dissenting.
I dissent. The majority holds that appellant has waived any claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting *356to certain remarks made by the assistant district attorney during closing argument to the jury. The majority asserts that appellant’s post-conviction counsel failed to preserve this issue, however, the issue was specifically raised in counsel’s written PCHA petition; was raised at the PCHA hearing; was briefed by appellant’s post-conviction counsel and answered by the prosecution; and was considered by the PCHA court.
Appellant’s amended PCHA petition stated, in part,
“Counsel was ineffective in that he failed to raise and/or preserve basic and fundamental issues and errors throughout the selection of the jury, as well as at the trial and at posttrial and appellate proceedings, all of which were without a rational basis, nor which could be considered trial strategy designed to effectuate the best interests of the client: specifically, no exception to denial of request to ask voir dire questions relating to gang attitude; counsel failed to raise on appeal the issue of self-defense; counsel failed to present and argue, at the time of trial, and further failed to raise, on appeal, the defense of mitigation, based on defendant’s consumption of wine prior to the alleged incident, all of which was discussed by the Assistant District Attorney at the time of trial; counsel failed to raise and preserve on appeal issues of inflammatory summation and other prosecutorial misconduct.” (Emphasis added.)
The entire record of the trial, — including the prosecutor’s allegedly inflammatory remarks — was incorporated by reference and made part of the record of the PCHA hearing by joint motion of counsel and acquiescence of the Court. In its Memorandum Opinion denying, in part, appellant’s requested post-conviction relief, the court stated,
“An evidentiary hearing was held at which time defendant was represented by counsel other than his trial counsel. After a careful consideration of the entire record and the applicable law, we are convinced that defendant’s petition must be granted in part and denied in part.” (Emphasis added.)
*357In making that decision, based on the record, the post-conviction court had not only the benefit of appellant’s petition, quoted above, but also, appellant’s Memorandum of Law which specifically raised the various allegedly inflammatory statements, as well as a letter from the prosecution replying to appellant’s memorandum. In this letter, the prosecution did not contend that the issue was waived because not specifically raised at the hearing, but instead, addressed the merits of appellant’s allegation, saying,
“Petitioner claims that his trial counsel failed to object to the summation of the prosecutor, which he now alleges was improper. An examination of the summation of the prosecutor as a whole shows that, contrary to petitioner’s claim, the prosecutor’s summation was reasonable under the circumstances. Moreover, any error in the prosecutor’s charge, in view of the direct evidence of petitioner’s guilt, constituted harmless error. Compare this summation with that found in Commonwealth v. Martin Valle, -Pa.Superior Ct.-, No. 1406, Oct. Term, 1975 (filed April 22, 1976). The remarks here were well within the reasonable bounds of advocacy.”
Clearly therefore, appellant’s post-conviction counsel did all that was necessary to preserve the issue for our review.
Furthermore, my examination of the PCHA proceeding (including the prosecution’s remarks) convinces me that trial counsel could have had no reasonable basis for failing to object to them and therefore appellant was denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial. The district attorney’s summation to the jury included the following statements,
“(1) ‘He didn’t even know who he was going to go out and kill that night. He just wanted to go out and kill somebody.’ (N.T. 137).
(2) ‘Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, if the Commonwealth did not produce any more evidence than Ralph Pippin, Michael Wilson would be guilty of murder.’ (N.T. 141).
*358(3) ‘I’m going to ask you to think when I am reading this, have you ever heard of anything more premeditated, anything more willful, anything more deliberate than asking for a gun, walking up a street, knowing its loaded, looking for somebody, you are not sure who, to kill and then going ahead and pumping two bullets into him and then running away? It’s not an argument. It’s more of those things, . . . This is a pre-meditated, willful, deliberate killing.’ (N.T. 159-160).
(4) ‘I want to leave you with one thought. I have a feeling that each of you in this jury box has been thinking in the last two days where was my loved one on October 10; . What if he happened to be on the corner of 16th and Thompson Streets, in Philadelphia, instead of Gregory Davis? . . . That person would have been dead just like Gregory Davis is dead today, because Michael Wilson didn’t care who he shot that night. He was going to get somebody from Seybert Street. Michael Wilson killed Gregory Davis. He killed him premeditately, willfully, deliberately.’ (N.T. 162-163).
(5) ‘Now it is true, as Mr. Kahn said, and I am sure Judge Weinrott will instruct you, that the defendant has an absolute constitutional right not to take the stand . However, the defense called no other witnesses and by that, of course, I mean friends to contradict anything you heard over the last two days . . . There is only one version of this case, the true version, it’s the Commonwealth’s version and that’s the only evidence in this case.” (N.T. 139).
(6) ‘Mr. Kahn would have you believe that the defendant might not have known what he was doing; might have made an involuntary statement. You will see C-8 which Detective Richardson, it’s uncontradicted, of course, said that Michael Wilson not only understood but, in fact, wrote in his answers in his own handwriting in this Exhibit C-8. ...” (N.T. 152).
(7) ‘Now, very briefly, defense counsel has argued, even though there is no defense evidence in this case, that Michael Wilson’s statement to the police should be con*359sidered involuntary. Ladies and Gentlemen of the jury, I am sure you realize the irony of that. There's been no testimony that in any way this was involuntary for you have your own imagination to think of it to say yes, it isn’t voluntary, because all the evidence in this case that you have heard from this witness stand was that he was warned as soon as he was arrested . . . ’ (N.T. 156).
(8) ‘. . . While the Commonwealth says this without a doubt is first degree murder, we are not seeking the death penalty in this case.’ ” (N.T. 159).
These remarks plainly violated our frequent admonitions against expression, by the prosecutor of a personal opinion as to the defendant’s guilt or credibility, see e. g., Commonwealth v. Hubbard, 472 Pa. 259, 372 A.2d 687 (1977), as well as the prohibition against commenting on the defendant’s right to remain silent and not testify at trial, see e. g., Commonwealth v. Davis, 452 Pa. 171, 305 A.2d 715 (1973). Notwithstanding these transgressions, appellant’s trial counsel sat mute, neither objecting and asking for cautionary instructions, nor requesting a mistrial.
Such remarks could not have failed to prejudice appellant in the eyes of the jury, and I would, therefore, reverse the judgment of sentence and order that appellant be awarded a new trial.
ROBERTS, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.