concurring:
I concur in the decision of the majority to affirm the order of the trial court which dismissed appellant’s P.C.H.A. petition without hearing.
Dorothy Finley was tried non-jury and was found guilty of murder of the second degree, robbery, weapons offenses, and criminal conspiracy. The judgment of sentence was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. See: Commonwealth v. Finley, 477 Pa. 211, 383 A.2d 898 (1978). Finley then filed a P.C.H.A. petition, which the trial court dismissed without a hearing and without appointing counsel. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, on appeal, remanded with instructions to the P.C.H.A. court to determine whether Finley was indigent and, if so, to appoint counsel. See: Commonwealth v. Finley, 497 Pa. 332, 440 A.2d 1183 (1981).
*395The succeeding proceedings were described by the P.C. H.A. court as follows:
Following the above-mentioned remand by our Supreme Court, court-appointed counsel ... reviewed the notes of testimony, Quarter Sessions file, issues of fact and law forwarded by Defendant herself, spoke with Defendant, conducted his own review for contentions which only a trained legal mind would discover, and concluded that no arguably meritorious issues existed. He then sought advice from this Court.
Counsel was instructed that he must take his client as he finds her; that the mere fact of having been appointed to represent a pro se Petitioner could not guarantee the existence of arguable contentions which might entitle the Defendant to post-conviction relief; that acceptance of the responsibility of a court-appointment in no way requires that he “find” an issue (e.g., manufacture an issue or present an issue not arguably meritorious); and that he must proceed as a responsible advocate and exercise his best professional judgment.
Counsel was instructed that where he had completed a comprehensive review of the entire record and the applicable law, and had interviewed Defendant and concluded that the record was devoid of arguably meritorious contentions, counsel should write this Court in letter form detailing not only the nature and extent of his review, but also listing each issue Defendant herself wished to have raised, followed by an explanation why those issues were meritless. At that point, this Court would conduct its own independent review and, if our conclusions coincided with counsel’s, the Petition would be dismissed without a hearing and Defendant would be apprised of her appellate rights.
Here, this procedure was followed and the Petition was dismissed without a hearing. Counsel was relieved with new counsel appointed to prosecute the instant appeal.
On appeal by new counsel, a panel of this Court, having accepted an argument advanced by appellant, held that *396P.C.H.A. counsel had been ineffective for failing to follow the requirements set forth in Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). The Commonwealth filed a petition for allocatur, which was granted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal as having been improvidently granted. See: Commonwealth v. Finley, 510 Pa. 304, 507 A.2d 822 (1986). Certiorari was then granted by the United States Supreme Court.
In Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 107 S.Ct. 1990, 95 L.Ed.2d 539 (1987), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Anders decision, which had been based on the constitutional right to appointed counsel as established in Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 83 S.Ct. 814, 9 L.Ed.2d 811 (1963), is not applicable to collateral attacks on convictions. Where a state chooses, nevertheless, to provide appointed counsel for the purpose of assisting an indigent criminal launch a collateral attack on his conviction, the United States Constitution does not dictate the form which such assistance must take. Therefore, the judgment of the Superior Court was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings.
Finley's right to appointed counsel in P.C.H.A. proceedings rests upon Pa.R.Crim.P. 15031 and 1504.2 Neither *397these rules nor any other criminal rule imposes upon appointed counsel a duty to proceed in the manner directed by Anders.
Finley has been convicted and, therefore, is no longer protected by the presumption of innocence. Consequently, the burden is on her in a collateral attack on her conviction to show that her conviction was invalid. See: 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543. The lawyer who represents her in collateral proceedings, whether retained or appointed, “has no duty, indeed no right, to pester a court with frivolous arguments, which is to say arguments that cannot conceivably persuade the court, so if he believes in good faith that there are no ... arguments that he can make on his client’s behalf he is honor-bound to so advise the court and seek leave to withdraw as counsel.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, — U.S. —, —, 108 S.Ct. 1895, 1901, 100 L.Ed.2d 440, 452 (1988), quoting United States v. Edwards, 777 F.2d 364, 365 (7th Cir.1985). When retained counsel concludes that a collateral attack via P.C.H.A. petition would be frivolous, he or she has a duty to inform the client that it would be a waste of money for the client and unethical for the lawyer to pursue it. When appointed counsel comes to the same conclusion, he or she also has an obligation not to pursue the collateral attack. “Appointed counsel, however, is presented with a dilemma because withdrawal is not possible without leave of court, and advising the court of counsel’s opinion that the [collateral attack] is frivolous would appear to conflict with the advocate’s duty to his client. It is well settled, however, that this dilemma must be resolved by informing the court of counsel’s conclusion.” McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, supra, — U.S. at —, 108 S.Ct. at 1901, 100 L.Ed.2d at 452. As the Supreme Court of the United States explained in Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 102 S.Ct. 445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (1981),
[Appellant’s] argument assumes that a private lawyer would have borne no professional obligation to refuse to prosecute a frivolous appeal. This is error. In claiming *398that a public defender is peculiarly subject to divided loyalties, [appellant] confuses a lawyer’s ethical obligations to the judicial system with an allegiance to the adversary interests of the State in a criminal prosecution. Although a defense attorney has a duty to advance all colorable claims and defenses, the canons of professional ethics impose limits on permissible advocacy. It is the obligation of any lawyer — whether privately retained or publicly appointed — not to clog the courts with frivolous motions or appeals. [Appellant] has no legitimate complaint that his lawyer refused to do so.
