468105 S.Ct. 3490, 87 L.Ed.2d 624, reh. den., 473 U.S. 925, 106 S.Ct. 16, 87 L.Ed.2d 695 (1985)).
In urging the position that the denial of the peremptory in these circumstances is reversible error, I need do no more than adopt and adapt Justice Clifford’s analysis in Singletary, supra, 80 N.J. 55. Here, as in the Singletary case, the trial court erroneously failed to excuse a juror for cause, thereby forcing defendant to expend a peremptory challenge to dismiss that juror; here, as in Singletary, defendant ultimately exhausted his allotment of peremptory challenges, i.e., entitled to twenty, he was, in effect, accorded but nineteen; and here, as stressed by Justice Clifford in Singletary, “[tjhat ... is the rub.” 80 N.J. at 69.
Any diminution of or infringement upon [the] legislatively granted opportunity [to excuse any juror peremptorily] deprives defendant of as fair a trial as our rules permit. Defendant’s argument here, with which I agree, is that his claim of error derives from his due process guarantees and from our standards of fair trial, whereas his entitlement to relief springs from the legislative grant of twenty peremptory challenges and his right thereto, which he was denied. [Id. at 71 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).]
What this analysis underscores is that a defendant’s right to challenge peremptorily even impartial and qualified jurors is one that belongs exclusively to the party. Its function is not to supplement or complement the trial court’s responsibility to excuse jurors for cause; nor, is it intended to be a safety net to catch the court’s error in failing to excuse an unqualified juror. “Purity of the right to be tried by an impartial jury is so zealously guarded that an accused may covet his peremptory challenges and ‘spend’ them as he alone sees fit....” State v. Morrison, 557 S.W.2d 445, 446 (Mo.1977). No one can dispute that “in a criminal case ... defendant is afforded twenty opportunities to excuse any venireman peremptorily — for a good reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all...” State v. Singletary, supra, 80 N.J. at 74 (Clifford, J., dissenting). But cf. State v. Gilmore, 103 N.J. 508 (1986) (prosecutorial exercise of peremptory challenges based on race violates defendant’s right to impartial jury).
*469In State v. Bey (II), supra, I stressed that the erroneous refusal by the Court to excuse a juror for cause, which forced the defendant to exercise a peremptory challenge, is not “harmless” nor does its prejudicial effect depend exclusively on whether a defendant has exhausted his peremptory challenges. 112 N.J. at 142 (Handler, J., dissenting). I emphasized that every time a peremptory challenge is “wasted” on a juror who should have been excused for cause, the calculus is altered with respect to the rest of the panel and the defendant’s right to his full complement of challenges is abridged. Peremptory challenges are usually exercised during the course of jury selection with no clear sense of the overall jury composition. Cf. State v. Morrison, supra, 557 S.W.2d at 446 (peremptory challenges with respect to a “struck jury” are exercised in light of the composition of the entire qualified jury panel.)2 Each exercise of a peremptory entails the risk that a subsequent venireperson who would be qualified for cause later during the voir dire could not be removed by a peremptory challenge because of the earlier expenditure of such challenges; the defendant cannot intelligently weigh each potential juror against others, making the exercise of each peremptory challenge a greater gamble and a more fateful decision. Indeed, this was understood, though understated, by the Court in State v. Bey (II), supra, when it observed that defense counsel forced “to waste” a peremptory challenge must “be more cautious in the exercise of remaining peremptories.” 112 N.J. at 155. The defendant, in effect, must treat each use of a peremptory as potentially his last peremptory.
*470Arguably, the question of whether peremptories were exhausted, or in what order they were used, may not be of controlling significance. Nevertheless, in this case, the error was extreme because the defendant did, in fact, use all of his peremptory challenges. Thus, in this case, Justice Clifford’s analysis, in my view, controls this issue: “[a]ny diminution of or infringement upon that legislatively granted opportunity [to exercise a full complement of peremptory challenges] deprives defendant of as fair a trial as our rules permit.” State v. Singletary, supra, 80 N.J. at 71.
