dissenting:
This decision severely stretches the application of existing law on “intentional infliction of emotional distress” well beyond our controlling opinions in this jurisdiction. It has disturbing social and economic implications for the workplace where there are, as there usually are, personnel frictions and the supervisors and employees involved are of the opposite gender. I would think that, for these reasons, this serious extension of the existing law would merit en bane consideration as it would have a far-reaching effect, as a matter of reality. One reason this case is something of a landmark case is that it establishes a different factual guide for inten-. tional infliction of emotional distress, as we shall see later on.
I.1
In the final analysis, the opinion in this case stands for the proposition, in the law on intentional infliction of emotional distress, that (a) if a complaining employee files several written grievances to various officials concerning her supervisors, and office frictions, over a period of months and then much later changes the substance of her complaints to a charge before the Office of Human Resources that her supervisor had sexually harassed her, and (b) after this new complaint before that agency was filed a newly received assignment, which she had long sought, was changed from a reassignment to a 120-day detail, and (c) she later received a grade raise but, due to the 120-day detail, this occurred some months beyond her eligibility for it, this will support a judgment against *680one of the participating agency executives, in this administrative action, for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress.2 This tort, by its nature, necessarily has the element of maliciousness.
In the process of seriously stretching the law on this tort to a new dimension, the majority judges also seem to tell us that when an employee sends a written grievance to the supervisor of her supervisor, complaining about frictions with her supervisor and another employee, there are “due process implications” if the executive then discussed with his assistant (the supervisor) the charges the complaining employee had made, asked him to prepare specific written questions for submission to the complainant, and when answers to these questions were received, sent her a memorandum in which, in effect, he rejected her grievance, giving his reasons, but without giving her a “hearing.” This absence of a “hearing” procedure, says the majority, raises “due process implications.” This, in itself, may send some tremors through the government and private industry.
Before penetrating the majority opinion on the essentials of the case it weaves against appellant King, I feel I should say in the interest of fundamental fairness that the recitation of the inflammatory details of the lurid sexual relations between Carter and Ms. Kidd is most unfortunate. As we know, Carter (a) is not a party to this appeal, and (b) Ms. Kidd has secured a judgment against him in the trial court for sexual harassment. But this appeal is a different matter. To employ against appellant King in this appeal those details of the revolting sexual relationship (“rupturing her anal tissues” “causing her to fear AIDS”)3 between Carter and Kidd has overtones of a violation of due process of law as to King. These are events of which he had no knowledge and had utterly no responsibility. When Kidd and Carter were engaging in these acts, King had no knowledge of it because the indication is he not only did not know Kidd but, so far as it appears, he probably was not even then employed in the governmental agency. It strikes me as an injustice for the judges in the majority nevertheless to employ this inflammatory evidence against King in this appeal.
But, says the majority, “that evidence is integral to the case against King as a collu-der.” (Emphasis added.) If so, it does not speak well for the case against King if it requires that sort of unfortunate inflammatory bootstrapping.
The majority tells us, however, that (a) the lurid evidence was relevant to Kidd’s claim against King and, if King “believed he was prejudiced by the joinder of this claim against him with the claim against Carter he could have moved for a separate trial,” but did not do so. However, the majority overlooks that in the trial court a sexual harassment charge was levelled against King, for some reason, though he was of course found not guilty of any sexual harassment by the jury.4 ■ Consequently, such a motion would not lie. There is, therefore, no good reason on this appeal to harm the reputation of this government official with these disgusting details of the lurid Kidd-Carter sexual relationship, of which he knew nothing and had utterly no responsibility for under our system.
The essential difference between the majority opinion and the dissent in this important, “new-law making” decision is that the majority passes the dissent off as simply an “argument to the jury” opinion, while carefully avoiding a substantive discussion of the law on this serious tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The legal discussions they do undertake ignore the tests placed by this court on plaintiffs seeking to prove intentional infliction of emotional dis*681tress in the employment arena. Instead, the majority substitutes a discussion on the evolutionary patterns of “contemporary community standards of offensiveness and decency” sprinkled with the nomenclature of Title VII, and avoids facing up to the realities of our decision in District of Columbia v. Thompson I, 570 A.2d 277, 289-91 (D.C.1990), vacated in part on other grounds, (Thompson II), 593 A.2d 621 (D.C.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 380, 116 L.Ed.2d 331 (1991).5 This case cannot be fairly decided without meeting Thompson head-on. There, Thompson’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress rest[ed] on the following actions: Maury [her supervisor] criticized her in memorandum after memorandum; he approved her leave and then changed her status to absence without leave; he refused to consider her for promotion to the next grade level or to give her the computer test she asked for; he isolated her from the other employees; he requested statements from her doctor as to her limited hours; he wrote memoranda on her excessive leave; and he assaulted her and lied about it, resulting in her job loss.
