dissenting:
I dissent. The majority acknowledges the general standard set forth in Maravich v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 350 Pa.Super. 392, 504 A.2d 896 (1985), that “whether an innocent co-insured will be allowed to recover under an insurance policy after another co-insured has intentionally destroyed the insured property depends on whether the interests of the co-insureds are joint or severable.” Majority Opinion at 337. Yet at the same time, the majority ignores the clear and unambiguous language in the definitional section of the policy that establishes that “[e]ach person ... is a separate insured under this policy ...” (emphasis in original).
The cases cited by the majority do tend to distinguish between joint and severable interests in an insurance policy *342based upon the use in the relevant exclusionary clauses of “an” and “any” (suggesting joint interests) or “the” (suggesting severable interests). However, the application of this rule of construction was necessary because none of the cited cases involved policies with a clear pronouncement that the co-insureds’ interests were in fact separate.
In this case, the language in the definitional section of the policy expressly establishes that the interests of the co-insureds are severable. I believe that this definition is the operative phrase, and it certainly is more meaningful than the articles “an”, “any” or “the”.1
I would affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings, because under the unambiguous language of the insurance policy, the innocent co-insureds are entitled to recover their share of the insurance proceeds.
. At the very least, the apparent conflict between the language in the definitional section and the use of "an”/"any” in the exclusionary clause creates an ambiguity which must be resolved in favor of the insured. See, e.g., Koenig v. Progressive Ins. Co., 410 Pa.Super. 232, 599 A.2d 690 (1991).