Moreover, these considerations are even weightier in the context of a capital-murder prosecution because jurors must be death-qualified. In this kind of criminal trial death-qualification prior to the guilt phase constitutes a substantial and additional constraint on the exercise of peremptory challenges; it effectively reduces a defendant’s complement of peremptories by requiring defense counsel to assess a prospective juror’s possible bias as to punishment in addition to the usual assessment of possible bias as to guilt. Increasing this burden on the exercise of defendant’s “substantial right,” moreover, is the fact that the death-qualification process itself induces bias as to guilt by requiring potential jurors to presuppose a finding that defendant is, indeed, guilty. See State v. Bey (II), supra, 112 N.J. at 133-40 (Handler, J., dissenting); State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 428-35 (Handler, J., dissenting). Thus, the defense counsel’s normal calculation of when to “spend” a peremptory challenge for possible bias as to guilt is heavily encumbered by concerns of possible bias as to punishment and is severely skewed by a process that fosters bias as to guilt.
As I observed in Bey (II), in assessing whether the court’s refusal to excuse a juror for cause is harmless, a defendant’s failure to exhaust his peremptory challenges is a relevant consideration in the ordinary case, and, given the singularly important function of peremptory challenges, such an error could be reversible. Supra, 112 N.J. at 145-46. But there is nothing ordinary about a capital-murder case. The principle *471that “death is different” requires, if anything, more punctilious appellate review, if not an enhanced standard of review with a stricter standard for reversibility. Whatever compunction and hesitation the Court might experience in characterizing an error as reversible in an ordinary criminal case assuredly cannot serve to dilute the gravity of the identical error in a case where the death penalty has resulted. See, e.g., State v. Zola, supra, 112 N.J. at 391 (Handler, J., concurring and dissenting); State v. Bey (I), supra, 112 N.J. at 52-65 (Handler, J., dissenting). Sharpened appellate review, combined with the distorting effects of death-qualification, leads me to conclude that an erroneous refusal to excuse a prospective juror for cause on death-qualification grounds should be reversible when a defendant ultimately exhausts all his peremptory challenges.
Thus, I believe that this Court should hold that in capital cases, where an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause prompts a defendant to dismiss a juror peremptorily, and the defendant ultimately exhausts his supply of peremptory challenges prior to the completion of jury selection and is denied an additional peremptory challenge, state constitutional standards of due process and principles of fundamental fairness compel reversal. Accordingly, on this ground alone, defendant’s conviction should be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
III.
Defendant also contends that the trial court, over defendant’s repeated objections, permitted the trial to become infected with highly prejudicial, inflammatory testimony and statements that focused not on defendant’s guilt or innocence but on the victim’s character. Defendant asserts that the court improperly admitted, as “background,” emotion-laden testimony relating to the victim’s personal life, and improperly allowed the prosecutor to comment on that testimony in an unduly prejudicial manner. As a result, he contends, the jury was invited, in both *472the guilt and penalty phases, to reach a verdict based on the victim’s virtues rather than the defendant’s culpability.
The Court states that because it is reversing both the guilt and penalty phases “on other grounds,” it need not determine the likelihood that the prosecutor’s behavior led to an “unjust verdict.” Ante at 446. In my opinion, the prosecutor’s misconduct tainted the presentation and consideration of evidence, and seriously affected the jury’s deliberations. The misconduct was so egregious, it would, apart from other errors, require reversal of defendant’s conviction as well as the death sentence.
The prosecution sought to provide certain background facts and to establish that the purse retrieved from the Delaware River belonged to the victim. This led to the introduction, over defendant’s objections, of extraneous information, such as the victim’s marriage plans and her involvement in a variety of church-related activities. The prosecutor repeatedly emphasized these facts during her opening and closing statements in both phases of the trial.
Thp defendant moved for a mistrial, contending that evidence and prosecutorial comments in both the guilt and penalty phases concerning the victim’s background and her future plans were not sufficiently probative of any facts genuinely in dispute and were presented solely to inflame the jury. The motion was denied, the trial court ruling that “background” information was admissible.
The Court seemingly agrees with the defendant, concluding that the prosecutor’s treatment of such evidence was “neither appropriate nor harmless,” and, further, that “[tjhis conduct cannot be attributed to the prosecutor’s overzealous advocacy in the heat of litigation, but to an intentional, calculated plan to induce the jury to reach a verdict based on the victim’s virtuous character.” Ante at 447.3 The Court’s reasoning, however, *473takes an ironic twist when it thereafter refuses to decide that this blatant prosecutorial misconduct was sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a reversal of defendant’s conviction of guilt or death sentence.
In Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496, 107 S.Ct. 2529, 96 L.Ed.2d 440 (1987), the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of introducing a victim-impact statement at the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. The statement contained a description of the effect of the murder on the victim’s family as well as “the personal characteristics of the victims,” i.e., they were a “close couple,” “married for fifty-three years,” “loving parents and grandparents.” Id. at-n. 3, 107 S.Ct. at 2531 n. 3, 96 L.Ed.2d at 446 n. 3. The Court concluded that the cruel and unusual punishment stricture of the eighth amendment prohibits a capital sentencing jury from considering such a statement because it caused the jury to focus on the victim rather than the defendant.
We thus reject the contention that the presence or absence of emotional distress of the victim’s family, or the victim’s personal characteristics, are proper sentencing considerations in a capital case, [Id. at-, 107 S.Ct. at 2535, 96 L.Ed.2d at 450-51.]
*474Similarly, in State v. Gathers, 295 S.C. 476, 369 S.E.2d 140, 144, cert. granted sub nom. South Carolina v. Gathers, —U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 218, 102 L.Ed.2d 209 (1988), the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded that prosecutorial remarks that “conveyed the suggestion appellant deserved a death sentence because the victim was a religious man and registered voter" violated the eighth amendment.4
In this case, the prosecutor’s remarks concerning the victim’s personality and character contain nothing that would aid the jury in determining the defendant’s guilt or innocence. As the Court itself states:
the inflammatory statements could likely result not only in unduly prejudicing the jury against defendant but also in confusing it over whether its deliberations should be influenced by the sterling character of the victim. There is no place in a capital case for such confusion and prejudice. The prosecutor’s remarks were clearly improper and should have been stricken from the record and the jury properly instructed to disregard them.” [Ante at 452.]
In dealing with comparable, highly inflammatory comments by the prosecutor, the Court in Ramseur found that the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial because curative instructions were given following prompt objections to the comment. 106 N.J. at 322-23. Likewise, in State v. Koedatich, supra, the Court ruled that curative instructions could overcome egregious prosecutorial misconduct. 112 N.J. at 325-26. However, here no curative instructions were given; indeed, the trial court by consistently overruling defendant’s objections seemingly authorized, if it did not condone, the prosecutor’s introduction of and comments on this evidence. Not only was prejudice not over*475come or neutralized by curative instructions, it was tangibly reinforced by the trial court’s rulings. Hence, in my opinion, it is not possible to conclude that defendant’s right to a fair trial was preserved.
The Court tacitly acknowledges this when it notes that the trial court mistakenly failed to exercise its powers to prevent undue prejudice. Ante at 457. Nevertheless, the Court refuses to consider whether the prosecutorial misconduct in this case would be sufficient independently to warrant a reversal of defendant’s conviction as well as the death sentence.
The majority, with a hint of self-righteousness, reminds us that “this Court has been neither indecisive nor hesitant to reverse a conviction where a defendant’s constitutional rights have been abridged as the result of glaring, unequivocal evidence of prosecutorial misconduct,” emphasizing that this is “especially true in capital cases where the severity of the penalty requires that nothing be permitted to undermine the underlying objective of our task — to insure that justice is done.” Ante at 452. Acknowledging that this is indeed a case in which “the prosecutor’s remarks were clearly improper,” ante at 452, the Court then does no more than “strongly admonish ... prosecutors to be circumspect in their zealous efforts to win convictions.” Ante at 456.
Sadly, we have been this route before. In State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 322-23, we admonished prosecutors that we would not hesitate to reverse capital convictions based on prosecutorial misconduct where that conduct is “so egregious that it deprived defendant of a fair trial.” This is such a case; the “fairness” of a trial depends not on the culpability of a defendant, for it seems obvious that the most guilty defendant can have a trial that was unfair; rather, the fairness of a trial must rest, particularly in capital cases, on the integrity of the procedures that safeguarded the trial. As Justice Clifford put it in State v. Koedatich, supra, “I see little hope of avoiding repitition of the deprivation of a fundamental constitutional *476right to a fair trial if we do no more than ‘reiterate our warning ... ’ that dire consequences may flow from [prosecutorial] violations ....” 172 N.J. 225 at 232-33 (Clifford, J., dissenting). A hortatory decision is not the plateau on which justice should come to rest when a defendant’s life is at stake.