Id. at 290. (Emphasis added).
Against this factual backdrop, this court stated that “[w]ith the exception of the alleged assault, this conduct by a supervisor is of a type inherent in the employment situation and, on this record, was not unusually egregious_ Nor was the alleged assault — pushing Thompson against the wall and pointing of finger, coupled with threatening words — sufficiently egregious under the applicable standard.” Id. (citations omitted).
Here, by contrast, the majority tells us “the evidence of events after Kidd filed her sexual harassment complaint shows the following actions by King in support of Carter, with knowledge of Kidd’s allegations of sexual harassment against Carter,” include:
1. After a telephone conversation with King, a financial officer changed Kidd’s transfer from the permanent “reassignment” requested by her new supervisor, Cheers, to a temporary “detail” with no potential for promotion.
2. In order to help Carter answer, and thus defend, Kidd’s sexual harassment complaint, King called Kidd into his office to tell her that Carter wanted Kidd to make a statement that her temporary detail was voluntary (contrary to her agreement only to a permanent reassignment).
3. At meetings attended by Carter and by Cheers and Cheers’s supervisor, King facilitated Carter’s demand that, before Carter would allow Kidd’s temporary detail to be reconverted to a permanent reassignment — providing, once again, the potential for promotion — Kidd would have to produce a statement that would help Carter defend against Kidd’s sexual harassment complaint.
4. In 1989, King refused Kidd’s request for a promotion because she was still on a “detail” which King, untruthfully, said was voluntary.[6]
Ante at 677. As will become evident, not only do appellant King’s actions fall significantly short of those found by Thompson I to be “not unusually egregious” as a matter of law, but unlike Thompson I, where the actions involved those of a direct, hands-on supervisor, appellant King was considerably removed administratively and, prior to these grievances, had no contact with Kidd as far *682as it appears. Moreover, characterizing Kidd’s delay in promotion as having “broader impact,” i.e., “evidence of the means by which King intentionally furthered Carter’s scheme of retaliation against Kidd for filing a sexual harassment complaint with OHR,” avoids the fundamental reality that, under Thompson I, appellant King’s actions do not, as a matter of law, rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous behavior.” It is understandable that the majority prefers not to attempt to square its opinion with Thompson /, where it reached the opposite result on facts more egregious than here, but it is necessary to do so if this majority opinion is to survive. Because the facts here do not meet the legal test, the majority resorts to conspiratorial words like “colluding,” and “retaliation,” as a substitute.
II.
It would unduly labor this dissent to outline the various voluminous, written complaints of Ms. Kidd lodged up through the echelons. Accordingly, I append only her grievance to appellant King, which deserves to be read. Her complaints all followed much the same theme, being largely complaints against a stranger to this proceeding (Mr. Parks, an acting supervisor, whom she disliked) and administrative criticisms of her supervisor, Mr. Carter, against whom she obtained a judgment in the trial court in this case for sexual harassment.
I will, however, outline the complaint she made to Mr. King, as he is the remaining appellant here.7 This is necessary for an understanding of our majority and dissenting opinions.
Ms. Kidd lodged a “Formal Grievance” dated May 19, 1988, to appellant King, who was Associate Director, Real Property Administration, Department of Administrative Services of the District of Columbia Government. \See Appendix.] As such, he was in supervision over Mr. Carter, who was Ms. Kidd’s Supervisor. Her informal grievances about the “harassment” were translated into a formal grievance.
Her grievance relating to this harassment is here directed largely toward Mr. Parks (not a party to this proceeding) and her administrative relationship with him. She complains in the grievance that she does not know who she is supposed to be supervised by, whether it is Mr. Carter, Chief, Space Utilization, or Mr. Parks, Space Specialist. She asserts she is not “kept abreast of important details of work or events of interest.” She complains of her official relationship with Ms. Darcel Henderson. She states she has been “cursed by the secretary” and called “PRISSY MISS MISSY.” She complains generally about the rudeness and the profanity which goes on among the staff in the office. She charges that “telephone callers are abused, unprofessionally handled and messages are not left by the secretary.” She stated this has been discussed with Mr. Carter and “he called a meeting” and reprimanded the whole staff and stated he did not want to hear “third party complaints” and “if a caller feels he is rudely treated refer them to me personally” and yet “the problems persist.”
