The opinion of the court was delivered by
Sullivan, J.The underlying suit was brought by Stanley C. Yan Ness, Public Advocate of the State of New Jersey, against the Borough of Deal charging the Borough with illegal and discriminatory practices in the maintenance and operation of its publicly owned beaches and related facilities. The suit was bottomed on this Court’s 1972 decision in Bor. of Neptune v. Bor. of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N. J. 296, which held that a coastline municipality, in the maintenance and operation of its public beaches, could not discriminate in any respect between residents and nonresidents.
Deal is a municipality in Monmouth County bordering on the Atlantic Ocean for its entire one-mile eastern boundary. Only about 1325 feet of that coastline is suitable for beach and bathing purposes. This area is municipally owned and is divided into three sections. The north beach is called the *176Phillips Avenue Pavilion Beach and extends for some 475 feet along the ocean. It has bathhouses, rest rooms, a play area and sun deck. The facilities are available on a daily or seasonal basis at fixed charges which are constant for residents as well as nonresidents.1 This beach area has been dedicated by the municipality to general public use.
Just to the south of the Pavilion area is the Deal Casino, also municipally owned, but operated on a restricted basis. The Casino has two swimming pools, a snack bar-restaurant, rest rooms, bathhouses and deluxe cabanas, as well as facilities for shuffleboard, ping-pong, basketball and the like. Only Deal residents or property owners can obtain membership in the Casino.
The beach area in front of the Casino, which extends approximately 4)20 feet along the ocean, is dedicated for the use of residents of Deal and, except for a 50-foot wide strip along the high water line, is reserved for the use of Casino members and guests. Prior to construction of the Casino in 1956, this area consisted of a bluff about 20-30 feet high which was unsuitable as a bathing beach. As a part of the Casino project, the bluff was bulldozed and graded to form a dry beach area. Approximately $800,000 was spent by Deal to construct the Casino and beach. Maintenance expenses are paid out of the membership fees.
There is no restriction on the right of the public to bathe and swim in the ocean in front of the Casino. The public is also allowed to use a 50-foot wide strip of the Casino’s dry beach area extending along the high water mark. However, commencing about 50 feet west of the high water mark, the dry sand area in front of the Casino is roped off and reserved for the use of ‘Casino members.
*177To the south of the Casino is the municipally owned surfing and boating beach approximately 430 feet in width. This area is used by bathers from both the Pavilion and the Casino, as well as by the general public.
The original suit had as its object the opening to the public of the Casino memberships and facilities, as well as the restricted dry beach area in front of the Casino. It was asserted that these facilities came under the Public Trust Doctrine as applied by this Court in Avon. The trial judge, in an opinion reported at 139 N. J. Super. 83 (Ch. Div. 1975), sustained the proposition that these municipally owned facilities, including the beach area, must be made available to nonresidents of Deal on the same basis as to residents. However, the specific relief ordered,2 was not rested on the Public Trust Doctrine but, rather, based on the concept of municipal power and the requirement of equal protection.
The Appellate Division reversed. Its opinion is reported at 145 N. J. Super. 368 (1976). As to the Casino, it held that limiting membership in the Casino to residents of Deal did not deny equal protection since the classification was reasonable under the circumstances. It found in N. J. S. A. 40 -.61-22.21, the statute empowering a municipality to build and operate a swimming pool facility, authorization to establish membership qualifications as long as they were reasonable.
It also held that the beach in front of the Casino was not subject to our holding in Avon as it had not been dedicated to the general public’s use and, since the remaining beach area made available for the use of the general public was adequate for the enjoyment of public trust rights, the Appellate Division sustained the power of the municipality to *178restrict use of the Casino beach to Casino membership. This Court granted certification on application by the Public Advocate. 74 N. J. 262 (1977).
At the argument of the appeal before this Court, the Public Advocate abandoned that part of the case which claimed that the Casino facilities were subject to the Public Trust Doctrine and must be opened to the public. His sole contention now is that the dry beach area immediately in front of the Casino is subject to the doctrine and should lie available to the general public so that there may be a proper enjoyment of public trust rights. This is the only issue before us.
In Bor. of Neptune v. Bor. of Avon-by-the-Sea, supra, as heretofore noted, we held that an Oceanside municipality, in the maintenance and operation of its public beaches, could not discriminate in any respect between residents and nonresidents. There involved was Avon’s asserted right to charge nonresidents higher fees than residents for the use of its public beach. Our ruling was bottomed on an expanded application of the Public Trust Doctrine, the original purpose of which was to preserve for all the public natural water resources for navigation and fishing. In Avon, supra, 61 N. J. at 303-310, there is discussed in some detail the origins of the doctrine, its history, development and modern connotations, citing numerous authoritative articles and critiques.
The Public Trust Doctrine has always been recognized in New Jersey. It is deeply engrained in our common law, Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N. J. L. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1821), due, no doubt, i» New Jersey’s unique location on the Atlantic Ocean, Delaware and New York Bays with numerous rivers and tributaries emptying into these bodies, resulting in extensive shorelines and considerable tidal waters and tidal lands in the State. New Jersey beaches adjacent to its tidal areas are world famous because of their suitability for bathing, surf fishing and other forms of recreation.