Id. at 323, 102 S.Ct. at 452-53, 70 L.Ed.2d at 519-520 (footnote omitted).
Every P.C.H.A. lawyer, whether privately retained or appointed by the court, has essentially the same professional responsibility. He or she must communicate with the client, examine the record, research the law, and identify arguments which can be pursued via collateral attack. In so doing, counsel must serve the best interests of the client. If, after such an evaluation, counsel comes to the conclusion that a collateral attack is “wholly frivolous,” he may inform the court and seek to withdraw. McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District 1, supra, — U.S. at —, 108 S.Ct. at 1901, 100 L.Ed.2d at 452.
In the instant case, appointed counsel consulted with his client, examined the client’s allegations of error, reviewed the record to determine whether those allegations of error or other arguments could be pursued, and concluded that there were no arguably meritorious issues which could be advanced. Counsel thereupon notified the court by letter that appellant had no meritorious argument. The P.C.H.A. court then made an independent review of the record and also concluded that there were no meritorious arguments to support a collateral attack on appellant’s conviction. The court, therefore, dismissed the P.C.H.A. petition without a hearing.
On appeal to a three judge panel of this Court from the P.C.H.A. court’s order, appellant argued only that prior *399P.C.H.A. counsel had been ineffective because he “failed to file an amended P.C.H.A. petition or a brief on behalf of his client and chose instead to outline for tlie court reasons why a P.C.H.A. petition would be meritless.” Statement of Questions Presented in Appellant’s original brief. Upon remand by the United States Supreme Court and reargument before this Court, sitting en banc, appellant filed a supplemental brief in which her argument was summarized and entitled as follows:
Appellant was denied the effective assistance of court-appointed PCHA counsel that she was entitled to under both Pennsylvania law and the remand order of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court when court-appointed counsel filed a “no merit” letter with the PCHA court instead of following the Anders procedure.
This issue has been properly raised on appeal, for this is the first opportunity to do so at which appellant has not been represented by counsel who is alleged to have been ineffective. See: Commonwealth v. Payne, 327 Pa.Super. 139, 143, 475 A.2d 137, 139 (1984); Commonwealth v. Moore, 321 Pa.Super. 442, 448-449 n. 1, 468 A.2d 791, 794 n. 1 (1983).
Appellant’s argument, however, is lacking in merit.3 In Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988), the Supreme Court said:
Under Pennsylvania law, where the PCHA petitioner’s right to counsel is established by rule of this Court, Pa.R.Crim.P. 1503, 1504, we hold that the procedure followed in the Finley case accorded the PCHA petitioner all the protection incorporated in the right to appointed counsel in collateral proceedings under the PCHA. Thus, the implication by Superior Court that the requirements of Anders and [Commonwealth v. ] McClendon supra [495 Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981)], governed the withdrawal of counsel in this case is erroneous. When, in the *400exercise of his professional judgment, counsel determines that the issues raised under the PCHA are meritless, and when the PCHA court concurs, counsel will be permitted to withdraw and the petitioner may proceed pro se, or by privately retained counsel, or not at all. The same procedure should be followed at any stage of the collateral proceedings, whether in a trial or appellate court. Inasmuch as the United States Supreme Court decided in Pennsylvania v. Finley, supra, that the federal constitutional considerations underlying the tortuous procedures of Anders do not apply under the PCHA, we deem these less rigid requirements for withdrawal of counsel to satisfy Pennsylvania law in collateral attacks on criminal convictions.
Id., 518 Pa. at 495, 544 A.2d at 928-29.
Therefore, I concur in the decision of the majority to affirm the order of the trial court. However, I do not join what appears to be an attempt by the majority to use the facts of the instant case to formulate a five step procedure to be followed in the future by counsel appointed to represent an indigent defendant who seeks to pursue a nonmeritorious collateral attack on a conviction. It is enough in this case that P.C.H.A. counsel provided effective professional assistance and that appellant’s P.C.H.A. petition was properly dismissed.
. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1503 is as follows:
Appointment of Counsel
(a) Except as provided in Rule 1504, when an unrepresented petitioner satisfies the court that he is unable to procure counsel, the court shall appoint counsel to represent him. The court, on its own motion, shall appoint counsel to represent a petitioner whenever the interests of justice require it.
(b) Where counsel has been appointed, such appointment shall be effective until final judgment, including any proceedings upon appeal from a denial of collateral relief.
. Pa.R.Crim.P. 1504 is as follows:
Summary Dispositions
Appointment of counsel shall not be necessary and petitions may be disposed of summarily when a previous petition involving the same issue or issues has been finally determined adversely to the petitioner and he either was afforded the opportunity to have counsel appointed or was represented by counsel in proceedings thereon.
. Whether P.C.H.A. counsel can be said to have been ineffective for failing to identify and assert a specific defect in the proceeding leading up to appellant’s conviction is not before this Court, and with respect thereto no opinion is expressed.