Ms. Kidd goes on along the same lines in her lengthy six page complaint and then concludes by requesting that (a) her Supervisor, Mr. Carter, rescind his letter of misconduct relating to her, and (b) she be given “an excellent performance evaluation” for her first year of service to the District government. She concluded by stating to Mr. King (appellant) that she regretted that her grievances concerning the office personnel “have to be aired to you but I have spent the past few months attempting to resolve them within the division to no avail.” (Appendix.)
It is significant that in this same “Formal Grievance” she made the specific “request that I be reassigned immediately to a position with non-competitive promotional opportunity like in my present position....” Id. (emphasis added). She bottoms this request for a transfer mainly on Mr. Carter’s memo of May 18, 1988 (a cautionary memo to her), which caused her no longer to have “confidence that Mr. Carter can or is capable of being fair, forceful and resourceful in resolving office problems in a [sic] equitable and *683non-bias manner.” She stated she feared “for reprisals or retaliatory actions against me” and “I feel stagnated and trapped not being able to network and have freedom to. interact with other departmental/govemmen-tal employees for the purpose of sharing, soliciting resources or for recreational purposes.” Id.
About two weeks later (June 8, 1988), she filed an “Amendment to Grievance” to appellant King. In this amendment, she complained, among other things, that she was not included by her Supervisor in the Mayor’s Space Plan Presentation; that in a staff meeting it was announced that the Mayor’s Space Presentation will be presented to the Senior Staff, Friday and “this is the first I have heard of this.” She also complained to Mr. King that she has “been denied the opportunity to serve as one of RPA’s representatives for the DAS’ Womens Advisory Committee,” which she stated, “I consider an event of interest which I feel will be of benefit in allowing me an opportunity to interface with other women throughout DAS. No reason is given by my supervisor.” She continued that her supervisor “did not speak to me or make contact regarding assignments of any kind until I approached him regarding reports 2 June 88.” Id.
She concluded her amended formal grievance to Mr. King by stating, “I believe these incidents to be reprisals/retaliations8 and wish to amend my grievance to include them” and she “respectfully requests a meeting or your immediate attention to my grievance.” (Emphasis added.)
The majority complains that, upon receipt of her written grievance against Messrs. Carter and Parks, appellant King called in his underling supervisor to explore the grievance with him, seemingly a reasonable administrative step to take. Mr. King decided to propound questions of Ms. Kidd in order to obtain the specifics underlying her charges. In order to accomplish this, he requested that Mr. Carter prepare for his signature appropriate questions of Ms. Kidd, and this was done. This was an intelligent way to explore administratively the merits of her complaints. This was, after all, not a quasi-judicial hearing. This was a government administrator exploring a grievance by an employee against (a) her supervisor and (b) another employee in her office who was sometimes acting supervisor. While the complaint was partially against Mr. Carter, he was an assistant of Mr. King in whom he then had confidence and he had the particular knowledge with which to frame questions. It was a reasonable, and not a malicious, thing for an executive to do. To have one’s staff assistant prepare a memorandum of questions for signature was not really an overt act in a collusion, as the majority argues. A reasonable jury would not conclude all this, adduced by Ms. Kidd, was evidence to show that appellant King intentionally inflicted emotional distress on her. As we will soon see, under our case law, this does not approach the tests we have laid down for this tort.
Instead of granting her request for a transfer because of the unsatisfactory office personnel situation she described, aggravated by personality clashes and rudeness, Mr. King sent a memorandum dated June 13, 1988, to Ms. Kidd responding to her grievances against Supervisor Carter. Assisted by Mr. Carter, Mr. King requested specifics on each of some twenty-three incidents she had complained of in her formal grievance. He later stated:
Ms. Kidd responded in a memo dated June 24, 1988 to Mr. King, the Associate Director of her Division giving a much detailed description of the numerous frictions and personality clashes within her office — her problems with the supervisory authority of Mr. Parks, the reprimands by Supervisor Carter and the interruptions she had experienced in relation to work assignments she had given to the office secretary, Darcel Henderson.
The Associate Director later responded to Ms. Kidd’s formal grievance by memorandum dated July 21, 1988. He stated he had reviewed all the information she had provided and had discussed the situation with her Supervisor (Mr. Carter). He stated, essentially, that it appeared that she is the only *684employee who “has difficulty with Mr. Carter’s decision to have Mr. Parks monitor certain projects; that Mr. Carter has informed him that ‘he has had conversations with you and Mr. Parks together regarding your difficulties and requested that you get together and try to resolve your differences;”’ and that “[wjhile Mr. Parks was agreeable you refused.” He then observed she had a negative attitude and was not a “team player;” that her other difficulty with the clerical assistant should be considered resolved since the latter is no longer employed by the department.
