OPINION ANNOUNCING JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
NIGRO, Justice.Kent Jones was injured and his wife was killed when a car being pursued by the police collided with his car. Jones sued the City of Philadelphia, Officer Charles Chieffo, Commissioner Willie Williams and Philadelphia Mayor Wilson Goode (Appellants) to recover wrongful death and survival damages and damages for his own injuries.
The trial court granted Appellants’ motion for summary judgment and held that the fleeing driver’s criminal acts relieved them of liability as a matter of law. The Commonwealth Court reversed in a 4-3 decision and held that a jury must decide Appellants’ liability. We affirm.
On November 12, 1989 at about 2:00 a.m., Officer Chieffo saw three cars in a row disregard a stop sign and then a red light. Officer Chieffo began to follow them. He heard a gunshot and saw the flash of a shot fired from the second car towards the first car. Officer Chieffo activated his dome lights. He tried to activate his siren but it did not work. Officer Chieffo alerted his supervisor of a pursuit and chased the cars for about 13 blocks. He saw the flash of a second shot. Officer Chieffo lost sight of the first car but followed the second and third cars. When the cars ran another red light, the third car collided with Kent Jones’ car. Officer Chieffo, with the help of another police officer, chased the third car’s driver on foot and apprehended him.
Jones testified at his deposition that as hé entered the intersection, he saw a car without headlights and then saw a police car about 15 to 20 feet behind it with flashing lights. Jones estimated that the cars were travelling 70 to 80 miles per hour. Jones applied his brakes but could not avoid the *49car. The driver did not try to slow down and struck Jones’ car.
A Philadelphia Police Department directive requires that officers report pursuits to a supervisor by radio. Upon receipt of a report, the supervisor evaluates the circumstances, determines if the pursuit should continue, and radios a decision to the pursuing officer. The directive requires that officers in pursuit operate their emergency equipment at all times. Police Captain Thomas Doyle testified at his deposition that Officer Chieffo should not have pursued the car because his car did not have a working siren. He believed that a supervisor should have terminated the pursuit.
The parties dispute whether Officer Chieffo terminated the pursuit before the accident. They stipulated for the purpose of summary judgment, however, that if the police car had a working siren, Jones would have heard it and avoided the accident. They also stipulated that the Police Department knew that a number of cars that could be involved in pursuits did not have working sirens. Appellants moved for summary judgment based upon governmental immunity. They claimed that the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8541 (1982), precludes holding them liable for the criminal or negligent acts of the fleeing driver.1
Relying upon our decision in Dickens v. Horner, 531 Pa. 127, 611 A.2d 693 (1992), the trial court held that Appellants are not liable for the fleeing driver’s acts. The Commonwealth Court, however, found our decisions in Crowell v. City of Philadelphia, 531 Pa. 400, 613 A.2d 1178 (1992), and Powell v. Drumheller, 539 Pa. 484, 653 A.2d 619 (1995), controlling. The Commonwealth Court held that a jury must decide whether Appellants’ negligence was a substantial factor causing Jones’ harm and whether the driver’s act was a superseding *50cause precluding governmental liability. Having granted Appellants’ Petition for Allowance of Appeal, we conclude that the Commonwealth Court properly held that Appellants are not immune from liability.2
In Crowell v. City of Philadelphia, 531 Pa. 400, 613 A.2d 1178 (1992), a drunk driver followed a sign with an arrow that directed traffic to turn. The arrow was wrongly placed and the driver crossed into another lane of traffic and struck a family’s car. The family sued the driver and the municipality for negligence. A jury found them both negligent. Although the municipality claimed on appeal that it was immune from liability under section 8541 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, this Court disagreed. 531 Pa. at 410-13, 613 A.2d at 1183-85. It explained that a municipality cannot be vicariously liable for a third party’s harmful acts under section 8541 of the Act. Id. However, a municipality can be liable despite the presence of a third party if it is jointly negligent. Id. Thus, the municipality was liable for its own negligent act of misplacing the sign.