The misconduct in this case did not begin with the penalty phase, but infected the entire proceeding. Indeed, in refusing to recognize the prosecutorial misconduct in this case as an independent ground for reversal, the majority denigrates such misconduct and sends an entirely wrong signal. A decision that does no more than this is no better than a primer for prosecutors; it is a placebo for the public but a bitter pill for defendants.
In my opinion, the defendant’s conviction must be reversed for reasons of prosecutorial misconduct. Under an appropriate enhanced standard of review, State v. Bey (I), 112 N.J. at 52-65 (Handler, J., concurring), there was a realistic likelihood that the misconduct of the prosecutor had an adverse influence on the jury’s ability to consider and deliberate exclusively on evidence properly admitted, warranting a reversal of the conviction and sentence. Similarly, even under this Court’s conventional standard of review for prosecutorial misconduct in a capital case, State v. Bey (I), supra, 112 N.J. at 93-95; Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 324 the prosecutor's misconduct requires such reversals. This Court should follow its own dictate in Ramseur and “more readily find prejudice’’ attributable to prosecutorial misconduct as justification to reverse the conviction.
IV.
For the reasons set forth, I conclude that the respective errors entailed in the improper refusal to excuse a juror for cause resulting in the defendant’s exhaustion of all peremptory challenges, and in the prosecutorial misconduct relating to the evidence of the victim's character and personality, independent*477ly justify a reversal of the defendant’s murder conviction. I therefore concur only in the judgment of the Court.
For reversal and remand — Chief Justice WILENTZ, and Justices CLIFFORD, HANDLER, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN — 7.
Opposed — None.
The State contended at oral argument that any error committed by the trial court in failing to excuse Ms. Pfeiffer for cause was harmless because although the defense ultimately expended all twenty of its peremptory challenges and requested additional peremptories, the defense expressed satisfaction with the jury while still holding two challenges in reserve. In this context, the argument is specious. A defendant's expression of satisfaction with the jury is of no legal significance where, as here, the prosecution subsequently alters the makeup of the jury by exercising an additional peremptory challenge, for what then results is a different jury.
In that case, the issue was posed in the context of a struck jury system, in which the voir dire of the potential juror is completed, challenges for cause are decided by the trial court, and the venireperson is then qualified for jury service in the instant case. All of the preliminarily qualified venirepersons return as a panel and are then subject to peremptory challenges by the defendant and prosecution who have the opportunity to exercise these peremptory challenges in light of the composition of the total qualified jury panel. See State v. Ramseur, supra, 106 N.J. at 239-43.
A sample of some of the remarks made by the prosecutor buttresses the Court’s conclusion, viz: *473Beverly Mitchell had so much to live for. Bright, beautiful, educated, religious, a member of her church choir. Beverly taught school in the Trenton school system, She taught special education. She was working part-time as a receptionist at the Bellevue Care Center to earn some extra money. You see, Beverly was due to be married in 1983. That very day, December 30, 1982, Beverly and her mother spent the day before Beverly went to work at the Bellevue Care Center, they spent the day looking for an apartment, an apartment that Beverly and her husband-to-be would share when Beverly started her new life. Beverly looked forward to 1983 with such joy, such hope, such promise. But it was not to be. The defendant, James Edward Williams, changed all of that. He changed.it brutally, savagely, permanently. In a few moments of unspeakable horror, the defendant destroyed all of Beverly's dreams. In a few moments of unimaginable terror, the defendant destroyed all of Beverly’s plans. In those few moments of a living nightmare, the defendant destroyed all of that joy, all that hope, all that promise. In those few moments, he destroyed Beverly Mitchell. She would never live to see her wedding day, [Ante at 448.]
Similarly, in this case, the prosecutor, in her opening remarks to the jury at the guilt phase of the trial, stated that the victim had “so much to live for," and was "religious, a member of her church choir," and that James Williams had "destroyed all the goodness and humanity that was Beverly Mitchell.” At the end of the State's case in the guilt phase, the prosecutor stated that she would be "remiss" if she did not "just take up a few more moments and talk about the person who was actually the most important in this case, and that person is Beverly Mitchell," and that "[s]he didn’t deserve to die as she did, naked, ravaged, in agony, and calling to Jesus for help. Jesus help me, Jesus help me.”