Mr. King (appellant) also stated that
Mr. Carter informed me some time ago that it is his intention to involve you more in the overall responsibilities of the Space Utilization Division as outlined in your position description, thereby relieving you of the full-time responsibility for monitoring the Automated Integrated Master System Program (AIMSP). I concur with his decision.
(Emphasis in text.)
The Associate Director then went on to state that he would not direct Mr. Carter to rescind his “letter of DIRECTION” to her; and that he would not grant her request to direct Mr. Carter on how to rate her performance in the upcoming rating. Turning to her specific request for a transfer (reassignment), Mr. King stated it was not his policy to reassign an employee because the employee disagrees with a particular style of the supervisor; that “certain formats are given to [a supervisor] by his superiors; that if Mr. Carter prefers that certain assignments are formatted in a particular manner, as subordinate she is expected to adhere to his instructions without creating difficulties.”
He concluded by stating her request for reassignment was denied.9 He observed that Mr. Carter has demonstrated to him that “he is a fair and honest person who is very reliable and dependable,” and that he did not agree “that Mr. Carter will take reprisal or retaliatory action against you.” He thereupon advised that she had a “right to submit a formal grievance to the Director of Administrative Services within ten (10) calendar days from the date of the receipt of this memorandum.”
Ms. Kidd then filed a similar complaint dated July 29, 1988, about administrative matters and much the same office frictions with Captain Lambert (an appellant), Director of the Department of Administrative Services. She generally complained about the supervision of her office, especially in relation to the role of the same Mr. Parks in the office and the supervision by Mr. Carter.
She charged, among other things, that Mr. King should have listened to her side of the grievance and instead favored Mr. Carter’s version concerning her grievance.
The detailed grievance concluded by requesting:
(a) Rescinding of Mr. Carters “Letter of Direction,”
(b) “Worthy Performance Rating,”
(c) An “Award/Reeognition for accomplishment of building a user friendly automated space program,”
(d) “Reassignment/I would consider remaining in this position providing I receive your word in writing that I receive equitable treatment with other male employees, that I not be harassed, and I obtain proper consideration for promotion to the GS-11 immediately upon eligibility/meeting the same standards as my male counterparts,"[10]
(e) “That Messrs. Carter and Parks receive counseling/training in what constitutes sexual harassment, women’s rights and how not to create dissension within a workplace,”
(f) That Mr. Carter receive disciplinary action,
(g) Reimbursement of all sick and annual leave to her in relation to her ongoing grievances,
*685(h) Such counseling as her doctor feels necessary in relation to the grievances, this to be charged to administrative leave,
(i) “Identification of a method by which to restore my character within” the agency.
(Emphasis added.)
It developed that the complaint by Ms. Kidd was not seen by Captain Lambert. In the regular course of business, such complaints were handled by the Equal Employment Opportunity Officer in the Agency.
On September 1, 1988, however, Ms. Kidd then filed a complaint with another agency, the OHR, in which, after all those written complaints over a long period of time, she charged for the first time that Mr. Carter, her Supervisor, had coerced her to have sex with him many months previously. Thus, her complaint now took a giant leap and went from one describing office frictions and personality clashes accompanied by charges of office mismanagement to a charge of coerced sex and sexual abuse twice by Mr. Carter a long time ago. Mr. Parks thereupon was dropped as an object of her complaints and became no part of this proceeding; and, as I related earlier, Mr. Carter, against whom the sexual charge was made, is not a party to this appeal. Instead, the charge here is that Mr. King, who was Mr. Carter’s Supervisor and the Associate Director, Real Property Administration, and Captain Lambert, who was, as I stated earlier, Director of the Department of Administrative Services for the District of Columbia Government, intentionally inflicted emotional distress upon her. In other words, this appeal involves officials in the higher echelons of government who, as far as the record discloses, did not even know Ms. Kidd at the time of her lurid sexual relationship with Carter. But both are charged here with intentional infliction of emotional distress on her.
We approach now the crucial area, factually, in the majority opinion. The majority judges argue that during a time Ms. Kidd was on leave, there was a clandestine arrangement by Ms. Kidd’s superiors to transfer her to a different division. To examine this contention of the majority, we must turn to the testimony adduced by Ms. Kidd which relates to her transfer. The only witness presented by Ms. Kidd who had knowledge of how her transfer came about was Mr. Cheers, her new supervisor. The testimony of her own authoritative witness, Mr. Cheers, refutes the argument made by the majority judges on the matter of the transfer.