Here, Jones alleges in part that Officer Chieffo negligently pursued the car without a working siren and that his supervisor negligently failed to terminate the pursuit. He also contends that the municipality neghgently failed to maintain the vehicles. Like in Crowell, a jury could find that Appellants are jointly hable with the driver and that their own neghgence was a substantial factor causing Jones’ injuries.
The conclusion that Appellants are not immune from liability is further supported by Powell v. Drumheller, 539 Pa. 484, 653 A.2d 619 (1995). In Powell, a decedent’s estate sued a drunk driver and the Commonwealth following a car accident. The estate alleged that the Commonwealth neghgently de*51signed the road where the accident occurred. Relying upon Crowell, the Court held that the Commonwealth was not immune from liability. 539 Pa. at 492-93, 653 A.2d at 622-23. Because a jury could find that the Commonwealth’s actions were a substantial factor causing the harm, the fact that the drunk driver was also a cause, did not relieve the Commonwealth of liability. Id. The Court rejected the Commonwealth’s argument that the driver’s criminal negligence was a superseding cause relieving it of liability as a matter of law. Id. at 495, 653 A.2d at 624. It explained that a jury usually should decide whether an act is so extraordinary that it is a superseding cause. Id3}
Appellants argue that Dickens v. Horner, 531 Pa. 127, 611 A.2d 693 (1992), decided the same day as Crowell and relied upon by the trial court below, dictates that Appellants are not liable when a driver’s criminal acts cause harm during a police pursuit. In Dickens, like in this case, a driver hit another motorist during a police pursuit. The injured motorist sued the police officer and the municipality. The motorist alleged that the municipality, through its employee, negligently decided to initiate the high-speed pursuit, negligently failed to follow accepted police practices for pursuits, and otherwise failed to exercise due care. See Dickens v. Upper Chichester Township, 123 Pa. Commw. 226, 553 A.2d 510 (1989)(setting forth the allegations in the complaint).
While the lower court overruled preliminary objections to the Dickens complaint, the Court reversed and the case was dismissed, holding that the officer and municipality were immune from suit because section 8541 of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act precludes governmental liability for the criminal or negligent acts of a third party. 531 Pa. at 130-31, 611 A.2d at 695. The Court relied upon Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118 (1987), where section 8541 of the Act was found to be consistent with the general *52rule that certain third-party acts are superseding causes thát absolve another actor from liability. Id.
Appellants are correct that this case is similar to Dickens. We conclude, however, that Dickens was wrongly decided and overrule it. We cannot hold as a matter of law that Appellants’ alleged negligence was not a substantial factor causing Jones’ injuries. A jury must make this determination. Similarly, Dickens should have gone beyond the pleadings stage to discover whether there was support for the plaintiffs allegation that the officer negligently failed to follow pursuit procedures. This result is consistent with Crowell and Powell, which establish that a governmental party is not immune from liability when its negligence, along with a third party’s negligence, causes harm.4
We therefore affirm the Commonwealth Court’s decision reversing the grant of summary judgment for Appellants. Jurisdiction relinquished.
NEWMAN, J., did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case. CAPPY, J., files a concurring opinion. CASTILLE, J., files a dissenting opinion in which ZAPPALA, J., joins.. Section 8541 provides that no local agency shall be liable for damages for personal injuries caused by "any act of the local agency or an employee thereof or any other person " (emphasis added). The Court has construed this section as precluding governmental liability for harm caused by third parties. Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 362-63, 523 A.2d 1118, 1124 (1987).
. In reviewing a trial court’s grant of summary judgment, an appellate court may disturb the decision if there has been an error of law or a manifest abuse of discretion. BLaST Intermediate Unit 17 v. CNA Insurance Co., 544 Pa. 66, 70, 674 A.2d 687, 689 (1996). Summary judgment is warranted where the pleadings, depositions, discovery responses and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa. R. Civ. P. 1035.
. Powell involved the Sovereign Immunity Act, which does not expressly preclude governmental liability for certain third-party acts like the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act. The Court stated that the principle of joint liability applies under both Acts. 539 Pa. at 492, 653 A.2d at 622.
. While we hold that Appellants are not immune under 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 8541, we have not considered whether Jones' claims satisfy the other requirements of the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act.