In Avon, this Court had no difficulty in finding that in this day and age the public rights in tidal lands were not *179limited to the ancient prerogatives of fishing and navigation, but extended as well to recreational uses including .bathing, swimming and other shore activities. 61 N. J. at 309. In so holding, we noted that the Public Trust Doctrine, like all common law principles, was not fixed or static, but should be molded and extended to meet changing conditions and the needs of the public the doctrine was created to benefit. Id.
With regard to municipally owned beaches, we said this:
* * * at least where the upland sand area is owned by a municipality — a political subdivision and creature of the state — and dedicated to public beach purposes, a modern court must take the view that the public trust doctrine dictates that the beach and the ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference and that any contrary state or municipal action is impermissible.
Id. at 308-309.
This ruling is fully applicable to the present appeal. In Avon, contrary to defendants’ contention herein, we were not limiting our ruling to the beach area between low and high water —• the wet beach area. We said and we meant that, in New Jersey, a proper application of the Public Trust Doctrine requires that the municipally owned upland sand area adjacent to the tidal waters must be open to all on equal terms and without preference. See Note, 26 Rutgers L. Rev. 179, 181 (1972). Of course, the municipality, in the exercise of its police power and in the interest of the public health and safety, would have the right to adopt reasonable regulations as to the use and enjoyment of the beach area.
Our ruling here, as in Avon, is concerned with municipally owned open beaches. We are not called upon to deal with beaches on which permanent improvements may have been built, or beaches as to which a claim of private ownership is asserted.
The fact that Deal has never dedicated the Casino beach to the use of the general public is immaterial. The beach is dedicated to recreational uses including bathing, swimming, surf fishing and other shore activities. If the area, *180which is Tinder municipal ownership and dedication, is subject to the Public Trust Doctrine, and we hold that it is, all have the right to use and enjoy it. Deal cannot frustrate the public right by limiting its dedication of use to residents of Deal. Nor may it allocate to the public on a limited basis, rights which, under the doctrine, the public inherently has in full.
Nor do we think it significant that the area in front of the Casino in its natural state, was unsuitable for normal beach activities and that a bluff had to be levelled and graded in order to create a beach area. Whether natural, or man-made, the beach is an adjunct to ocean swimming and bathing and is subject to the Public Trust Doctrine.
Our ruling herein is intended to encompass normal beach areas. We are not presented with special circumstances such as an unusually large dry beach which might call for a modified application of our ruling herein.
The dissent herein, expressing uncertainty as to the extent of the Public Trust Doctrine, would not, at this time, hold that it applied to municipally owned dry sand beaches. However, this State is rapidly approaching a crisis as to the availability to the public of its priceless beach areas. The situation will not be helped by restrained judicial pronouncements. Prompt and decisive action by the Court is needed.
The dissent also expresses concern that in Avon the Court appeared to deny the Legislature power to alter the status of property impressed with the public trust. Avon, by way of dictum, does say that “¡state * * * action,” which is contrary to the concept that beach and ocean waters must be open to all on equal terms, “is impermissible,” 61 N. J. at 309, and that statements in New Jersey cases of an unlimited power in the Legislature to convey such trust lands to private persons “may well be too broad.” 61 N. J. at 308. This proposition, the dissent asserts, would place public trust property beyond legislative control and regulation, and cast doubt upon the validity of titles to public trust lands which *181have been or may hereafter be conveyed by the State. We agree that the question is troublesome, but it is not involved in the present case and we leave a more definite resolution of it to specific facts and circumstances where it can be dealt with directly.
The last ground of dissent suggests that the inclusion of municipally owned dry sand beaches within the Public Trust Doctrine — making them at once indiscriminately available to all members of the public — constitutes a taking for which the municipality would be entitled to compensation from the State. No such claim is made herein by Deal, nor has the issue been briefed or argued. We, therefore, hold the question for a more appropriate case. However, our adjudication that the Deal municipal dry sand beach is subject to the Public Trust Doctrine does not create a public right where none existed previously. It merely gives recognition to the existence of such right. To say that this adjudication constitutes a compensable taking is questionable at best.
In summary, we hold that the municipally owned beach in front of the Deal Casino must be opened to- the general public on the same basis as the Pavilion beach.3 That portion of the Appellate Division judgment which approved and sanctioned the municipal restriction on the use of the Casino beach to Casino members is reversed.
Pavilion charges originally were higher for nonresidents than for residents. This was one of the discriminatory practices which the Public Advocate challenged. The trial judge ruled that the charges had to be the same for both residents and nonresidents. The Borough, accordingly, has amended its ordinance to equalize these charges and the matter is no longer an issue in the case.
The trial judge ordered that the Casino facilities and beach be opened to nonresidents as well as residents, and memberships allocated among the applicants on a lottery basis. He also required the Casino, up to a safe limit of people, to provide for daily rates and admissions to Casino facilities.
The Public Advocate represents that there is adequate public access to the Casino beach from the Pavilion beach immediately to the north and the surfing and boating beach immediately to the south, and that direct access through the Casino itself is unnecessary.