Mr. Cheers testified that
[o]n one occasion in July of 1988 as I talked with Mr. Carter, he informed me that he was having some difficulty working with and relating to Ms. Kidd, who was his employee. He told me that she wasn’t working out, that they weren’t getting along.
So I, I knew that Ms. Kidd had prepared a data processing program.... And so as Mr. Carter talked to me about his having problem [sic] with her, at that point I knew I needed data processing to help me manage the personnel property for the department and the District, so I suggested to Mr. Carter that he transfer Ms. Kidd and her position number from real property administration to my division within the procurement management.
Q. Now, after you spoke to Mr. Carter did you take any action with respect to transferring Ms. Kidd?
A Yes. After talking to Mr. Carter perhaps twice, I then went to Ms. Kidd and let her know what I was proposing and what I was proposing was that she come to work for me as a personnel management ... specialist.
Q. Now, when was it that you approached Ms. Kidd about coming to work for you?
A After my conversation with Mr. Carter about perhaps having her come to work for me, before I did anything official I wanted to chat with her.
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I went to her and I told her that I needed someone in my organization to create a program for our computer that we had that would manage the property and since she had done a good job with the space management I thought that she would be able to help me. And I asked her if she would be willing to transfer from *686real property administration to my division.
Q. And what did she tell you?
A. She told me that, yes, she would like to do that.
(Emphasis added.)
As we see, the testimony of Ms. Kidd’s crucial witness on her transfer (Mr. Cheers) explodes the argument being made by the majority judges about the conspiratorial arrangement leading up to it. Her witness Cheers who was her only witness who knew of how it came about (and he was not impeached) established the simple truth that the transfer was his idea and she was in favor of it. So much for that particular “collusion” (“locked out of her office,” etc.).
We are now at the critical point, according to the majority, where Ms. Kidd’s new position with Mr. Cheers became a 120-day detail. This occurred after she had filed the sexual harassment complaint at OHR against Mr. Carter; and, argues the majority, this is where the most important “collusion” and “retaliation” took place, these being ascribed to appellant King. Let’s examine the facts relating to this.
Ms. Kidd had filed her complaint with OHR on September 1, 1988.11 In support of her position in the trial court that appellant King, and others, e.g., Captain Lambert and Mr. Carter, had retaliated against her by bringing about a change in her position from a reassignment to a 120-day detail, Ms. Kidd placed in evidence a document (Exhibit 20). It was a memorandum dated September 14, 1988 to Mr. Gordon (Mr. Cheers’ boss) from Ms. Britton, Associate Director for Finance and Administration on the subject “Detail of Patricia A. Kidd.” It stated:
Pursuant to a telephone conversation with Robert King, attached is a copy of the SF-52 to detail Ms. Kidd from RPA to MMA, for a period not-to-exceed 120 days.
During this period of time, MMA should identify a permanent position number to effect the reassignment of Ms. Kidd. Once this is accomplished, MMA should prepare the appropriate SF-52, indicating “reassignment” under Block A(.) “Kind of Action Requested”.
We need to process the required personnel action as soon as possible.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This document, introduced by Ms. Kidd, establishes that the “detail” arrangement came about after a conversation between appellant King and the personnel chief two weeks after Ms. Kidd filed her unsuccessful sexual harassment complaint with OHR. The memorandum stipulates that her new division should identify “a permanent position number to effect the reassignment of Ms. Kidd” and that, once this is done, her new division should prepare the appropriate form indicating her “reassignment.” (Emphasis added.) Then the memorandum is terminated by an indication of urgency to effect the “reassignment” (terminating the “detail”) by stating, “We need to process the required personnel action as soon as possible.”
This does not seem “retaliatory.” A reasonable jury could not so conclude, unless words have lost their meaning.
Ms. Kidd’s witness, her former supervisor, Mr. Cheers, testified concerning the significance of “position numbers.” He explained the complication of “position numbers” as they relate to reassignments. He said that under personnel regulations in order to increase staff it is necessary to have the position number as well, and that positions and position numbers affect budget plans for a given year. Cheers said that his arrangement with Carter was that as soon as he had a position number that became vacant he would transfer that position number back to *687the Real Property Administration (Carter). Cheers stated that when he accepted Ms. Kidd and her position number he did not have a position number to give back to Carter (Real Property Division); and, furthermore, during all the time Ms. Kidd was in his division he never had a position number to give back to Mr. Carter. This, he said, had the practical effect that Mr. Carter was going to lose a position number and, therefore, a body in his section.
This raised complications between the two divisions as the original understanding was not being implemented.
The majority relates emotional scenes by Carter during meetings to unravel these problems on Ms. Kidd’s transfer and sets forth manifestations of ill-will by Mr. Carter toward Ms. Kidd, who had filed the sexual harassment complaint against him.12 To demonstrate the “collusion” between King and Carter and the “retaliation” by Carter and King against Kidd, the majority relates that at a meeting Carter wanted Cheers to obtain a memo stating- the circumstances of her transfer. This transfer, of course, was at the request of Cheers, as he had testified. At a later meeting, Cheers said there was a request for Ms. Kidd to sign a memo saying she “agreed to or wanted to be transferred to [Cheers’] division,” this being the actual fact, as Cheers had so testified. Yet, the majority argues strenuously that these incidents establish its conspiracy theory.
The majority judges contend that all this establishes “collusion” among her superiors, including her supervisor, appellant King, and a “retaliation” against her because she had filed a complaint against Mr. Carter with the OHR charging sexual harassment. When these unassailable facts established in the trial are reviewed in the way we are legally required to examine them, the conclusion of the majority is unreasonable as a matter of law.
But this is not all, says the majority. After she was transferred back to the Real Property Division, subsequent to a conference with Mr. Gordon (Cheers’s boss), she did not receive a grade raise until December, 1989. This was months after she was legally eligible to receive it, complains the majority.13
All this, they say, establishes that appellant King intentionally inflicted emotional distress on Ms. Kidd, as she suffered such distress as a result. But this conclusion is clearly contrary to the law on intentional infliction of emotional distress as established by our decisions, as will now be explained. It is a mystery in this ease that the majority carefully avoids an analytical discussion of our decisions on this charge in order to demonstrate that their opinion here accords with the law this court has created. There must be a reason. See, e.g., Thompson I, for starters.
III.
In order to get to the jury as a matter of law on this charge, a plaintiff must present conduct that is so extreme and outrageous that it “goes beyond all possible bounds of decency and [is] regarded as atrocious and utterly intolerable in a civilized society.” Waldon v. Covington, 415 A.2d 1070, 1076 (D.C.1980), quoting Restatement (Second) of TORTS § 47 comment d (1946).14
Ms. Kidd’s witness, Cheers, who was her one witness able to testify from beginning to end regarding the circumstances of her transfer to his section and later back again to King’s division, did not testify to any occurrences amounting to outrageous conduct which could reasonably be construed as intending to inflict emotional harm on Ms. Kidd. See, e.g., Waldon v. Covington, supra, *688and District of Columbia v. Thompson (Thompson I), supra.
Her initial written grievances amounted to complaints of office friction with the secretary, the acting supervisor (a Mr. Parks), and her supervisor, Mr. Carter. In essence, these grievances to appellants King and Lambert amounted to complaints of poor administration by her supervisor, personality conflicts with her sometime acting supervisor, and a grudge against the office secretary for back-talking her. Office complaints such as those she made are not unknown to experienced executives.
Even if one were to accept the majority’s theory concerning a delay beyond the date of her legal eligibility for it, in reaching her Grade 11, the evidence still does not approach, as a matter of law, an intentional infliction of emotional harm on Ms. Kidd by appellant King. At the most, her promotion to Grade 11 was delayed.
In Thompson I, supra, 570 A.2d at 290, we said that a defendant-supervisor’s conduct of criticizing plaintiff-employee in over twenty memoranda, approving employee’s leave and then changing that status to absence without leave, refusing to consider employee for promotion to next grade level or not allowing employee to take a computer test that employee had requested, isolating employee from other employees, employee’s ultimate discharge, pushing employee against the wall and pointing of finger, coupled with threatening words was not “sufficiently egregious under the applicable standard” for . intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In Waldon v. Covington, supra, 415 A.2d at 1077-78, we held that a supervisor who refused to give a professor who was employed at the university the keys to a laboratory, failed to give him adequate notice of departmental meetings, threatened to initiate action to determine his competency “with an eye to terminating his employment ” and assigned the professor to teach classes outside of his specialty knowing it would cause him embarrassment and difficulty, did not constitute intentional tort liability. (Emphasis added.) See also Schoen v. Consumers United Group, Inc., 670 F.Supp. 367, 379 (D.D.C.1986) (plaintiff-employee’s claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress for dismissal without prior disciplinary procedures, breach of confidentiality, “an unbroken string of humiliations and attempts to force Plaintiff [] to resign ... simply do not satisfy the standard for liability”) (emphasis added); Shewmaker v. Minchew, 504 F.Supp. 156, 159, 163 (D.D.C.1980) (supervisor’s alleged wrongful reassignment of employee which amounted to employee’s termination from his position, supervisor’s repeated attacks on his character to other agencies as well as to the news media, supervisor’s efforts to block a hearing after his termination because “harassment in a professional context, including exclusion from business meetings and the spreading of unfavorable rumors, is not the type of conduct that gives rise to such a cause of action”), aff'd, 215 U.S.App.D.C. 53, 666 F.2d 616 (D.C.Cir.1981); Hogan v. Forsyth Country Club Co., 79 N.C.App. 483, 493-94, 340 S.E.2d 116, 122-23 (1986) (cited in Thompson I) (supervisor’s interference with employee’s supervision of subordinates, screaming and shouting at her, calling her names, throwing menus at her and firing her was not extreme and outrageous conduct). See generally Bradley v. Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., 657 F.Supp. 197 (S.D.N.Y.1987) (continual negative evaluations, harassment, and disparaging statements was not extreme and outrageous conduct); Price v. Federal Express Corp., 660 F.Supp. 1388 (D.Colo.1987) (allegations that employer subjected employee to harassment, coerced him to accept a lateral transfer, and constructively discharged him in retaliation for participating in another employee’s race discrimination suit, failed to state a claim for infliction of emotional distress); Byrnes v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 562 F.Supp. 892 (E.D.La.1983) (five incidents of cursing at employee, taking over his sales presentations, and otherwise embarrassing him in presence of others not sufficiently continuous or prolonged to constitute outrageous conduct); Wells v. Thomas, 569 F.Supp. 426 (E.D.Pa.1983) (demoting employee and taking away private office and secretary, giving poor performance ratings, and failing to give annual salary increase do not constitute outrageous conduct); Jackson *689v. Colonial Baking Co., 507 So.2d 1310 (Ala.1987) (reducing work schedule of employee with respiratory disability because he refused to climb a ladder and clean exhaust fans was insufficient to constitute outrageous conduct); Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82, 508 N.E.2d 72 (1987) (no outrageous conduct where, after employee was acquitted of sexual assault charges by another employee, employer moved the employee’s desk into a hallway, gave him no meaningful work, and supervisors would not talk to him).
Situations where the courts have found that sexual harassment by an employer, including unwelcome sexual advances, inferior work assignments, and failure to investigate complaints, constitutes outrageous conduct are instructive in comparison with the actions ascribed to appellant King. See Pratt v. Brown Machine Co., 855 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir. 1988) (employer required employee in dire financial need to attend church and pray and apologize to company official in spite of fact that official had subjected employee’s wife to 18 months of threatening and obscene phone calls); Pavilon v. Kaferly, 204 Ill.App.3d 235, 149 Ill.Dec. 549, 561 N.E.2d 1245 (1990) (employer’s requests for dates and sexual favors, alleged threats to kill and rape plaintiff, and unsolicited letters to plaintiffs parents and psychotherapist were sufficient basis for intentional infliction claim); Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 388 Pa.Super. 400, 565 A.2d 1170, 1184 (1989) (where Court stated “it could visualize no conduct more outrageous ... than to vent highly radioactive steam upon another”); Engrum v. Boise Southern Co., 527 So.2d 362 (La.App. 3d Cir.1988) (plaintiff stated claim where he alleged that employer repeatedly publicly threatened him, that he was fired without adequate investigation, and that paycheck was issued to him in manner which led to his arrest); Kaminski v. United Parcel Service, 120 A.D.2d 409, 501 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1986) (an employee who was threatened with prosecution and kept in a room for three hours until he signed a confession and resignation papers successfully stated a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress); but see Aquino v. Sommer Maid Creamery, Inc., 657 F.Supp. 208 (E.D.Pa.1987) (employee’s allegations that her work was scrutinized closer than other employees, that a co-worker followed her to the restroom, banged on the door and asked what she was doing, and that president of employer stared at her, called her at home to demand she report to work and berated her for low work production, were insufficient to support intentional infliction claim); Lewis v. Oregon Beauty Supply Co., 302 Or. 616, 733 P.2d 430 (1987) (allegation that employer failed to respond to sex harassment complaints was insufficient to state emotional distress claim); Ponton v. Scarfone, 468 So.2d 1009 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.), rev. denied, 478 So.2d 54 (Fla.1985) (employer’s attempts to convince female employee to have sex did not constitute outrageous conduct).
The majority opinion, after attributing all manner of “collusion,” and “retaliation” by the higher officials in the agency, finally tells us what it considers the heart of the case it weaves against King. They conclude:
Thus, the jury could find that Kidd suffered more than a delayed promotion; there was also severe emotional distress resulting from the same cause: King’s collusion with Carter in pressuring Kidd to help Carter defend against Kidd’s own OHR complaint.
Ante at 679.
There, we have it. This is the statement of the majority judges on what this case is all about. Ms. Kidd was (1) delayed beyond her eligibility date in receiving her promotion and (2) there was also severe emotional distress resulting from the same cause: King’s collusion with Carter in pressuring Kidd to help Carter defend against Kidd’s own OHR complaint. Fundamentally, this is where the majority opinion and the dissent differ on the law.
Strikingly, the majority does not deal with this court’s opinions because Thompson I, for example, and this opinion cannot be reconciled.
Secondly, the majority is there ascribing “collusion” on the part of King because he engaged in “pressuring” Edd “to help Carter defend against Edd’s own OHR complaint.” There was an effort to get her to put in writing, to aid Carter, the circumstances relating to her transfer. Yet all her *690own evidence established the transfer was agreeable to her; and in fact she had repeatedly requested in writing (in her several grievances) that she be reassigned.
It is evident that, under our decisions, and viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, as a matter of law, as established by our decisions, this case should not have been submitted to the jury, and the trial court erred in doing so. I agree with the majority that the trial court clearly erred in submitting the case on appellant Lambert to the jury. But I think it also erred as to appellant King.15
I believe this decision creates a disturbing new precedent for the workplace, and that it will have wide reverberations.
ATTACHMENT
APPENDIX TO DISSENT:
Reproduction of barely legible trial court exhibit entitled “Formal Grievance”, dated May 18, 1988.
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. I do not discuss the jurisdictional issue being more concerned about the extension of the law on this tort.
. The jury returned a verdict of about a quarter of a million dollars against the defendants jointly and severally.
. Ms. Kidd testified that she did not relate this painful injury to her doctor during several visits and so she did not support her testimony with medical records.
.Kidd testified on direct examination that just before she became employed at this agency she had checked herself into the Psychiatric Institute and was treated for two weeks and then received two more weeks of out-patient treatment.
. In footnote 23 of their opinion, the majority judges apparently wish to convey that Thompson I (which is referred to in the dissent) no longer exists as it was vacated on rehearing in order to consider a jurisdictional issue. The employment of Thompson I by the dissent relates to the discussion and resolution by the court on the merits of the charge of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Rehearing in Thompson was granted to decide the jurisdictional issue raised. Rehearing was granted therefore on other grounds, i.e., on grounds not relating to the merits of the intentional infliction charge, and the latter issue was not discussed on rehearing. Logically, the vitality of the court’s discussion on the merits issue remains. Nothing in Thompson II questioned it.
So, Thompson I, is utilized by the dissent as a matter of reason, not, of course, for a binding effect. From the standpoint of reason, the merits discussion there does exist. Also, even as a matter of judicial economy it would be unfortunate to waste that learned discussion of the merits issue in Thompson I.
. As indicated, Ms. Kidd later received the grade promotion.
. The judgment against appellant Lambert is be-big reversed, and I most certainly concur in this.
. Interestingly, the majority judges also use this term "retaliation” in their opinion.
. Later on, however, she got her wish and was reassigned and sometime later was promoted.
. It is rather interesting that this statement is made several months after the "sexual harassment" she later on described in a complaint to the Office of Human Resources (OHR).
. It is of incidental interest to note that the Office of Human Resources of the District Government, to which she had made her charge of sexual harassment by Mr. Carter, ruled that she had not supplied probable cause to support her charge. Having lost there, Ms. Kidd then appealed the decision of the Office of Human Resources to the City Administrator. The City Administrator upheld the decision of the Office of Human Resources. Having been unsuccessful in the statutorily provided administrative process, Ms. Kidd next turned to the courts. She filed a complaint in this proceeding and, after a jury trial, judgment was entered in her favor against Mr. Carter (who, as stated, is not a party on this appeal) and judgments were entered against appellants King and Lambert on a charge of intentional infliction of emotional distress on her.
. The majority charges that Ms. Kidd returned from leave to find herself "locked out of her office.” In the next sentence, however, it becomes evident that while on leave her transfer had become effected.
. It is doubtful that government employees necessarily receive grade raises at the point they are legally eligible for it.
.The majority favors us with an inspiring and scholarly exposition relating to Title VII and sexual harassment. Yet, there are no legal issues on Title VII or sexual harassment in this appeal. The charge is intentional infliction of emotional distress.
. Appendix comprised of Ms. Kidd’s complaint to appellant King is attached to this opinion.